

USFG should substantially reduce deployment of its (non-covert) military forces in one or more of the following: South Korea, Japan, Afghanistan Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Oman, (Iraq), (Germany), (Turkey), (Central Asia)

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Introduction

The basic idea behind this topic is for the affirmative to very substantially reduce the presence of U.S. military forces overseas. There are four major issues related to the topic.

First, where to reduce them. While there are some general arguments against the overseas deployment (force/economic/military overstretch, counterbalancing), most of the arguments are region specific. I strongly feel that any resolution would need to identify particular areas of the globe from where the forces would be reduced. How many regions/countries should be included?

Second, exclusion of nuclear. The 2009-10 college topic focuses on reducing the roles and missions of U.S. nuclear forces. In order to avoid at least a partial repeat of the topic, reducing nuclear weapons should not be a plan option for the affirmative. Of all of the tasks, this is probably the easiest one to accomplish.

Third, definition and selection of terms. I think this will be the most difficult task. There are two critical definitional issues. First, the regions. Terms like the "Middle East, East Asia, Central Asia" have widely varying definitions. If we chose regions, we may want to list specific countries, though the list could quickly become larger than we wish for a resolution. Second, what specifically do we want the affirmative to reduce – "troops," "forces," "bases," etc.

The majority of the paper will focus on suggesting some answers to these three questions. In answering the questions I arrived at the follow resolution: USFG should substantially reduce deployment of its non-covert military forces in one or more of the following: South Korea, Japan, Afghanistan Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Oman, (Iraq), (Germany), (Turkey), (Central Asia)

Final sections with general affirmative and negative arguments, evidence, and bibliographic references, follows

Where?

The U.S. has some type of military presence in close to 60% of the countries of the world, and our presence is geographically scattered.

The “spread” of the presence depends on what specific element of said presence is being referred to.

The U.S. has approximately 900 military “**facilities**” – temporary or otherwise -- scattered around the world.

> The Base Structure Report is the most insightful source on US military presence around the World. In the 2007 REport, the DoD lists 909 military facilities in other countries and territories. Please be advised though, that the Report does not include: - Temporary facilities (such as all military facilities in Iraq and Afghanistan) - Very small or 'cheap' sites. - Some facilities that are not owned by US forces but property of the 'host' government. This is the case with several NATO deployments in Europe. - Several known bases whose locations are undisclosed due to 'national security reasons'. US military presences in the Philippines and Israel are examples. (http://www.no-bases.org/show_page/resources#documents)

According to (<http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=5564>), the U.S. military has “**bases**” in 63 countries and there are 255, 065 U.S. military personnel deployed overseas. Tom Englehardt , founder of the American Empire Project

(http://www.alternet.org/audits/97913/the_us_has_761_military_bases_across_the_planet%2C_and_we_simply_never_talk_about_it/) says there are 761 U.S. military bases world-wide.

There are four different types of bases: Air Force, Army or Land, Naval Bases, and Communication and Spy bases

There is a much more limited list of military “**installations**,” all of which are listed as being in allied countries , such as Japan, Germany, and South Korea (see Appendix)

A list of military **deployments** is available here (<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/deploy.htm>) – attached to this paper.

There is also the issue of **covert military operations**. For example, “The Citizens’ Peace Watch fact-finding mission to Zamboanga City and Sulu from February 18-21 found proof reinforcing concerns that the US has established military basing in the Philippines; the US is involved in actual combat operations in the country; the US military has, in complicity with the Philippine military, committed human rights violations in the Philippines; the US is conducting operations outside the control of the Philippine government and military; the US military’s so-called humanitarian projects are mere cover for military operations that do not benefit the local population; US basing and intervention in the country is contributing to insecurity and leading to an escalation in conflict “(http://www.no-bases.org/show_page/resources#documents) See also: Unconventional Warfare: Are U.S. Special Forces engage in an “offensive war” in the Philipines”
<http://www.focusweb.org/pdf/unconventionalwarfare.pdf>

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Of course, since these operations are covert, it is not like there will be a public list of these operations, nor will they be included in a list of "military deployments"

This is obviously quite a spread, but I'll suggest some places for the resolution to focus on based on the following criteria:

Size – I think we should choose areas/countries where there are a significant number of troops deployed. This increases both the likelihood that there will be a quality debate in the literature, that there will be solvency advocates, that the negative will have to reduce a lot of troops in that area/country to be a "substantial" reduction, and that a substantial reduction will help the negative with disadvantage links.

Controversy – Where is the literature with the most controversy concerning U.S. overseas military deployments? This is not be completely consistent with the first criteria, but it should be given consideration.

Uniqueness – We want the affirmative to only be able to reduce deployments where deployments are not being reduced now. For example, the U.S. is already reducing U.S. military deployments in Iraq.

Potential countries based on size

Iraq (largest). My initial thought was to exclude Iraq for uniqueness reasons (we are withdrawing some now, making DAs NU), but many troops will stay, and it is hard for the Aff to access the "military presence in the Middle East bad" arguments without being able to withdraw troops from Iraq. Currently I'm leading towards including Iraq, but I need to do some more research.

Germany. QUESTIONABLE. I don't know how controversial it is for the U.S. to have military deployments in Germany, though I'm sure there is some evidence that says that those deployments are bad. Also, there are uniqueness issues, as the U.S. has pulled some forces from Germany for deployment in Iraq.

South Korea. INCLUDED. Always contentious, a "hot" area in the news, lots of troops there now.

Japan. INCLUDED. Always contentious, a "hot" area in the news, lots of troops there now.

Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain. INCLUDED. Always contentious, a "hot" area in the news, lots of troops there now. *Does the U.S. have military deployments in Saudi Arabia?* Not according to this list, but I'm going to check elsewhere.

UAE/Oman. QUESTIONABLE. Very few troops (570 & 270), though Djibouti only has 800. One argument in favor of including – the affirmative may want to reduce in Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, UAE, and Oman and run a "big stick" affirmative.

Afghanistan. Included. The U.S. has an extensive military presence in Afghanistan, and that presence is increasing and it is highly controversial.

Pakistan. QUESTIONABLE. We don't have a lot of troops in Pakistan. Most of those troops, it seems, support our operations in Afghanistan via border policing.

Djibouti. EXCLUDED. It's a small number of troops, and (more importantly) we just debated Africa.

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Turkey. QUESTIONABLE. Need more information.

Central Asia/Central Asia. I have to check on the status of this. I know we have military relationships there, but nothing is listed on this chart/. I will say that given that this topic is already geographically large, excluding that would probably not be a terrible idea.

Based on this list, I would support a resolution along these lines...reduce X in....South Korea, Japan, Afghanistan
Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Oman, (Germany), (Turkey), (Central Asia)

What?

The next question is what do we want the affirmative to reduce? Facilities, bases, installations, forces, deployments, covert military operations, etc?

This part of the paper needs more work that will be done in the next few days, but I think it is important to establish a couple of things at the outset.

First, we need a term that is relevant/appropriate for all of the countries that are chosen. For example, for diplomatic reasons, we are very cautious as to what we refer to our arrangements in Iraq are and at least do not refer to them as "installations" and we probably do not refer to them as "bases." I don't think (need to check) we officially refer to what we have in Afghanistan as "bases" either.

Second, ideally, I think we should have a term that excludes covert operations. These operations give the negative little ground except to say that the particular operation is good. By design, covert operations do not link to geopolitical arguments or politics arguments. If we cannot find such term, we might want to say "non-covert" in the paper.

Third, we need to balance breadth issues. Broader terms make more sense if the list of the countries is smaller.

Fourth, terms need to match the literature/solvency advocates. I do think that sometimes we are in search of the "holy grail" here because these terms are often used more loosely in the in the literature than what is intended, but we should make sure that at least a couple of official/government sources define the terms in a way that is inclusive as to what we want.

Fifth, we need to decide how much emphasis we want to put on weapons systems (missile defense) vs troop deployments vs both (need infrastructure) to deploy missile defense (seems to be included in "deployments")

I'm leaning toward "substantially reduce deployment of military forces in one or more of the following:

How?

The “how” question is a vague one in my mind, but it is driven by the desire to reduce things like deployment tempos (how often particular troops are deployed).

- <http://www.army.mil/-newsreleases/2008/04/10/8420-army-deployments-to-centcom-return-to-12-months/index.html>

I haven't yet come up with a good way to exclude this.

General Advantages

Anti-Americanism -- Large overseas deployments trigger anti-Americanism

David Deptula is a Lieutenant General and Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, U.S. Air Force, Winter 2009, Orbis, p.

Another trend is that the deployment of large numbers of U.S. forces on foreign soil is increasingly at odds with securing America's goals and objectives. Consider the array of domestic repercussions resulting from ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.² Invariably, anti-American backlash plays out on the world stage any time U.S. military forces are involved in the affairs of a sovereign state, no matter how justifiable.³ Moreover, large deployments of U.S. force may create destabilizing effects within the very state or region they are intended to secure.⁴ Such second- and third-order effects, which even our allies recognize, increasingly result any time the United States exercises power unilaterally. Such trends are unlikely to subside in the future, particularly given the growing transparency of the information age. An implication to consider is moving toward force structure options that project power without projecting mass with all its related challenges and vulnerability. It is also likely that force deployments will increasingly confront antiaccess challenges and strategies. Few states can contest U.S. military power in force-on-force combat; fewer still will try. Rather, the means by which our adversaries will attempt to counter our strengths are likely be efforts designed to counter our presence.

collapse of primacy is inevitable by 2030.

Christopher LAYNE, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute, **2007** ["The Case Against the American Empire," *American Empire: A Debate*, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415952034, p. 64-65 //BATMAN]

Can the United States Be Caught? Up to a point, the primacists are correct. In terms of hard power, there is a yawning gap between the United States and the next-ranking powers. It will take some time before any other state emerges as a true "peer competitor" of the United States. Nevertheless, **at some point within the next decade or two, new great power rivals to the United States will emerge.** To put it slightly differently, **American primacy cannot be sustained indefinitely. The relative power position of great powers is dynamic, not static, which means that at any point in time some states are gaining in relative power while others are losing it. Thus,** as Paul Kennedy has observed, **no great power ever has been able "to remain permanently ahead of all others, because that would imply a freezing of the differentiated pattern of growth rates, technological advance, and military developments which has existed since time immemorial."**³⁶ **Even the most ardent primacists know this to be true, which is why they concede that American primacy won't last forever. Indeed, the leading primacists acknowledge, that—at best—the United States will not be able to hold onto its primacy much beyond 2030. There are indications, however, that American primacy could end much sooner than that. Already there is evidence suggesting that new great powers are in the process of emerging.** This is what the current debate in the United States about the implications of China's rise is all about. But China isn't the only factor in play, and **transition from U.S. primacy to multipolarity may be much closer than primacists want to admit.** For example, in its survey of likely international developments up until 2020, the CIA's National Intelligence Council's report Mapping the Global Future notes:

The likely emergence of China and India as new major global players—similar to the rise of Germany in the 19th century and the United States in the early 20th century—will transform the geopolitical landscape, with impacts potentially as dramatic as those of the previous two. In the same way that commentators refer to the 1900s as the American Century, the early 21st century may be seen as the time when some in the developing world led by China and India came into their Own.

In a similar vein, a recent study by the CIA's Strategic Assessment Group projects that by 2020 both China (which Mapping the Global Future pegs as "by any measure a first-rate military power" around 2020) and the European Union will

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come close to matching the United States in terms of their respective shares of world power.³⁸ For sure, there are always potential pitfalls in projecting current trends several decades into the future (not least is that it is not easy to convert economic power into effective military power). But **if the ongoing shift in the distribution of relative power continues, new poles of power in the international system are likely to emerge during the next decade or two. The real issue is not if American primacy will end, but how soon it will end.**

Terrorism – Overseas deployments trigger terrorism

⁴Posen and Ross, “Competing Visions of US Grand Strategy,” p. 16. An additional benefit of the neo-isolationist approach is in the reduced probability of a nuclear or biological weapon attack on American cities – though such an attack is perhaps one of the few scenarios that might actually trigger such “restraint.”

A Smaller Military to Fight the War on Terror

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6W5V-4J791RH-3&_user=10&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&_view=c&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10&md5=604afc0e24da258447fcd9cd52a04b17

Domestic Abuse Advantage – Deployments create stress on family life

Shock and Awe: New Nonfiction Book Addresses the Effects of Military Deployment on American Families <http://www.emediawire.com/releases/2008/12/emw1739654.htm>

Financial Overstretch/Empire collapse Forward deployment of military forces

Prolif -- The pursuit of primacy is self-defeating – it creates a cycle of interventionism that dramatically increases WMD proliferation and risks catastrophic conflict.

Ivan **ELAND**, Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, **2002**

[“The Empire Strikes Out: The “New Imperialism” and Its Fatal Flaws,” Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 459, November 26, Available Online at <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa459.pdf>, Accessed 04-25-2007 // *BATMAN*]

The answer is probably no. **Over the long run the strategy of empire will likely prove unsustainable and ultimately self-defeating.** Certainly, the United States currently has the world’s most powerful military, and it spends much more on its defense than all its rivals combined. But **it costs far more for the United States—a relatively secure nation separated from most of the world by two vast oceans—to project its power across the seas than it does for states located on other landmasses to project their power regionally.** In other words, **proximity matters**, which raises what John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago has called the “stopping power of water,” the belief that “the presence of oceans on much of the earth’s surface makes it impossible for any state to achieve global hegemony.”

What’s more, **the strategy of empire necessarily leads to a devaluation of other states’ sovereignty. That’s because accepting the principle of noninterference is an impediment to a dominant state seeking to make other nations conform to its will. State sovereignty also allows for the formation of multiple loci of power and the prospect of power balancing, which are things an empire cannot accept if it is committed to maintaining supremacy. The echo of Rome is clear.** As political scientist Frank Russell once wrote: **“Rome . . . never was interested . . . in preserving a balance of power. A balance of power system is essentially a device for keeping the power of different states within limits by a system of checks and balances. Rome certainly was not interested in a balance of power for the very reason she was interested in a monopoly of power.”**

From this perspective, the strategy of empire is unlikely to function if all sorts of states are allowed to acquire weapons of mass destruction (**WMD**) **as a deterrent against the power projection of the United States. The logic of empire therefore dictates that as few states as possible should be allowed to gain a defensive footing with the United States. In practice this idea will bring preventative efforts, including war, to make sure WMD proliferation is stopped at all costs.** In its National Security Strategy, the Bush administration notes: “These weapons may . . . allow [end page 13] these states to attempt to blackmail the United States and our allies to prevent us from deterring or repelling the aggressive behavior of rogue states. Such states also see these weapons as their best means of overcoming the conventional superiority of the United States.” 91

In his June 2, 2002, speech to West Point’s graduating class, President Bush laid out his vision of a future in which the United States more or less monopolizes global military power through preemption if necessary: “America has, and intends

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to keep, [its] military strengths beyond challenge,” said Bush, and “we have to be ready for preemptive action” because “if we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long.” 92 (Although the president used the word “preemptive,” which means taking military action before an imminent attack by an adversary, in many cases the United States might launch a preventive attack to stop an incipient threat before it is even realized. for example, before a nation working on WMD, such as Iraq, obtains them.)

That approach is consistent with the strategy of empire. But supporting preventative or preemptive action could shift the rules of the world order against peace and stability. 93 Indeed, if other nations, such as India and Pakistan, adopted preemption as their official policy, the risk of nuclear war could actually rise. “One of the reasons there is not a constant state of war,” says a skeptical Bush administration official, “is that we all expect certain rules. We just have to be careful that if we create exceptions to those rules, the exceptions justify it—lest we establish precedents that others will emulate.” 94 “There’s no question that great powers like the United States [can] launch preventative wars or preemptive strikes whenever they conclude it’s in their interests,” adds Mearsheimer. But the “\$64,000 question is whether or not it makes sense to stand on the rooftops and announce loudly to the world that this is your doctrine. I think it would be better not to do that. I favor the Teddy Roosevelt approach to foreign policy: Speak softly and carry a big stick.” 95 The strategy of empire, however, is to speak loudly (extended deterrence) and cut up and scatter Washington’s inadequate stick all over the place. That’s a blueprint for trouble if there ever was one. It will also increase the likelihood of war. That’s because the doctrine of prevention or preemption is predicated on the “ideology of the offensive,” which says that striking early is less difficult than striking later. The Bush administration’s National Security Strategy boldly asserts that “our best defense is a good offense.” 96

Consequently, offense-minded states are apt to be war-prone because they believe the prospects for victory are very favorable to them. What’s more, offense-minded states have a tendency to incite security dilemmas, whereby the efforts of weaker states to increase their relative security undermines, or appears to undermine, the security of the offense-minded state, thus triggering a spiral of security competition that can culminate in confrontation or war. 97 For example, as China’s economy grows, it may want more ability to control its security environment within East Asia. The expansion of Chinese influence in that region may run afoul of a United States, which has a defense perimeter that is far forward and a military doctrine that is very preventive or preemptive.

The other major problem with the doctrine of prevention or preemption is that in the absence of actual aggression against the United States, how will Washington prove that an attack might have happened? Surely some foreign and domestic critics will discount the threat afterward. Inevitable mistakes will lead to recrimination and suspicions about America’s motives. And other states will worry that the doctrine could be used against them. 98 Hence there is a paradox. The doctrine of prevention or preemptive intervention could actually create a greater incentive for other states to try to acquire WMD secretly as an insurance policy against American military might, which could in turn spur even more U.S. prevention or preemption. (Yet as President Clinton [end page 14] found out in 1998 during Operation Desert Fox, preventive attacks on installations associated with those superweapons often founder on a lack of intelligence on the location of such clandestine small mobile, or deeply buried facilities.) The unintended consequence of interventionism, in other words, could be more interventionism.

Failed states are already an example of those self-reinforcing phenomena. Failed states matter to today’s advocates of empire because the existence of such states raises the specter that interventionist foreign policies in one place can have a deadly price tag made possible by individuals willing to take advantage of the situation in another place. Accordingly, the security threat posed by failed states is really a second-order issue; that is, the danger posed by failed states is a consequence of something other than state failure per se. The primary danger is from an interventionist foreign policy that makes enemies who are resourceful and willing move into and exploit failed states. The very problem of failed states, in other words, shows, not that interventionism necessarily solves problems, but that interventionism can create altogether new ones. Nevertheless, today’s advocates of empire are unable to break out of their consolidating logic. Thus, the fact that so many people in the Muslim world dislike America’s meddling is not seen as an argument for rethinking U.S. policy or assuming a lower profile. Instead, those advocates see it as an argument for deeper involvement; that is, for ramping up U.S. economic aid, promulgating foreign educational and health care programs, telling other states and aspiring states who their leaders should be, and launching wars to transform countries like Iraq “into a beacon of hope.” 99 Yet it was such nation building that led to the attack on U.S. forces in Somalia. Thus, like the proverbial man who finds himself stuck in a hole, today’s advocates of empire recommend more digging. But digging will neither get the man out of the hole nor make the United States safer. America and its citizens will become an even greater lightning rod for the world’s political malcontents. As former Reagan adviser and Cato Institute senior fellow Doug Bandow warns: “With the growing ability of small political movements and countries to kill U.S. citizens and to threaten mass destruction, the risks of foreign entanglements increase. . . . In coming years, the United States could conceivably lose one or more large cities to demented or irrational retaliation for American intervention.” The strategy of empire could make the United States less secure in another major way as well—by dispersing and overtasking its military personnel and equipment. In fact, a recent top-secret Pentagon war game, code named Prominent Hammer, has revealed that, even now, expanding the campaign against terrorism to a country like Iraq would place severe strains on personnel and cause deep shortages of certain critical weapons. According to the New York Times, “The war game measured how the strains of new commitments

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to domestic defense, the demands of long-term deployments in places like the Balkans and South Korea, southwest Asia and the Sinai, and the stress of ongoing operations in Afghanistan, would affect the military's ability to wage and win a new regional war." 101 The conclusion was that the American military would be stretched very thin. The Joint Chiefs of Staff subsequently recommended postponing an attack against Iraq. And over the longer term there is the issue of being ready to fight a major theater war if necessary. **Empires get into trouble because they get bogged down fighting protracted small wars in the hinterland, garrisoning myriad outposts, and accumulating manifold security and treaty commitments they are obliged to honor.** 102 **The strategic implications are potentially enormous. One of the primary reasons Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain appeased Adolf Hitler at Munich in 1938 was that much of Britain's strength was diffused throughout its far-flung empire; that is, London was not in a position to rebuff a rising Nazi Germany early on because Britain was overstretched.** 103 According to British historian P. M. H. Bell: [end page 15]

The fundamental problem was the disparity between Britain's commitments and her resources. The commitments were almost literally worldwide. The Dominions, though asserting their independence of the mother country, still relied on her for protection. Australia and New Zealand, Malaya and Singapore, the Middle East and Mediterranean, Western Europe and the British Isles were all under some kind of threat as the 1930s went on.

In 1937, Britain's chiefs of staff produced a gloomy assessment of London's security prospects. Their conclusion was that England should not make new enemies. "The policy of 'appeasement' should never be appraised without recalling this sternly realistic recommendation," says Bell. "To reach an accommodation with Italy in the Mediterranean; to avoid confrontation with the Axis powers over the Spanish Civil War; to find the basis of a settlement with Germany; to make only the most cautious response to Japanese aggression in China—all this followed in large part from the need to diminish the number of one's enemies." 105 **Empire, in short, reduced Britain's options in the face of a horrible danger.**

Similarly, the United States may find that its alliances and commitments around the world may sap its strength for dealing with any rising power—perhaps China.

General Disadvantages

Nuclear proliferation – Reducing commitments to allies, particularly Japan and South Korea, could cause them to develop nuclear weapons. There is also evidence about the Middle East that makes this argument.

LIEBER – Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown University – 2005

[Robert J., *The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century*, p. 174]

Taken together, these Asian involvements are not without risk, especially vis-a-vis North Korea, China-Taiwan, and the uncertain future of a nuclear-armed Pakistan. Nonetheless, the American engagement provides both reassurance and deterrence and thus eases the security dilemmas of the key states there, including countries that are America's allies but remain suspicious of each other. Given the history of the region, an American withdrawal would be likely to trigger arms races and the accelerated proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is thus no exaggeration to describe the American presence as providing the "oxygen" crucial for the region's stability and economic prosperity.³⁷

LIEBER – Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown University – 2005

[Robert J., *The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century*, p. 167]

An American withdrawal from East Asia could very well result in a Japanese decision to build a more robust conventional military capacity and to acquire nuclear weapons - a contingency that Chinese leaders implicitly acknowledge and that has muted their calls for U.S. disengagement. The potential for a Japanese decision to go nuclear is not just theoretical. The country operates a fast-breeder nuclear reactor as part of its civilian nuclear program for producing electricity. Japanese authorities describe the fast breeder program as merely a component of their comprehensive nuclear fuel cycle, but there is another implication. The fast-breeder reactor itself is costly and difficult to maintain and is of dubious economic value.²⁷ However, the plutonium the reactor produces is not only available as fuel for nuclear reactors, but also has the potential to be used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Moreover, there is an additional source of fissile material in the stock-piles of plutonium that have been reprocessed in Britain and France from Japan's used civilian nuclear reactor fuel and then returned to Japan.

MANDELBAUM – Professor and Director of the American Foreign Policy Program at Johns Hopkins – 2005

[Michael, *The Case for Goliath: How America Acts As the World's Government in the Twenty-First Century*, p. 39-41]

American forces remained in Europe and East Asia because the countries located in these two regions wanted them there, even if they did not always say so clearly or even explicitly. They wanted them there because the American presence offered the assurance that these regions would remain free of war and, in the case of Europe, free of the costly preparations for war that had marked the twentieth century. **The American military presence was in both cases a confidence-building measure, and if that presence were with-drawn, the countries in both regions would feel less confident that no threat to their security would appear. They would, in all likelihood, take steps to compensate for the absence of these forces.** Those steps would surely not include war, at least not in the first instance. Instead, since the American forces serve as a hedge against uncertainty, some of the countries of East Asia and Europe might well seek to replace them with another source of hedging. **A leading candidate for that role would be nuclear weapons of their own.⁹ The possession of nuclear weapons equips their owner with a certain leverage, a geopolitical weight that, unless somehow counterbalanced, can confer a political advantage in dealing with countries lacking them. Like the relationship between employer and employee, the one between a nuclear-weapon state and a non-nuclear-weapon state has inequality built into it, no matter how friendly that relationship may be.** During the Cold War, the American military presence, and the guarantee of protection by the mighty nuclear arsenal of the United States that came with it, neutralized the nuclear weapons that the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China accumulated. Russia and China retain nuclear stock-piles in the wake of the Cold War, and with the end of the American military presence in their regions, several of their non-nuclear neighbors—Germany, Poland, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, for example—might feel the need to off-set those stockpiles with nuclear forces of their own. Perhaps the process of replacing American nuclear armaments with those of other countries, if this should take place, would occur smoothly, with Europe and East Asia remaining peaceful throughout the transition. But this is not what most of the world believes. To the contrary, **the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that do not already have them is widely considered to be the single greatest threat to international tranquillity in the twenty-first century. The United States has made the prevention of nuclear proliferation one of its most important foreign policies,** and its efforts to this end constitute, like reassurance, a service to the other members of the international system.

Empirically, perceptions of declining U.S. influence in Asia trigger nuclearization

Toshi **Yoshihara** and James R. Holmes, professors of strategy, Naval War College, Summer 2009, Naval War College Review, "Thinking About the Unthinkable,"
<http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/review/PressReviewPDF.aspx?q=383>

Indeed, historical precedents in Cold War Asia provide ample evidence of the proliferation-related consequences of real or perceived American indifference to the region. In the past, perceptions of declining American credibility and of weaknesses in the nuclear umbrella have spurred concerted efforts by allies to break out. In 1971, under the Nixon Doctrine, which called on allies to bear heavier burdens, Washington withdrew a combat division from the Korean Peninsula. As a consequence, according to Seung-Young Kim, "Korean leaders were not sure about U.S. willingness to use nuclear weapons," despite the presence of tactical nuclear weapons on Korean soil.³⁶ Such fears compelled President Park Chung Hee to initiate a crash nuclear-weapons program. To compound matters, President Jimmy Carter's abortive attempt to withdraw all U.S. forces and nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula accelerated Park's pursuit of an independent deterrent. Similarly, China's nuclear test in 1964 kindled "fear that Taiwan might be wiped out in a single attack, with U.S. retaliation coming too late to prevent destruction."³⁷ This lack of confidence in American security guarantees impelled Chiang Kai-shek to launch a nuclear-weapons program. The Sino-U.S. rapprochement of the early 1970s further stimulated anxieties among Nationalist leaders about a potential abandonment of Taiwan. In fulfilling its pledges under the Shanghai Communiqué, which began the normalization process, the United States substantially reduced its troop presence on the island. As Nancy Bernkopf Tucker argues, "The withdrawal of American forces from Taiwan compelled the Nationalists to think more seriously about alternative ways of protecting themselves," including nuclear weapons.³⁸ Recently declassified materials document growing American alarm at the prospect of a nuclear breakout on the island throughout the decade.³⁹ In both cases, sustained American pressure, combined with reassurances, persuaded the two East Asian powers to forgo the nuclear option. The Taiwanese and South Korean experiences nonetheless show that states succumb to proliferation temptations as a result of a deteriorating security environment, heightened threat perceptions, and a lessening of confidence in the United States. While Japan certainly faces far different and less worrisome circumstances, these two case studies serve as a reminder to analysts not to casually wave away the possibility of a Japanese nuclear option.

Terrorism – Decline in hegemony won't solve terrorism – it only decreases the ability to kill terrorists quickly

BROOKS AND WOHLFORTH, 2002 (Stephen, Assistant Professor, and William, Associate Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth, Foreign Affairs, "American Primacy in Perspective", Volume 81, Issue 4, L/N)

Some might question the worth of being at the top of a unipolar system if that means serving as a lightning rod for the world's malcontents. When there was a Soviet Union, after all, it bore the brunt of Osama bin Laden's anger, and only after its collapse did he shift his focus to the United States (an indicator of the demise of bipolarity that was ignored at the time but looms larger in retrospect). **But terrorism has been a perennial problem in history, and multipolarity did not save the leaders of several great powers from assassination by anarchists around the turn of the twentieth century. In fact, a slide back toward multipolarity would actually be the worst of all worlds for the United States. In such a scenario it would continue to lead the pack and serve as a focal point for resentment and hatred by both state and nonstate actors, but it would have fewer carrots and sticks to use in dealing with the situation. The threats would remain, but the possibility of effective and coordinated action against them would be reduced.**

Thomas Donnelly, American Enterprise Institute, THE MILITARY WE NEED, 2005,
http://www.aei.org/books/filter.all,bookID.819/book_detail.asp

The danger is that, despite what is actually a remarkably successful series of counterinsurgency campaigns since the September 11 attacks, the United States will suffer from fatigue and withdraw from the region in the hope of a new stability. Such stability, however, would be illusory and, at best, temporary; the enemy, which has been under constant pressure, will use any respite to rearm, reorganize, and plot new attacks. The status quo regimes will believe, as they want to believe (and history has given them good reason to believe), that the United States has again lost interest in the region. Our allies, including those in the region who yearn for a better, freer life, will draw similar conclusions.

Military Deployments -- Bauschard

Primacy/Hegemony – Reducing our foreign military commitments could be perceived a signal of weakness. There is evidence for this in the “hegemony links” section of the paper

Domestic Deployment Shift – If there are fewer troops overseas, they may end up getting deployed domestically. This is low risk, but there are big impacts to domestic deployment of military troops.

<http://nearing.newsvine.com/news/2008/10/27/2045211-aclu-presses-bush-regime-on-domestic-military-deployments->

Economic Growth –

A) Forward deployments boost economic growth in hosting nations

<http://www.heritage.org/research/nationalsecurity/cda05-03.cfm>

The presence of U.S. troops boosts economic growth in host countries. There is a positive unconditional relationship between troop deployments and growth, based on data from 94 countries, and there is also a positive conditional relationship that factors in other explanatory variables like war, political stability, and initial gross domestic product (GDP) levels. For example, a deployment of 500,000 U.S. troops to a host country spread over five decades (10,000 per year) is associated with an increase of 1 percent annual GDP growth per capita.

b) U.S. military leadership key to the global economy

Michael Mandelbaum, professor of American Foreign Policy, Johns Hopkins, *THE CASE FOR GOLIAATH: HOW AMERICA ACTS AS THE WORLD'S GOVERNMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY*, 2006, pp. 186-7

If public pressure within the United States were to compel the American government to withdraw most or all of the military forces stationed beyond North America and to do far less than it had become accustomed to doing to discourage the spread of nuclear weapons, to cope with the consequences of fiscal crises outside its borders, and to help keep global markets open to trade, what impact would this have on the rest of the world? The last occasion on which the United States placed itself on the periphery rather than at the center of international affairs, the period between the two world wars, was not a happy one. Indeed, the antecedents of the American twenty-first-century role as the world's government lie in the fear, after World War II, that in the absence of an expansive American international presence the world would experience repetitions of the two global disasters of the 1930s and the 1940s—the Great Depression and World War II. It was to prevent a recurrence of these economic and political calamities that the United States assumed the responsibilities it bore during the Cold War, which, modified and extended, comprise its post-Cold War role as the world's government. Although the history of the interwar era will not precisely repeat itself even if the United States takes a far less active part in international affairs, a substantial contraction of the American global role would risk making the world a less secure and less prosperous place..... No early twenty-first-century version of imperial Japan and Nazi Germany is likely to appear: The twentieth-century ideologies of conquest-fascism and communism have been discredited and no comparable set of ideas, whose adherents could seize control of a powerful state and thus menace the world, are in circulation. The militant Islam of the early twenty-first century does bear a resemblance to the twentieth century's totalitarian ideologies' but does not pose a threat of the same kind or of the same magnitude as fascism and communism did. The Islamist ideology lacks appeal in the world's most powerful countries and has had little success in gaining control of even less powerful, predominantly muslim countries.

Chinese Aggression

Jamestown Foundation, 7-7, 9,

http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35241&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=13&cHash=021157f86c

<Chinese perceptions of American power are consequential. China's assessment of the global structure of power is an important factor in Chinese foreign policy decision-making. As long as Chinese leaders perceive a long-lasting American preeminence, averting confrontation with the United States is likely seen as the best option. If Beijing were to perceive the U.S. position as weakening, there could be fewer inhibitions for China to avoid challenging the United States where American and Chinese interests diverge. Since the late-1990s, Beijing has judged the United States as firmly entrenched in the role of sole superpower. As long as the comprehensive national power of China and the other major powers lagged far behind the United States, and the ability of China to forge coalitions to counterbalance U.S. power remained limited

PINR, 2004 (July 28, Erich Marquardt, "Beijing Tests Washington's Resolve in East Asia, http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=189&language_id=1)

Additionally, the failure of **Washington** to successfully pacify Iraq **has demonstrated the limits of American power**. While **Washington retains a tremendous military advantage over other states in the world, that advantage is primarily technological**, and only extends to the point of when an occupation of a foreign country becomes necessary **The perceived erosion of American power has led to a loss of U.S. power since other states potentially hostile to U.S. interests now believe that Washington will be less likely to directly challenge them. This belief is evident in China's recent posturing over Taiwan, where Beijing is challenging American resolve in East Asia by intensifying its threats toward Taipei. Taiwan, which China considers a renegade province, may become the location where China will conduct a test of U.S. resolve. Beijing has continued to direct some 500 short-range missiles toward the island. One objective** of this missile deployment is to increase Beijing's chances of **executing a successful "decapitation strike" where, in one opening salvo, China would be able to neuter Taipei's military and political structure, effectively forcing the island to comply with China's demands of reunification**To highlight its seriousness, China last week conducted its eighth annual military exercises in the Taiwan Strait on an island only 174 miles from Taiwanese territory. The exercises consisted of some 18,000 Chinese troops, involving land, air and sea maneuvers. Beijing quite bluntly announced that the purpose of the exercises was to simulate an invasion of Taiwan. Even more candidly, Jiang Zemin, the chief of the Communist Party's Central Military Commission, promised that China would recover Taiwan by 2020, through the **use of force** if necessary. Beijing's recent posturing reflects Taipei's continued flirts with independence. Chen Shui-bian, the Taiwanese president who was recently reelected, held as his central campaign theme the importance of an independent Taiwan. Chen also announced that he would be revising the Taiwanese constitution, a move that could attempt to institutionalize Taiwan as a sovereign state, permanently separated from the mainland. Chen's reelection and subsequent controversial actions explain why Beijing is flaunting its military might; the one issue it does not seem capable of negotiating on is the status of Taiwan. Furthermore, in light of the U.S. being overburdened in the Middle East, China now considers it the ideal time to test Washington's resolve in the region. **Certainly, the U.S. still retains the military ability to engage Chinese forces should they attempt to invade Taiwan; nevertheless, the fact that U.S. forces are so embroiled in other areas of the world means that any such engagement would be risky for the United States**, and therefore less likely to occur Beijing no doubt recognizes this and is now testing to see how far Washington will go to protect the small Taiwanese island from invasion by a state as large and potentially powerful as China. Since China is becoming such a force to contend with in the region, it seems a natural development that Taiwan will soon be engulfed by the mainland; **it is not clear how beneficial it would be for the United States to risk a military engagement to impede such efforts. If Taiwan continues to flirt with independence, it is uncertain how long China will continue to refrain from taking serious action against the island**. The best outcome for Beijing would be if Taiwan were to retreat from its talk of independence and continue to increase its

economic relations with China; China already purchases 40 percent of Taiwan's exports. Under this scenario, as time proceeds, it would become easier for China and Taiwan to reunite peacefully. Yet, even if this failed, in future years, the leaders of Beijing recognize that they would have a better military capability to forcefully take Taiwan, which would demonstrate to the greater world that China was finally strong enough to assert itself as a major power in East Asia. For example, the Pentagon asserts that China is now spending between \$50 and \$70 billion a year on its military budget. While Beijing declares that its military spending is significantly lower, standing at \$25 billion, it still admits that it increased its military budget 11.6 percent from 2003 to 2004. Furthermore, the money is being spent on more modern weapons, much of them being purchased from Russia. While Beijing would hope that a confrontation with Taipei would not occur until it had further advanced its military and economic might, it is preparing for such a confrontation now, should the need to invade Taiwan.

Military Deployments -- Bauschard

riseThe invasion of Taiwan would have important implications for the rest of the region. Most importantly, it would show that China was beginning its attempts to supplant U.S. influence in East Asia with its own. **Similar to how the United States effectively prevented European powers from exploiting the markets in the Americas by establishing the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, China will follow its own doctrine to prevent the United States from exploiting markets in East Asia. It will be important for the United States, which benefits tremendously -- strategically and economically -- from its immense influence in East Asia, to prevent China from gaining hegemony over the area. In order to stunt this possibility, Washington will need to devise methods and strategies to meet increased Chinese regional influence.**

War in Asia

Zbigniew Brzezinski, famous geostrategist, former diplomat, John's Hopkins & CSIS, THE CHOICE: GLOBAL DOMINATION OR GLOBAL LEADERSHIP, 2004, p. 110

Ultimately, war or peace in the Far East will be determined largely by how China and Japan interact with each other and with the United States. If the United States were to withdraw its forces from the region, a repetition of the twentieth century European scenario would be very probable. Japan would have little choice but to rapidly unveil and accelerate its ongoing rearmament; China would be likely to engage in a rapid buildup of its nuclear forces, which till now have been designed to give China a minimal deterrent; the Taiwan Straits would become the locus of Chinese national self-assertion; Korea would most likely experience a violent end to its partition and perhaps emerge unified as a nuclear power; and the Chinese-Indian-Pakistani nuclear triangle could provide a dangerous umbrella for the resumption of open conventional warfare. A single match could then set off an explosion.

War -- US military power projection is needed to solve for a host of issues – WMD proliferation, hotspots for conflict, and peace enforcement

Ruth **Wedgewood**, Professor of Law @ Yale University, **Winter 2001** ("The Irresolution of Rome" – Law & Contemporary Problems) <http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/lcp/lcptoc64winter2001.html>

With the close of the Cold War, some political leaders in Europe and elsewhere have felt a heady independence, doubtful that U.S. power remains crucial in global security tasks. Deterring regional bullies and terrorist groups is seen by some as insufficient reason to accommodate American military needs, even with the **tensions remaining between India and Pakistan, North and South Korea, Taiwan and** the People's Republic of **China**. But a disdain for American power **will have wide ranging consequences**. In peace enforcement operations, whether in the Persian Gulf or Kosovo, the traditional U.S. tasks of airlift, logistics, intelligence, and air power cannot be delegated to countries that lack capacity. A new generation of smart weapons has not been purchased by Europe, and no country matches U.S. naval capacity. Even in regional peacekeeping, as in East Timor, a successful operation often depends on U.S. material and diplomatic support. In peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and counter-terrorism, **the United States will continue to play a flagship role**. There are other new threats to peace as well, including the proliferation of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons.

Loss of a credible threat of force encourages hegemonic rivalry and rogue states – empirically proven

Tobias **Harris**, Editor of Concord Bridge Magazine, **5/20/2003** ("Gulliver Unbound" – Concord Bridge Magazine) <http://people.brandeis.edu/~cbmag/Articles/2003%20May/Gulliver%20unbound-%20May%202003.pdf>.

With the pitfalls of multilateralism exposed following the jaunt into the United Nations prior to the Iraq war, what should be the new structure of America's foreign and national security policy? As President Bush has made painstakingly clear, the world is rife with states that aspire (and conspire) to harm the United States and its global interests. This is by no means a new development, as the machinations of various rogue states during the 1990s revealed. The robust use of American power must remain the foundation upon which American foreign policy is based. The renunciation of power is not a possibility, as the Carter administration demonstrated. Ex-President Carter desired a world in which human rights were respected, but he foreswore the forceful exertion of American might that is the most certain means with which to guarantee human freedom worldwide. The failure to use the American military to challenge the Iranian revolution at its inception, and the simultaneous degradation of the military's capabilities led America to the nadir of its influence during the cold war, as the success of Ayatollah Khomeini and the renewed wave of Soviet expansion revealed the extent of American decline. Clearly, then, **the abnegation of force** by the United States **merely encourages America's foes and potential challengers for hegemony**. Any foreign policy that seeks to extend the unipolar moment must rest on the use of force to destroy or discourage apparent and rising threats. If the world is unwilling to stomach American power, then security multilateralism must be downgraded. American security must take precedence over the feelings of the international community.

Israel. Substantial withdrawal from the Middle East would likely trigger a significant downturn in U.S.-Israel relations, precipitate Israel's disclosure of its nuclear arsenal, and possible lead to an Israeli attack on Iran

Arms sales –reducing defense relations with key allies would likely reduce their weapons purchases, threatening our defense industrial base

*Journalist **Donald Kirk** has been covering Korea - and the confrontation of forces in Northeast Asia - for more than 30 years, 7-26, 9, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/KG26Dg01.html>*

A clue to what might happen in a showdown is South Korea's purchase of record quantities of arms from the US. South Korean military imports from the US last year totaled \$790 million, almost as much as the \$808 million imported by Saudi Arabia, the second-largest buyer of US arms after front-ranked Israel, whose military imports from the US last year cost \$1.35 billion.

Iran/North Korea – the plan could make us seem weak, embolding Iran, NK and/or others

Solvency arguments

Commercial circumvention. The Pentagon could shift to private contractors (depending on how the resolution was worded)

Training shift - <http://www.fpif.net/papers/miltrain/index.html> Reducing deployments could increase military training.

The ability for the negative to use these as solvency arguments will depend on how the resolution is worded. It obviously should say something like "U.S. troops/deployments/etc. Are trainees troops/part of "deployments?" Are contractors?

Region shift. The U.S. might simply re-deploy the troops elsewhere. This could be a solvency argument against general advantages like overstretch, but not region-specific advantages. (Marines Propose withdrawal from Iraq, Shift to Afghanistan – <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123275907840012057.html>) This could also be an affirmative advantage

Iraq. Our position/strength in Iraq will have a big impact on issues of overstretch/blowback, etc. If we don't allow the affirmative to address Iraq (and I'm arguing that we should not), this is a very good solvency arguments against these broad advantages. (Multiple Deployments to Iraq Breaking Our Military <http://www.talkleft.com/story/2007/5/5/9913/89415>)

Counterplans

Iraq withdrawal. Withdrawing from Iraq instead of many of these other place could solve some of the advantages.

Increase deployment in one of the countries

Deployments for particular purposes

- peacekeeping

Consult – Japan, NATO, China, South Korea, Australia, etc...

Condition on particular countries doing certain things (like Russia cooperating to stop Iranian nuclearization).

Terms – Military *Deployment*

DOD Dictionary of Associated Military Terms, March 09,

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf

deployment — 1. In naval usage, the change from a cruising approach or contact disposition to a disposition for battle. 2. The movement of forces within operational areas. 3. The positioning of forces into a formation for battle. 4. The relocation of forces and materiel to desired operational areas. Deployment encompasses all activities from origin or home station through destination, specifically including intra-continental United States, intertheater, and intratheater movement legs, staging, and holding areas. See also **deployment order; deployment planning; prepare to deploy order.**
(JP 4-0)

Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_deployment

Military deployment is the movement of armed forces and their logistical support infrastructure. In most of the world's [navies](#), a deployment designates an extended period of duty at sea. The [United States Navy](#) recognizes those who complete deployments with a special decoration known as the [Sea Service Deployment Ribbon](#).

Deployment

A military unit that mobilizes for contingency operations, usually in conjunction with wartime operations, United Nations peacekeeping operations, humanitarian operations, or training exercises. The length of the deployment can vary from a few days to many months.

www.lds.org/pa/display/0,17884,7720-1,00.html

- A troop movement resulting from a Joint Chiefs of Staff/Unified Command Deployment Order for 30 continuous days or greater to a land-based ...

www.gulflink.osd.mil/medsearch/glossary/glossary_d.shtml

In naval usage, the change from a cruising approach or contact disposition to a disposition for battle. 2. The movement of forces within areas of operations. 3. The positioning of forces into a formation for battle. 4. The relocation of forces to desired areas of operations. (NATO)

epress.anu.edu.au/sdsc/sfsr/mobile_devices/go01.html

the distribution of forces in preparation for battle or work

wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn

- deploy - place troops or weapons in battle formation
- deploy - to distribute systematically or strategically; "The U.S. deploys its weapons in the Middle East"

wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn

Military Deployments -- Bauschard

deployed - An overseas assignment to an area that does not allow dependants to accompany the service member.

www.degrees.info/online/military/glossary.html

Terms – Forces

force - military unit: a unit that is part of some military service; "he sent Caesar a force of six thousand men"

en.wiktionary.org/wiki/forces

A military is an organization authorized by its nation to use force, usually including use of weapons, in defending its country (or attacking ...

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_forces

DOD Dictionary of Associated Military Terms, March 09,

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf

armed forces — The military forces of a nation or a group of nations. See also **force**.

DOD Dictionary of Associated Military Terms, March 09,

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf

force — 1. An aggregation of military personnel, weapon systems, equipment, and necessary support, or combination thereof. 2. A major subdivision of a fleet. (JP 1)

Terms – Bases

base — (*) 1. A locality from which operations are projected or supported. 2. An area or locality containing installations which provide logistic or other support. See also **establishment**. 3. **(DOD only)** Home airfield or home carrier. See also **base of operations; facility**. (JP 4-0)

Afghanistan – Debate Cards

½ Afghanistan troops are from the U.S.

Robert E. Hunter, Senior advisor, RAND, Survival, December 2008, p. 49-66 “A New American Middle East Strategy?”

Common to all these issues is that the United States is both the leading external power involved and almost universally expected to take the lead in 'resolving' them - or at least to manage or contain them and not make them any worse. While the United States has coalition partners in Iraq, it does the bulk of the fighting, especially with the progressive drawdown of British forces. In Afghanistan, by contrast, all 26 NATO allies have forces deployed as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), along with troops from 15 other countries (mostly members of NATO's Partnership for Peace), although only a few have a significant presence. Nevertheless, the United States still accounts for more than one-half of deployed forces, with ISAF and the separate *Operation Enduring Freedom*.³ Bearing in mind calculations about where troops are deployed in regard to the most active fighting and what some are not permitted by their nations to do ('caveats'), the United States clearly bears the largest strategic weight.

Afghanistan – Solvency

The Case for Withdrawal from Afghanistan (2007). <http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/1942>

The Case for U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan (2007). <http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/5658>

Afghanistan: Call for a Troop Withdrawal (2009). <http://sydney.indymedia.org.au/image/afghanistan-call-troop-withdrawal>

Afghan Leaders Demand Timetable for U.S. Withdrawal (2009). <http://www.twf.org/News/Y2009/0521-Afghan.html>

Impossible to Set a Date for Afghan Withdrawal (2009) (Inh/U)

http://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/gates_afghan_withdrawal/2009/03/03/187897.html

The LRC Anti-War Commission has published a series of discussion papers under the title 'Afghanistan: Time for Military Withdrawal'. Let us know your views by adding your comments below or emailing info@l-r-c.org.uk . (<http://www.l-r-c.org.uk/policy/discussion/afghanistan-time-for-military-withdrawal>)

Download the [Introduction by Mike Phipps](#), Chair of the LRC Anti-War Commission.

The 'Afghanistan: Time for Military Withdrawal' papers are:

- [The Failure of the War in Afghanistan by Dr Elaheh Rostami-Povey, SOAS](#)
- [Neither a 'noble cause' nor a 'sovereign democracy' - Time for a negotiated settlement, by Gabriel Carlyle, Voices in the Wilderness](#)
- [Afghanistan: Ending the Unwinnable War by Stephen Beckett, Labour Against the War](#)
- [Afghan Women: Resistance and Struggle in Afghanistan and diasporic communities by Dr Elaheh Rostami-Povey, SOAS](#)

Afghanistan – Solvency

Afghanistan: why a withdrawal of troops (2008) http://www.rawa.org/temp/runews/2008/06/06/afghanistan-why-a-withdrawal-of-troops_9237.html

1. [The Coming Catastrophe: the American War in Afghanistan and ...](#)
There is no important US domestic political pressure for an **Afghanistan withdrawal** - though undoubtedly the fiscal and financial crises are concentrating ...
www.britannica.com/.../The-Coming-Catastrophe-the-American-War-in-Afghanistan-and-Pakistan - [Cached](#) - [Similar](#) -

Afghanistan – Negative

Early Withdrawal Will Spark Terror Attacks <http://livenews.com.au/news/early-withdrawal-from-afghanistan-will-spark-terror-attacks-houston/2009/7/21/213587>

Should We stay in Afghanistan? (2009) <http://www.dissentmagazine.org/online.php?keyword=+withdrawal>

Afghanistan – General Bibliography

The Way Forward in Afghanistan: Three Views

Authors: Rubin, Barnett; Saikal, Amin; Lindley-French, Julian

Source: [Survival](#), Volume 51, Number 1, 2009 , pp. 83-96(14)

Doctrine and Reality in Afghanistan

Author: Roberts, Adam

Source: [Survival](#), Volume 51, Number 1, 2009 , pp. 29-60(32)

Publisher: [Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group](#)

Flipping the Taliban. [Christia, Fotini](#)¹ [Semple, Michael](#) [Foreign Affairs](#); Jul/Aug2009, Vol. 88 Issue 4, p34-45, 12p

Abstract:

The article discusses the U.S. war in Afghanistan and offers suggestions for achieving peace in the region. The author suggests that policies which include reconciliation between insurgency groups, the Afghan government, and military organizations are more likely to result in stability than military victories alone. The historical willingness of Taliban commanders to change allegiances, the specific tribal and traditional needs of involved groups, and the importance of national and international reconciliation in Afghanistan are addressed. The influence of the Afghan presidential election, efforts to improve Afghan governance, and effective increases in security are also discussed.

Japan—Solvency

Toward A New Relationship with Japan (<http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb105/105-47.pdf>)

The U.S. government should

- inform the Japanese government that all U.S. military forces will be withdrawn from Japan in five years,
- inform the Japanese government that the mutual security treaty will be terminated in seven years,
- adopt a policy that encourages Japan to take primary responsibility for East Asian stability,
- replace the U.S.-Japanese alliance with a more limited and informal security relationship,
- redeploy approximately 50 percent of the U.S. air and naval units now stationed in Japan to Guam and other U.S. territories in the Central Pacific and demobilize the rest,
- avoid the temptation to use the security commitment as bargaining leverage on trade issues, and
- have as its fundamental goal the creation of a new relationship with Tokyo that treats Japan as a mature and responsible great power.

Okanawa Calls for U.S. military withdrawal (1996) <http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1P3-625132001.html>

The marines should come home: adapting the U.S.-Japan alliance to a new security era (1996)

<http://www.questia.com/googleScholar.qst;jsessionid=KvIVDhB7xfMhhH1X7d186fpQg22LKz45HCWLrQQwYyQLcqL9Y31W!1296077275!275188706?docId=5000351870>

Japan – Negative

Japan-U.S. Must Keep Military Ties (2004). <http://www.okazaki-inst.jp/10172004yomiuri-E.html>

Iraq – Pro Withdrawal

The Precedents for Withdrawal. [Romberg, Bennett Foreign Affairs](#); Mar/Apr2009, Vol. 88 Issue 2, p2-8, 7p

Abstract: In this article the author comments on issues arising from the need for the United States to end hostilities in Iraq and to withdraw U.S. armed forces from that country. He suggests that U.S. policy makers consider lessons learned from other military withdrawals undertaken in the past. He cites a number of such events including the U.S. withdrawals from Vietnam and Cambodia in the 1970s, a similar action in Lebanon in the 1980s and the U.S. departure from Somalia in the 1990s. Noting that the merits of each disengagement was debated at the time, history has proven that withdrawal was the best plan of action. He states that the best interest of the United States lie in a prompt withdrawal from Iraq.

Beyond Iraq: A New U.S. Strategy for the Middle East.

[Haass, Richard N.](#)¹

[Indyk, Martin' Foreign Affairs](#); Jan/Feb2009, Vol. 88 Issue 1, p41-58, 18p, 1 bw

In this article the authors discuss the future of U.S. foreign policy in the period following the eventual conclusion of the war in Iraq. They suggest that questions regarding the hostilities which have dominated U.S. international relations in the period 2002-08 will diminish in importance. They claim that the administration of U.S. president Barack Obama will be able to draw down the number of U.S. forces in Iraq. As a result of this the U.S. will be able to achieve a number of foreign policy aims in the Middle East including a reduction of tensions with Iran, achieving peace between Israel and Syria and a resolution to the Palestinian-Israeli question.

U.S. should declare victory and leave Iraq, 7/30, 9, <http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2009/07/30-10>

A top US military officer in Baghdad has stirred controversy by arguing in a confidential memo that the American presence in Iraq has outlived its welcome and that it was time "for the US to declare victory and go home".



Two US soldiers stand on the banks of the Tigris River as they secure the area waiting for Iraqi officials to arrive for a hand-over ceremony of a military base from the US army to the Iraqi army, west of the city of Mosul, on July 26, 2009. (AFP/File/Mujahed Mohammed)

The memo, leaked to the New York Times, was written by Colonel Timothy Reese who calls for all US troops to be pulled out of Iraq by August next year. He draws on the adage "Guests, like fish, begin to smell after three days," adding: "Since the signing of the 2009 security agreement, we are guests in Iraq and after six years in Iraq, we now smell bad to the Iraqi nose."

Under that Status Force Agreement, the US has agreed with the Iraqi government to complete withdrawal by the end of 2011. Though the numbers of troops pulled out so far is limited, the US military has begun to quit Baghdad and other Iraqi cities.

The disclosure of the Reese memo comes a day after the US defence secretary Robert Gates said that the pull-back from Iraq could be sped up slightly with the inclusion of an extra brigade of about 5,000 troops by the end of this year on top of the two already planned. But that still leaves most US troops still inside Iraq at the time of the sensitive Iraqi elections in January.

Reese, an author of the official US army history of the Iraq war and a current adviser to the Iraqi military in Baghdad, is double-headed in his memo. He warns that there are still big problems within the Iraqi security forces, from corruption to ongoing political pressure from Shia politicians.

He also reports that since the US withdrawal of combat troops from Baghdad, there has been a "sudden coolness" shown by Iraqi military leaders towards US advisers. Iraqi units were now less willing to work with the Americans in joint operations.

Nonetheless, he goes on to argue that staying on will only foment further resentment among Iraqis.

The idea of a rapid acceleration in the pullout from Iraq was greeted with scepticism by Stephen Biddle of the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, a former adviser to General David Petraeus. Biddle said that it was not in the interests of either the Iraqis or the US to speed up withdrawal.

Biddle said that the main problem facing the military in Iraq was an "identity civil war" between Shias and Sunnis and potentially between Arabs and Kurds, comparable to the Balkans.

"Our mission is peacekeeping stabilisation in Iraq. I would like to see a long, slow drawdown to the level of a peacekeeping force, as we saw in the Balkans," Biddle said.

He added that his impression was that neither General Ray Odierno, the top US commander in Iraq, nor Petraeus who now heads US central command, would agree with the call for a faster departure.

A spokesman for Odierno told the New York Times that the Reese memo was not intended for widespread dissemination and did not reflect the view of the US military.

Middle East/Gulf States – Aff & Neg

Is Offshore Balancing Possible in the Middle east? (2006)

http://drezner.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2006/12/12/is_offshore_balancing_possible_in_the_middle_east

Time to Offshore Our Troops (2007)

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Korea – Aff & Neg

U.S. Delays Troop Withdrawal (2009) <http://www.nytimes.com/1992/10/09/world/us-in-pact-with-south-korea-delays-further-troop-withdrawal.html>

Hegemony Good Links

Withdrawal from the Middle East will be perceived as a strategic retreat

Robert E. Hunter, Senior advisor, RAND, Survival, December 2008, p. 49-66 "A New American Middle East Strategy?"

Another reason for continued presence is America's reputation for strategic purpose and will. One of the consequences of becoming important to the security of a region is that one becomes seen as important to that security for the future. Now that the United States is so deeply engaged in the Greater Middle East, all and sundry have adapted to Washington's role. Local states and populations conclude that the United States must be there to fulfil some particular purpose in pursuit of American interests, which implies a lasting importance for the region in US estimation. By this logic, if Washington significantly reduces its engagement without a clear-cut fulfilment of declared goals, it risks being seen not as responding to immediate requirements (as after the Persian Gulf War) but as engaging in a strategic retreat. Given that the United States did not become so deeply engaged militarily in the Greater Middle East as part of compelling, overarching and enduring interests that required long-term engagement, as in Cold War Europe, such logic may seem strange to Americans, but it cannot be ignored. The United States was able to 'lose' the Vietnam War without suffering major consequences to its position, power and influence in the world as a whole because it continued to meet its central strategic purpose: containing the Soviet Union and European communism. That, coupled with the US opening to China which ended Soviet calculations that China could weigh on its side in a notional global balance, spared the United States lasting strategic consequences of defeat in Southeast Asia. Today's Greater Middle East, by contrast, is the primary locus of US strategic engagement, by accident or design, and is so represented in US debate. For America to retreat haphazardly from any of its positions in the region would expose it to serious questions about US strategic purpose and staying power, expressed at least in part in national will. Such perceptions, however invalid in fact they could prove to be, would be reinforced by the recent collapse of confidence in the US elites that dominate the global financial system.

Rapid force withdrawals will make the U.S. seen as unreliable

Robert E. Hunter, Senior advisor, RAND, Survival, December 2008, p. 49-66 "A New American Middle East Strategy?"

With the end of the presidential campaign, it is now possible for the new administration to craft practical details and open a real debate about the desired 'end-state' of the US presence, both military and non-military, in Iraq, including efforts to help Iraq become self-sustaining in a way that proves meaningful in terms of US strategic, political and moral interests. This will not be easy, but can be facilitated by making the issue as much a bipartisan, national effort as possible. No one in the United States would benefit from a botched process of changing US engagement in Iraq, or from perceptions that the United States cannot be relied upon as an ally or to understand its own strategic interests and act to secure them. This will matter as much to America's allies in Europe and elsewhere as it does to Middle East states. Countries that do not wish America well will also take note.

Anti-Americanism Advantage Answers

Bradley A. **THAYER**, Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, **2006**
["In Defense of Primacy," *National Interest*, Issue 86, November/December]

A remarkable fact about international politics today--in a world where American primacy is clearly and unambiguously on display--is that countries want to align themselves with the United States. Of course, this is not out of any sense of altruism, in most cases, but because doing so allows them to use the power of the United States for their own purposes--their own protection, or to gain greater influence.

Of 192 countries, 84 are allied with America--their security is tied to the United States through treaties and other informal arrangements--and they include almost all of the major economic and military powers. That is a ratio of almost 17 to one (85 to five), and a big change from the Cold War when the ratio was about 1.8 to one of states aligned with the United States versus the Soviet Union. **Never before in its history has this country, or any country, had so many allies.**

U.S. primacy--and the bandwagoning effect--has also given us extensive influence in international politics, allowing the United States to shape the behavior of states and international institutions. Such influence comes in many forms, one of which is America's ability to create coalitions of like-minded states to free Kosovo, stabilize Afghanistan, invade Iraq or to stop proliferation through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Doing so allows the United States to operate with allies outside of the UN, where it can be stymied by opponents. American-led wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq stand in contrast to the UN's inability to save the people of Darfur or even to conduct any military campaign to realize the goals of its charter. The quiet effectiveness of the PSI in dismantling Libya's WMD programs and unraveling the A. Q. Khan proliferation network are in sharp relief to the typically toothless attempts by the UN to halt proliferation.

You can count with one hand countries opposed to the United States. They are the "Gang of Five": China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Venezuela. Of course, countries like India, for example, do not agree with all policy choices made by the United States, such as toward Iran, but New Delhi is friendly to Washington. **Only the "Gang of Five" may be expected to consistently resist the agenda and actions of the United States.**

China is clearly the most important of these states because it is a rising great power. But **even Beijing is intimidated by the United States and refrains from openly challenging U.S. power.** China proclaims that it will, if necessary, resort to other mechanisms of challenging the United States, including asymmetric strategies such as targeting communication and intelligence satellites upon which the United States depends. But China may not be confident those strategies would work, and so it is likely to refrain from testing the United States directly for the foreseeable future because China's power benefits, as we shall see, from the international order U.S. primacy creates.

The other states are far weaker than China. For three of the "Gang of Five" cases--Venezuela, Iran, Cuba--it is an anti-U.S. regime that is the source of the problem; the country itself is not intrinsically anti-American. Indeed, a change of regime in Caracas, Tehran or Havana could very well reorient relations.

Dictionaries

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Links Related to U.S. Military Overseas

Foreign Military Bases in Eurasia

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[Chievres Air Base / SHAPE](#)

Cuba:

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Diego Garcia (India):

[Diego Garcia Navy Support Facility](#)

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[Army - Ansbach](#)

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Military Deployments -- Bauschard

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[254th Base Support Battalion \(Schinnen\)](#)

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