Arctic Topic Proposal

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Introduction/Timeliness

The Arctic is an emerging geopolitical region characterized by complex, multi-scalar, and rapidly evolving environmental, political, and economic processes, and it therefore offers an exciting and timely topic area for high school CX debate (Young 2017a). Due to its extreme northern location, the Arctic is characterized by a unique polar ecosystem that plays an important role in the global climatic system, the circulation of the planet’s oceans, the migration of many animal species, and more. These processes are now being disrupted by climate change, increased development, and pollution. For example, the 2017 NOAA Arctic Report Card indicates that Arctic sea ice extent has experienced new record lows for three years in a row, and recent USGS studies predict that 2/3 of the global polar bear population will be lost within the next fifty years (Amstrup et al. 2008; Mahmood 2018; NOAA 2017; Pagano et al. 2018; Resnick 2018a). Not only do these shifts have immediate implications for the global environment, but they are also transforming the social and economic dimensions of the Arctic region (Heinenen and Southcott 2010; Young 2017a). Given its harsh environment and general inaccessibility, the Arctic was historically an isolated area in which indigenous peoples developed vibrant cultures and knowledge systems that remained relatively sheltered from processes of colonialism and globalization until fairly recently (Heinenen and Southcott 2010). Increased globalization combined with sea ice melt, however, has increasingly opened the region up to economic development, mineral extraction, shipping, and much more. These changes have both exacerbated a range of social problems and produced new economic opportunities. Given the Arctic’s location between competing world powers such as the United States and Russia, these dynamics are producing new geopolitical challenges (US Department of State 2016; Nuttall and Callaghan 2000).

The Arctic Council is the primary intergovernmental forum through which Arctic states negotiate these emerging challenges (Arctic Council Panel 1991). The Council was established in 1996 with the goal of promoting cooperation between the different nations, indigenous communities, and other organizations that have a stake in the Arctic (Arctic Council 2018). It is therefore composed of three distinct sets of members – Member States (Canada, Denmark/Greenland, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Russia, and the United States), Permanent Participants (indigenous organizations including the Aleut International Association, Arctic Athabaskan Council, Gwich’in Council International, Inuit Circumpolar Council, RAIPON, and Saami Council), and Observers (non-Arctic states, intergovernmental and inter-parliamentary organizations, and non-governmental organizations that are approved for the status). In response to the new economic opportunities arising within the Arctic, many new countries and organizations are applying for Observer status. The Permanent Participants have watched with concern as countries like China and Singapore have recently become Observers, fearing that new voices will dilute the voices of indigenous communities (Myers 2013; Sevunts 2016).

The Council’s work is primarily carried out by six different Working Groups, primarily focused on monitoring and assessment of environmental and social issues in the Arctic (Arctic Council 2018). These Groups include the Arctic Contaminants Action Program (ACAP), Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna Working Group (CAFF), Emergency Prevention, Preparedness, and Response Working Group (EPPR), Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment Working Group (PAME), and Sustainable
Development Working Group (SDWG). The Council also has the capacity to set up ad hoc Task Forces to accomplish tasks outside the scope of the Working Groups. Based on the scientific work of the Working Groups, the Arctic Council will put forward guidelines and recommendations to its Member States or choose to initiate new assessment programs. All of these decisions are made through a consensus of all eight Member States, with required and full consultation of the Permanent Participants. Notably, though, the Arctic Council does not itself have a mandate to enforce its recommendations – this is ultimately the responsibility of the Member States themselves. The consensus-driven nature of the forum will help highlight the complexity of geopolitical relationships for debaters, and presents interesting options in terms of the actor used in any potential resolution. For example, the resolution could include any of the eight individual Member States as an actor (i.e., have a Member State increase support for Arctic Council programs), or focus on the Arctic Council itself as an intergovernmental actor (i.e., have the Council adopt a new set of recommendations or provide a forum for treaty negotiations). Regardless of the actor that is chosen, though, the Arctic presents a wide range of issues that will enable balanced, timely, and high quality debates grounded in a wealth of interdisciplinary literature.

Scope

A natural topic exists because of the geographic boundedness of the Arctic and the pre-existing mandates and programs of the Arctic Council. The Arctic itself is 5.5 million square miles in size, about 1.5 million square miles larger than the US (Arctic World ND). This provides a clear geographic bright line to the topic. Traditionally, Arctic geopolitics has been dominated by scientific projects assessing the social and environmental dimensions of the region, and the Arctic Council’s mandate is very explicitly defined within its founding document, the Ottawa Declaration (Arctic Council 2018; Arctic Council Panel 1991; Nord 2016). This provides debaters with clear and predictable policy focuses for which there is ample literature. Within this scope, though, there are a broad range of issues confronting the Arctic that will provide sufficient ground for affirmative and negative teams. Arctic geopolitics is dominated by eight different nation-states and six different indigenous people’s organizations, many of which hold diverging views on Arctic issues. The topic would provide teams ground to explore complex geopolitical relationships between these different actors, over issues including climate change, environmental management, trade and shipping, sovereignty, geopolitics, science, indigenous rights, social welfare, and much more. By limiting the geographic bounds of the topic but highlighting diverse supra-national, national, and sub-national actors, this topic area will ensure that education on international relations is strongly in focus for debaters during this foreign topic year.

Debatability of the Topic

An Arctic resolution can be scoped to ensure a well limited topic that provides fair affirmative and negative ground. As mentioned above, this resolution would have a natural scope because of the geographic boundedness of the Arctic and the pre-existing mandates and programs of the Arctic Council. The exact dimensions of affirmative ground will be impacted by the selection of an actor for the resolution. Choosing the Arctic Council or United States federal government will provide a more limited set of possible affirmative cases, while choosing a broader set of Arctic Council Member States as actors will expand affirmative ground. The physical and social
attributes of the topic – low human population, nascent economy, and fragile environment – will likely also limit affirmative ground, since they impact what academic literature is available. However, these areas have large amounts of literature associated with them, and will give affirmative teams access to large and varied harm impacts. Regardless of how the resolution is worded, negative teams are assured ample ground. The Arctic is characterized by very complex issues, and action in the Arctic to solve one set of harms often exacerbates other harms. For instance, economic development and environmental protection are often in tension with one another, and indigenous interests in the Arctic can clash with both of these initiatives. This guarantees strong negative disadvantage ground. Because there are eight Arctic Council Member States, the negative will have access to some set of international actor counterplans. Finally, the recent colonial context of the Arctic will give negative (and critically minded affirmatives) access to unique ground for criticisms, in addition to more generic economic and environmental critiques.

**Topic Durability**

There is no chance that policies will be enacted that resolve the issues facing the Arctic, particularly because many of the areas of interest lie in tension with one another. For instance, policies directed at increased economic development in the area often exacerbate environmental issues. This is consistent with current US policy toward the Arctic – the Trump administration is pursuing ways to open the Arctic up to increased natural resource extraction (DiChristopher 2018; Plouffe 2017), while retreating on efforts to combat the effects of climate change (Merica and Miller 2018). Economic and environmental policies often also have complex impacts on indigenous communities, making it even less likely that Arctic issues will be resolved any time soon.

Within the more specific context of the Arctic Council, it is unlikely that the Trump administration would *increase* its support of this multilateral institution. To some degree the administration has upheld status quo multilateral cooperation in the region, in that it continues to follow Obama’s 2013 US Arctic Policy (Plouffe 2017). However, Trump has made it clear that he does not support international bodies in general, and his 2017 *National Security Strategy* clearly indicated that he would not allow Arctic multilateral forums or rules to infringe on US sovereignty in the region (Uljua 2017). US Secretary of State Tillerson demonstrated this Arctic isolationism in 2017 when he eliminated the position of US special representative to the Arctic, a key position established to make the US more proactive in the region (Plouffe 2017). Given that executive branch agencies take the lead in developing US Arctic policy, it is very unlikely that this situation will change during the Trump administration, regardless of the outcomes of the 2018 midterm election. This ensures the inherency of the topic into the future.

One key change in relation to the topic will be chairmanship of the Arctic Council. The chair rotates every two years, and has the primary task of setting the Council’s activity priorities and supporting multilateral engagements (Smieszek and Kankaanpaa 2014). Finland is the current chair, but Iceland will be the chair from 2019 – 2021. This shift will require evolving research related to the topic, but ensures unique case areas given a new international context during the Icelandic chairmanship. While it is still too early to definitively determine Iceland’s priorities, the current Senior Arctic Official in Iceland stated that they would likely emphasize many of the
same issues that the country has historically focused on: “international cooperation regarding the environment, particularly the marine environment; sustainable resource management; renewable energy and socioeconomic conditions in the Arctic.” (Sigurdsson 2017)

**Accessibility**

This topic is accessible to both novice and varsity debaters due to popularized representations of the Arctic. Based on the efforts of environmental organizations like Greenpeace, the polar bear has become an international symbol for the dangers of climate change. Other charismatic megafauna, from seals and walruses to orca, similarly resonate with broad segments of the public when thinking about the Arctic environment. A recent study at the University of New Hampshire demonstrated that, in spite of the political divisiveness of climate change, a majority of US voters recognize that Arctic sea ice is declining, that CO2 levels are increasing, and that human activities are impacting the earth’s climate (Hamilton 2016). These factors will make this topic accessible for novice, particularly given that the US is only one of 8 Arctic countries worldwide.

Advanced debaters will be able to engage the more complex policy and critical aspects of Arctic geopolitics. The physical and social aspects of the Arctic are complex, interrelated, and transforming at an unprecedented rate, meaning that advanced debaters will be rewarded for taking creative approaches to the topic and constantly updating their research. Varsity debaters will be challenged to understand the nuanced, and often contradictory, geopolitical relationships between the countries, indigenous peoples, and organizations that have a stake in the future of the region.

This education will be extremely valuable for students moving forward – the US National Science Foundation has recently identified *Navigating the New Arctic* as one of its *10 Big Ideas* for future investment. This signals that the US government views the Arctic as a key site for establishing “cutting-edge research agendas and processes that will require collaborations with industry, private foundations, other agencies, science academies and societies, and universities and the education sector.” (NSF 2016) This ensures that there will be significant academic, policy, and business opportunities related to Arctic policy and research as these students begin their adult lives. The topic’s timing is ideal for getting student’s into the area just as it explodes onto the world scene.

**Potential Harm Areas**

*Indigenous Knowledge, Livelihoods, & Politics*

An Arctic resolution would highlight not only issues of colonialism and indigeneity, but would also provide debaters with a unique view of indigenous peoples as geopolitical actors. Many different indigenous groups can be found throughout the Arctic, with many of those groups spread across multiple Arctic states. The geographic remoteness and inaccessibility of the Arctic often delayed or minimized contact between indigenous peoples and outside cultures, meaning that processes of colonialism were often delayed when compared with other areas of the world. This means that many Arctic indigenous peoples have experienced an accelerated form of settler
colonialism in the past few decades, and continue to face drastic shifts in their culture and livelihoods today (Amagoalik 2012; Cameron 2015; Chaturvedi 2000; Heininen and Southcott 2010; Laugrand and Oosten 2010; Leduc 2010; Penikett and Goldenberg 2013; Simon 2009; Tester and Irniq 2008; Young 2017b). In Canada, for example, colonialism continues to affect Inuit communities in the form of lack of access to education and jobs; high cost of living; high incidences of health issues; high levels of domestic and sexual violence; exploitation of natural resources; and increasing disconnection from their land and culture (Laugrand and Oosten 2010; Stern and Stevenson 2006; Stevenson 2014; Tester 2009; Young 2017b). Affirmative cases can easily be crafted to address some of these harms.

Despite these problems many Arctic indigenous peoples have managed to mobilize themselves politically, and have strong presences across local, national, and international scales (Abele and Rodon 2011; Cameron 2015; Coote 2015; Fabbi, Young, and Finke 2018; Henderson 2009; Marecic 2000; Penikett and Goldenberg 2013; Watt-Cloutier 2005; Wilson and Smith 2011). The Arctic Council itself, for instance, was originally conceptualized through collaboration between state governments and indigenous leaders. This participation led the organization to support inclusion of indigenous organizations as Permanent Participants, in order to guarantee a high-level forum for indigenous consultation. The Council has also continuously reaffirmed the importance of indigenous knowledge, and has had varying levels of success integrating its Western scientific research with local knowledge systems (Young 2016a). An Arctic topic would therefore force debaters not only to think about indigenous peoples as passive populations in need of policies that support their livelihoods, but also as active political actors that have the desire and ability to intervene in geopolitical processes (e.g., Huntington et al. 2011; Martello 2008; Meier et al. 2006; Murphy 2011; Robards and Lovecraft 2010; Tremblay et al. 2006; Watt-Cloutier 2004, 2005).

Despite this general emphasis on inclusion, the relationship between Arctic states and indigenous peoples is also regularly characterized by conflict. Permanent Participants have regularly criticized the Arctic Council for only implementing shallow forms of consultation, and they worry that the increasing number of Observers is diluting their influence in the forum (Young 2016a). When compared with the Arctic nations, indigenous communities often also have opposing views on development projects, natural resource extraction, and environmental regulation (Young 2017b). It can also be quite difficult to combine Western scientific and indigenous understandings of the environment, leading to complex forms of knowledge politics (Audla 2016; Armitage 2005; Berkes 2012; Cameron et al. 2015; Murphy 2011; Tester and Irniq 2008; White 2009; Young 2016b, 2017a, 2017b). These conflicting views can provide ample affirmative and negative ground – in addition to providing case harm areas, there are many potential disadvantages, counterplans, and critiques that could draw on these dynamics.

Geopolitics

Scholars often cite Mikhail Gorbachev’s 1987 Murmansk Speech as the first time the Arctic is described, on the geopolitical stage, as a distinct and important region (e.g., Nord 2018). The Arctic had played a key geopolitical role throughout the Cold War, primarily because the shortest distance between the US and the Soviet Union was across the pole (Chaturvedi 2000; Steinberg et al. 2015; van Eferink 2015). In response to fears over Soviet invasions or missile
strikes, the US and its allies established the Distance Early Warning (DEW) Line across the Arctic in Alaska, Canada, Greenland, and Iceland. In Canada they also shifted entire indigenous communities to the north, using them as ‘human flagpoles’ to maintain their sovereign claims on the Arctic. Gorbachev’s Murmansk Speech was an attempt to decrease tensions in the Arctic, and to instead promote the region as a ‘zone of peace’.

While Gorbachev’s speech was over three decades ago, it has had an enduring legacy. The Arctic Council is expressly excluded from discussing military security, so that the forum is not used to further military agendas (Nord 2016). Instead, it was designed to encourage science diplomacy between its Member States, as well as cooperation over sustainable development in the region. The Obama administration, for instance, focused heavily on the Council as a conduit for building US soft power (Plouffe 2017). Particularly given the increasing tensions between the US and Russia today, the forum offers a potentially important space for discussion between the two superpowers.

More broadly, the multilateral and consensus-driven politics of the Arctic Council open up ground, for both the affirmative and the negative, to make arguments about multilateralism, bilateral political trade-offs, and hegemony. International agreements of direct relevance to the Arctic region include the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), the Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution, the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, and ILO Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, among many others (Arctic Portal ND).

Environmental Issues

The Arctic is facing a wide range of pressing environmental issues, many of which have global implications. At the top of the list is climate change – many scientists describe the region as a ‘canary in the coal mine’ for climate change. It is already experiencing warming, increased climatic extremes, ice melt, a decline in permafrost, and more (Barber et al. 2008). These shifts in the physical environment directly impact Arctic organisms, ranging from microbial primary producers to charismatic megafauna such as polar bears and seals (Amstrup et al. 2007; Arrigo 2013, 2014; Pfeffer 2011; Post et al. 2013). These shifts have potentially global effects on biodiversity, since the Arctic is a key site in the migration of many species. The continued loss of sea ice also has the potential to disrupt the global thermohaline cycle and further accelerate global climate change.

Pollution is also a large concern in the Arctic, largely because the global climate system funnels airborne pollutants up to the region (Arctic Council 2015). Frigid polar temperatures then ensure that the pollutants do not naturally break down as they would in southern latitudes. Build-up threatens the health of humans and animals alike. These problems will only accelerate as ice melt opens the Arctic up to new forms of commerce and development. As shipping and tourism increases in the Arctic Ocean, there is increased risk of oil spills (Nunez 2014; Waldman 2017). Similarly, oil drilling increases the risk of catastrophic environmental disasters. Three of the six Arctic Council Working Groups are explicitly focused on strengthening monitoring, assessment, and response programs related to pollution (Arctic Council 2018).
Environmental shifts also have implications for safety and health. Local communities and scientific teams face greater risks due to the more extreme and variable weather, and the risk of falling through thinning sea ice has greatly increased. Communities also report seeing a greater number of polar bears nearby, as ice melts and the bears are driven southward toward land masses. Perhaps the most apocalyptic risk has been brought about by the melting layer of permafrost, which can release ancient microbes (Meyer 2017; Parkinson et al. 2014; Resnick 2018b). In 2016 a Siberian community experienced an anthrax outbreak, and scientists fear that eradicated diseases, such as smallpox, may also be released.

These environmental issues have resulted in new forms of politics, a range of scientific interventions, and global animal rights movements. The complexity of these politics guarantees ample ground for both affirmative and negative sides. For instance, the politics around environmental protection often clash with desires for development and mineral extraction, which creates debates around the correct way to engage in sustainable development (Heinenen and Southcott 2010). Scientific projects have a long history of not sufficiently consulting indigenous peoples, and therefore of marginalizing indigenous knowledge systems (Murphy 2011; Riewe and Oakes 2006; Scobie and Rodgers 2013; Young 2017b). And, finally, animal rights movements often clash with both business and indigenous interests, using Arctic animals as symbols to push policies that prevent economic development and endanger indigenous hunting. These are rich areas for debate (Wenzel 1991).

*Infrastructure and Development*

Many businesses view ice melt in the Arctic as an emerging opportunity. The region has attracted a wide range of business interests in sectors including natural resource extraction, tourism, fishing, and shipping (Heinenen and Southcott 2010). The opportunity has attracted not only private industry, but also the attention of non-Arctic nations. In 2013, for example, the Republic of Singapore joined the Arctic Council as an Observer in order to represent the country’s shipping interests (Myers 2013). The Arctic Council itself examines issues of economic development within the Sustainable Development Working Group, but countries are also pursuing economic interests outside of the Council. For example, Russia has used the UNCLOS to extend its own territorial claims farther into the Arctic (van Efferink 2015). This presents debaters with opportunity not only to debate the benefits of economic development, but also to explore what type of diplomatic approach or forum (e.g., Arctic Council, UNCLOS, bilateral negotiations, unilateral approach) is best to accomplish specific goals of development.

In stark contrast to the riches that are attracting large, transnational corporations to the region, many Arctic communities face social issues grounded in lack of infrastructure (e.g., Ford and Smit 2004; Greenpeace ND; Tester 2009). Arctic residents face very high costs of living and housing shortages, coupled with lack of job opportunities. Homelessness is an increasing issue, with potentially deadly consequences given the frigid environmental conditions. Poverty also exacerbates problems like substance and domestic abuse, particularly when coupled with histories of colonial trauma. Communities often also lack health care infrastructure, telecommunications infrastructure, and other basic services, which further impacts quality of life. Shipping and travel costs further restrict opportunities for Arctic residents. These social issues
are deeply and complexly interconnected with the changing environment, offering important areas for debate.

**Solvency Mechanisms/Possible Affirmative Cases**

*Increased Support of or Collaboration with Indigenous Peoples*

Indigenous leaders were involved in the initial conceptualization, and ensured that indigenous groups would continue to have a voice in the organization through their role as Permanent Participants (Arctic Council Panel 1991; Nord 2016). The Council guarantees consultation rights to the Permanent Participants, and it has repeatedly reaffirmed the importance of indigenous knowledge through its formal Declarations (Arctic Council Indigenous Peoples’ Secretariat 2014; Young 2016a). Despite this, many indigenous peoples feel that there are serious shortcomings in the organization’s approach to consultation, as well as structural constraints that prevent indigenous communities from taking advantage of consultation opportunities (Arctic Council Indigenous Peoples’ Secretariat 2014). They feel that token or shallow forms of consultation will perpetuate unequal, and colonial, relationships between the Member States and indigenous organizations (Coote 2015). This fear has been amplified both by dramatic increase in Observers to the Council, and also by the increasingly precarious nature of life in an Arctic region impacted by environmental change and globalization.

There are many potential affirmative cases that could support greater collaboration between scientists, policymakers, and indigenous peoples to better realize the Council’s commitment to meaningful consultation and to make inroads against the Arctic’s history of colonialism. An affirmative case might promote indigenous leadership in research by funding indigenous researchers, requiring scientific studies to include community engagement or capacity-building components, or supporting the development of local research protocols to encourage knowledge sharing between Western science and indigenous knowledge systems (Coombes et al. 2014; Young 2016a). Other cases might focus on supporting scientists so that they are more equipped to ethically engage with local peoples and knowledge systems, such as by supporting and requiring the training of scientists in indigenous knowledge systems and indigenous languages (Young 2016a). The Permanent Participants have also suggested a number of programs or recommendations that they would like the Arctic Council to implement. The Indigenous Peoples’ Secretariat has suggested the establishment of better funding mechanisms to encourage indigenous participation in Arctic Council meetings and work, and the Permanent Participants have been pushing for the adoption of thirteen principles of indigenous engagement, titled the *Ottawa Traditional Knowledge Principles*, since 2015 (Arctic Council Indigenous Peoples’ Secretariat 2015; Arctic Council Sustainable Development Working Group 2015; Coote 2015; Veldstra 2015). Affirmative teams could easily justify the importance of these cases for reversing colonial relationships, improving indigenous participation in governance and research, and enriching the scientific outputs of Arctic Council work.

In summary, specific affirmative solvency mechanisms might include:

- Increase funding for indigenous researchers or education
- Require scientific studies to include indigenous community engagement and/or capacity-building
• Support the development of local, indigenous research protocols for guiding community engagements with scientists
• Fund indigenous language and culture training for physical scientists
• Establish funding for Arctic Council Permanent Participants, to increase their participation in Arctic Council work
• Have the Arctic Council adopt the Ottawa Traditional Knowledge Principles
• Increase the role of indigenous consultation within the Arctic Council
• Support multilateral or bilateral engagement with indigenous communities in sustainable development
• Support programs for indigenous cultural regeneration or language preservation

Improved Infrastructure, Trade, Sustainable Development, & Safety Planning

A 2017 report by the Council on Foreign Relations finds that the US is falling behind other Arctic nations in terms of its investment in ice-breaking vessels, deepwater ports, roads, and energy and telecommunications infrastructure (Allen et al. 2017; see also Blanchard 2017). The country’s funding of research in the Arctic has also flatlined in recent years, and the US refuses to ratify international treaties, like UNCLOS, that would make territorial rights in the region much clearer (Berwyn 2017; Mirzakashani 2016). This has implications for economic development, the environment, and the safety of northern communities. A lack of infrastructure and climate change research makes it more difficult for US-based companies to engage in business in the Arctic, and it also makes existing development projects more dangerous for people and the environment (Lindsay 2017; Shalal and Rascoe ND).

Affirmative plans could increase funding for infrastructural development or business-oriented research, implement policies or ratify treaties to support business developments or trade, or institute monitoring and rescue programs to improve safety (Roughead 2015). Affirmative plans could also target the safety of northern communities by improving infrastructure, ensuring that existing infrastructure is resilient in the face of climate change, and increasing housing availability. Affirmative teams can explore the recommendations of the Arctic Council SDWG for additional recommendations related to improving Arctic infrastructure, development, and safety. These cases will give affirmative teams access advantages such as the economy, increased environmental resiliency in the face of development, and human or indigenous rights related to safety.

In summary, specific affirmative mechanisms might include:
• Increase funding for infrastructure development, including ports, roads, and energy and telecommunications infrastructure
• Improve community infrastructure in order to increase the resiliency of Arctic populations against climate change
• Establish treaties regulating mineral extraction and/or trade
• Implement policies or ratify treaties that support bilateral or multilateral trade and development in the Arctic
• Ratify the UN Law of the Sea
• Expand the US Law of the Sea
• Increase support and/or research funding for sustainable development planning
Institute new monitoring and rescue programs to improve Arctic safety
Expand housing within Arctic communities
Implement specific recommendations of the Arctic Council SDWG

Social Programs

Arctic communities, and particularly indigenous communities, face a wide range of social issues that provide potential cases for affirmative teams. Many communities face poverty as well as job and housing shortages, which place the lives of many in danger (Tester 2009). Arctic Canada, for instance, has a rapidly growing population, and is estimated to need 3,000 housing units immediately just to provide for the current population (Kestler-D’Amours 2017; MacCharles 2013). The Arctic economy is largely based on extractive industries, which means that most of the wealth flows away from the communities themselves (Milazzo ND). Affirmative cases could provide funds for housing development, provide technical training or other job-related services, or increase the role of communities in local development projects, among other options (e.g., Johnson 2016; Tester 2009; Tysiachniouk 2016). They could also target youth by expanding their educational opportunities, which are often lacking (e.g., Castro 2016; Gavenus 2016; Simpson 2016). Affirmative teams can explore the recommendations of the Arctic Council SDWG for specific social programs to support or implement.

Poverty exacerbates many other social issues, including physical and mental health issues. Many communities lack access to even basic health care services, and they also face increasing exposure to environmental pollutants due to climate change and mineral extraction (Stenlund 2002). Indigenous communities, in particular, face a suicide epidemic driven by mental health issues, substance abuse problems, and the continued legacy of colonial violence (Rosen 2015; Stevenson 2014). Many of these same issues also drive high rates of gender-based violence. In 2016, for example, the Government of Canada established the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Women and Girls, which has explored the high rate of violence against women, girls, and LGBTQ2S individuals (MMIWG 2018). One recent study indicated that up to twenty percent of youth in the Canadian territory of Nunavut may be victims of human trafficking (CBC 2016). Affirmative cases can fund services directed at combating physical and mental health problems, gendered violence, or human trafficking, and can garner human rights or feminism advantages.

In summary, specific affirmative solvency mechanisms might include:
- Fund job training, and other job services, in norther communities
- Fund public educational opportunities
- Expand housing
- Fund physical and/or mental health care services
- Fund suicide prevention programs
- Fund substance abuse programs
- Fund programs to fight gender-based violence
- Fund programs to fight human trafficking

Scientific & Environmental Programs
The Arctic is facing unprecedented environmental issues, including climatic shifts, ice melts, a decline in permafrost, pollution, loss of biodiversity, shifts in migration patterns, and more. Despite these increasing challenges, US funding of Arctic research has remained flat for the past three years (Berwyn 2017), the Republican Congress has refused to maintain the satellites and ice-breaker fleet necessary for effective research (Allen et al. 2017; McKie 2017), and the Trump administration has backpedaled on climate change programs. In response many US agencies and organizations have made recommendations for how the country can maintain scientific leadership in the Arctic. The Joint Ocean Commission (2017), for example, recommends that the Trump administration pursue a comprehensive research program that includes “baseline assessments of environmental conditions and basic charting and mapping; increased understanding and incorporation of socioeconomic information and traditional knowledge sources in decision making; enhanced ecological monitoring, including ocean observing systems; comprehensive predictive modeling to inform proactive policy responses appropriate to future conditions; risk assessment and scenario planning for various activities; establishing an international Arctic forecasting center to improve weather and ocean forecasting; and establishing a national center for Arctic oil spill research.” (np) They recommend increasing funding for federal agencies that operate in the Arctic, including the US Coast Guard, National Science Foundation, and Department of Defense, and increasing multilateral scientific engagements in the region. Other US-based resources for affirmative teams include the Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee’s (2016) FY2017-2021 Research Plan and the US Arctic Research Commission’s (2017) 2017-2018 Report on the Goals and Objectives for Arctic Research.

Affirmative cases can also increase support for Arctic Council recommendations related to scientific research or environmental monitoring and management. Working Groups including ACAP, AMAP, CAFF, and PAME all offer specific recommendations in this area. CAFF (2018), for example, currently offers its Member States 17 specific recommendations in the areas of climate change, ecosystem-based management, mainstreaming biodiversity, identifying and safeguarding important areas for biodiversity, addressing individual stressors on biodiversity, and improving knowledge and public awareness. The Arctic Council (2017) also provides a forum for Member States to negotiate legally binding agreements, which has led to the adoption of the Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation. Affirmative cases that implement cases in these areas can claim advantages related to the environment and scientific diplomacy.

In summary, specific affirmative solvency mechanisms might include:

- Increase funding for the Arctic satellite and ice-breaker fleets
- Fund the Joint Ocean Commission’s Arctic research strategy, or strategies recommended by other agencies
- Increase funding for Arctic research through the US Coast Guard, National Science Foundation, Department of Defense, or others
- Increase support for multilateral research initiatives
- Increase support for ongoing research within the Arctic Council working groups
- Establish new, legally-binding agreements through the Arctic Council, related to scientific study or environmental management
• Increase support for environmental co-management regimes that combine indigenous and Western scientific management principles

International Cooperation

The Arctic has long been a region defined by military risk and multilateral opportunities. Military activities in the Arctic increased dramatically during the Cold War, and the Arctic Council was established largely to decrease tensions between the United States and Russia in the area. This mix of risk and opportunity has not diminished in recent times, and the Arctic could serve either as a flashpoint or opportunity for peaceful collaboration between the US and Russia. A recent US Department of State (2016) report indicated that Russia is raising the concerns of Arctic nations because of “a significant growth in Russia’s military presence, base infrastructure, and personnel in the Arctic; ambitious attempts to assert through various international channels its legal claims, some of which are inconsistent with US – and many other nations’ – positions on relevant provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea; and an expressed desire to exploit the diminishing polar ice cap by encouraging transit through the Northern Sea Route (NSR)” (2). These concerns are unlikely to diminish given that Russia identified the Arctic as one of two focal areas in its Maritime Doctrine of Russian Federation 2020 (Coffey and Kochis 2016).

Affirmative plans could respond to this situation by expanding cooperative scientific, confidence-building, and security activities between Russia and the US (Allen et al. 2017; Lindsay 2017; US Department of State 2016). The US Department of State (2016) identifies six major initiatives for US action: “1) Continue US leadership in the Arctic; 2) speed ratification of UNCLOS as an urgent imperative for US national interests; 3) advance increased ‘presence’ and ‘domain awareness’ in the Arctic region; 4) increase and continue cooperation among the Arctic nations; 5) adopt appropriate policies regarding Russian interests, policies, and activities in the Arctic; and 6) strengthen possible ‘Transparency and Confidence Building Measures’ in the Arctic region.” (3) Many of these activities could be pursued unilaterally or through the multilateral mechanisms of the Arctic Council. The Heritage Foundation has suggested that other multilateral institutions, such as NATO, should have an increased presence in the Arctic in response to current Russian activities (Coffey and Kochis 2016). Affirmative teams could also leverage forms of science diplomacy to claim advantages related to both hegemony and environmental science.

While US-Russian relations offer the most promising affirmative topic areas, other bilateral relationships could also be explored in relation to an Arctic topic. For example, a recent panel put together by the American Security Project identified China’s interests in Arctic resources as an important source of concern for Arctic nations (Mirzakashani 2016). New observer nations raise geopolitical challenges for both Arctic nation-states and international indigenous organizations. This presents many opportunities for affirmative cases.

In summary, specific affirmative solvency mechanisms might include:
• Expand cooperative science programs with Russia or other nations, as a form of scientific diplomacy
• Expand military confidence-building activities with other Arctic nations
• Expand the US military presence in the Arctic
• Strengthen military transparency in the Arctic
• Strengthen geopolitical ties with non-Arctic states, in relation to their trade activities in the Arctic

Reform of the Arctic Council

In 2016 the Arctic Council turned 20 years old, leading many Arctic scholars to reflect on both the past and possible futures of the organization. In many instances these reflections also led to suggestions for reforming, or even transforming, Council so that it is better able to react to the current problems facing the Arctic. As Arctic scholar Oran Young (2016) put it, “While the dynamism of the Council is an indicator of its vitality and adaptability to changing circumstances, there is no getting around the fact that these developments [of the Council] have occurred in an ad hoc and somewhat unplanned manner. Accordingly, it is timely to take a step back to reflect on the current organization of the Council, evaluate its coherence, and ask whether there is room for structural adjustments that would strengthen the Council’s performance going forward.” (13) He recommended several areas of reform, including increasing the Council’s focus on issues of sustainable development, increasing coordination and synergy between Working Groups and Task Forces, rethinking the role of Observers in relation to Permanent Participants, and increasing the importance of the Arctic Economic Council. The Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) commissioned a study of the Arctic Council at this same time, which articulates reform processes ranging from deferred maintenance to a complete redesign of the organization (Conley and Melino 2016). Affirmative teams could easily transform these recommendations into cases that reform the Arctic Council in order to claim environmental, economic, or diplomatic advantages.

In summary, specific affirmative solvency mechanisms might include:
• Increase the Arctic Council’s focus on sustainable development
• Increase coordination and synergy between Working Groups and Task Forces
• Rethink the role of Observers in relation to Permanent Participants
• Increase the importance of the Arctic Economic Council

Negative Ground

Environment and Climate Change Disadvantages

The tension between economic development and environmental protection will be one of the largest areas of debate on this topic. Many of the emerging economic activities in the Arctic – including oil and mineral extraction, shipping, fishing, and tourism – pose direct threats to the fragile Arctic environment. Negative teams can argue that economic development directly exacerbates, or increases the risk of events that exacerbate, the environmental shifts associated with climate change. Given the importance of the Arctic in global environmental systems, it will be easy for the negative team to claim global impacts. These dimensions are discussed extensively in the section on the environment as an advantage. This disadvantage will pair well with counterplans that implement more environmentally-sensitive forms of sustainable development.
Economy Disadvantage

For those affirmative plans that focus on climate change mitigation or environmental regulation in the Arctic, negative teams can argue that the plan negatively impacts emerging Arctic economies. The impact could be local or global. At a local level environmental regulations can negatively impact community economies, and have historically hurt the ability of indigenous peoples to engage in subsistence hunting. Terminal impacts might relate to human rights or colonialism. At a global level, environmental regulation may prevent many countries from taking advantage of highly profitable opportunities. USGS, for example, estimates that as much as a quarter of the earth’s undiscovered oil and natural gas may lie in the Arctic Circle (Council on Foreign Relations 2014). Russia has already invested billions in over 250 potential projects in the region (Roston 2017). Countries without territory in the Arctic are highly interested in how ice melt is opening up shipping routes that could shave thousands of miles off the current trade routes. Negative teams can argue that the impact of environmental regulations will destroy the value of pre-existing investments in the Arctic by large economic players, and thereby bring about a global recession.

Politics Disadvantages

Climate change, and especially the pitting of environmental protection against economic development, is a very divisive issues amongst politicians and the public in the United States. This divisiveness is exacerbated by the Trump administration’s skepticism toward climate change, and their reversal of many Obama-era environmental policies (Holden 2018). There will therefore be persuasive link stories for election-based or Congressional politics disadvantages on this topic. If the plan impacts other Arctic states, negative teams might also focus on politics scenarios domestic to those countries. For instance, US-Russian cooperation on scientific issues may make Russian President Putin look weak within the country, with implications for his political capital.

Geopolitics and Relations Trade-Off Disadvantages

If negative teams prefer to focus on international politics, then they can build disadvantages based on political divisions between the different Arctic Council Member States. Countries often have very different views of human rights, and Russia in particular has opposed advances in indigenous rights in the Arctic (Thompson 2017). Many of the States also have opposing economic interests in the Arctic, which can form the basis for geopolitical disagreements. Russia, for example, has tried to use the UNCLOS in novel ways to extend its territorial and economic interests in the region (Leonhardt 2015). Plans that touch on these issues may negatively impact diplomatic relations in other areas, leading to large impacts.

Hegemony Disadvantages

The Arctic is characterized by a strong multilateral organization, but Arctic states also engage in unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral actions outside of the Arctic Council. If the affirmative team focuses on multilateral action, the negative team may argue that this international cooperation
undermines the Trump administration’s America First policy, and therefore weakens unilateral hegemony. If the affirmative team engages in action outside of the Arctic Council, the negative team may argue that this action undermines the multilateral institution.

International Actor Counterplan

The US is one of eight Arctic Countries that make up the Member States of the Arctic Council. Negative teams will have many options in terms of choosing what combination of actors are best able to implement a particular set of policies. In relation to engagement with the Arctic Council, for instance, they may argue that Iceland is the best actor because they will Chair the Council from 2019 – 2021. If the affirmative team has the entire Arctic Council take action, then the negative could suggest counterplans that involve unilateral or bilateral cooperation. They could also suggest multilateral action that does not make use of the Arctic Council. In 2010, for example, Canada pushed for an Arctic G-5 arrangement for cooperation between itself, Russia, Norway, Denmark/Greenland, and the US (Staalesen 2010). The Arctic Council Member States of Sweden, Finland, and Iceland were left out of these talks. The negative can claim a broad range of net benefits with these counterplans, including country-specific domestic disadvantages (e.g., a US-based politics disadvantage), disadvantages to particular types of international cooperation (e.g., a hegemony disadvantage to multilateral cooperation), or international relations disadvantages to cooperation between certain countries (e.g., a disadvantage to cooperation between the US and Russia).

Consult Permanent Participants Counterplan

As described in the section on Indigenous advantages, the Arctic Council Member States are required to consult the Permanent Participants on all Council matters. However, many factors have led the Permanent Participants to feel that they are not consulted sufficiently, and that the consultation that does take place is genuine. These issues are made worse because the Permanent Participants feel that their voices are being drowned out by the increasing number of Observers within the Council. The negative team can claim that increased consultation is uniquely important in the context of indigenous relations within the Arctic Council. They can then garner net benefits related to colonialism or indigenous participation in Arctic Council projects.

Indigenous-based Criticisms

With the exception of Iceland, all of the Arctic Council Member States have significant populations of indigenous people. In those States the Arctic is strongly defined by a history of settler colonialism, even when those indigenous populations have advanced their own rights. Member States are often accused of marginalizing indigenous populations, and even the Arctic Council has often failed to live up to its own ideals of genuine consultation of Arctic indigenous peoples. Affirmative cases that focus on economic development can be most easily critiqued, since they extend a long history of wealth extraction and economic assimilation that marginalizes indigenous communities (Amagoalik 2012; Cameron 2015; Chaturvedi 2000; Penikett and Goldenberg 2013; Simon 2009; Tester and Irniq 2008). However, subtle critiques can also be leveraged against cases that focus on environmental protection or even scientific study (Young 2017b). In Canada, for example, Inuit have long had a contentious relationship with
environmentalist organizations like Greenpeace, because the environmental protections pushed by those groups has been viewed as infringing on their indigenous relationship to the land. Many Inuit continue to view Greenpeace’s anti-sealing campaign, in the 1970s, as an attack on their livelihoods and culture. Today some of the largest political fights surround debates related to polar bear hunting and protection. Scientific studies can also produce new forms of epistemological colonialism, even when done with reference to indigenous peoples. As I argue, in reference to Western engagements with Inuit knowledge:

“Studies rarely included the full participation of Inuit researchers, and often just mention the Inuit knowledge system without fully engaging its fundamental differences from Western science. This allows these studies to then subsume Inuit knowledge within a Western scientific framework (Murphy 2011). […] As a result the wider social, political, and normative aspects of these indigenous systems of knowledge are rarely engaged, much less used to problematize the epistemological dominance of the frameworks embraced by most scientists. As Tester and Irniq (2008) argue, the ‘very language used to define and promote IQ often serves to move IQ away from its cosmological implications and define it as a tool useful for filling gaps in scientific knowledge.’ (48)” (Young 2017b, 38)

Negative teams should therefore be able to persuasively argue that affirmative methods for economic development, environmental management, or scientific study perpetuate colonial violence at material and epistemological levels.

**Potential Wordings**

*United States Only Options* – These potential wordings focus on the United States federal government as an actor. The options have been crafted to force the United States to engage in either bilateral or multilateral action related to the Arctic, and the options can be adjusted to focus on areas including scientific research, support of the Arctic Council, support of indigenous peoples, environmental protection, economic (or sustainable) development, or social programs. The advantages of focusing on the US are that it gives debaters a familiar actor, it better ensures enforcement of the plan, and it creates a clear division of affirmative (i.e., US action) and negative (i.e., action by other Arctic states) ground. The disadvantages are that the US cannot unilaterally reform the Arctic Council, the US has limited ability to enforce Arctic-wide cooperation, and there is a chance that affirmatives will focus on action within only Alaska rather than on international issues.

Note that all of these resolutions were worded to guarantee a broad enough topic, but could be narrowed through the addition of appropriate adjectives. For example, ‘support’ might be specified as diplomatic or economic, and ‘cooperation’ might be targeted at scientific, environmental, indigenous, social, and/or economic development issues.

The United States federal government should substantially increase its support of Arctic Council programs.

The United States federal government should substantially increase its support of the Arctic Council.
The United States federal government should substantially increase its support of Arctic Council Permanent Participants in the Arctic.

The United States federal government should substantially increase its engagement with Arctic Council Member States and/or Permanent Participants in the Arctic.

The United States federal government should substantially increase its multilateral cooperation in the Arctic.

The United States federal government should substantially increase its bilateral cooperation in the Arctic.

The United States federal government should substantially increase its support for multilateral agreements that govern the Arctic.

The United States federal government should substantially increase its support for multilateral efforts on sustainable development in the Arctic.

_Bilateral/Multilateral Agreement Options_ – These potential wordings are similar to the ones offered above, but require the affirmative to choose multiple Arctic Council Member States as their actors. Depending on the wording, this may be bilateral or multilateral action. Affirmative plans may or may not include the United States federal government as one of the actors, depending on the exact wording of the resolution. These resolutions may also allow for reform of the Arctic Council itself. Given that the Arctic Council recently celebrated its 20th anniversary, there is a great deal of literature reflecting on ways in which the Arctic Council can be reformed. The advantages of these wordings are that they would encourage education about a wide range of international actors, would allow the affirmative case to flat enforcement of bilateral or multilateral action, and would provide lots of affirmative and negative ground to have complex arguments about both international relations and the domestic politics of a range of Member States. The disadvantage is that it provides a very large amount of affirmative ground, which may be difficult to prepare for on the negative. The negative would need to be prepared to debate against cases that include any of the eight Member States as actors. This may be checked, though, by various generic, agent counterplans and international relations disadvantages.

Arctic Council Member States should substantially increase their bilateral cooperation in the Arctic.

The Arctic Council Member States should substantially increase and/or reform their multilateral cooperation in the Arctic. [Note: This would provide affirmative ground to reform the Arctic Council, for which there is a large degree of literature.]

The United States and other Arctic Council Member States should substantially increase and/or reform their multilateral cooperation in the Arctic.
Arctic Council Member States should substantially increase their support of Arctic Council programs.

Arctic Council Member States should substantially increase their support of Arctic Council Permanent Participants.

All Arctic Council Member States should establish a new, binding agreement on the Arctic.

Definitions

Accessibility of Research

A Google search returns the following number of results for these search terms:

“Arctic” returns 63,000,000 results
“Arctic Council” returns 4,170,000 results
“Arctic environment” returns 44,000,000 results
“Arctic development” returns 61,900,000 results
“Arctic indigenous peoples” returns 577,000 results
“Arctic international agreements” returns 104,000,000 results
“Arctic international cooperation” returns 1,180,000 results
“Arctic science” returns 61,600,000 results

Arctic

Lay definition

http://www.dictionary.com/browse/arctic

adjective
1. (often initial capital letter) of, relating to, or located at or near the North Pole: the arctic region.
2. coming from the North Pole or the arctic region: an arctic wind.
3. characteristic of the extremely cold, snowy, windy weather north of the Arctic Circle; frigid; bleak:
an arctic winter.
4. suitable for use in the arctic: arctic boots.
5. extremely cold in manner, atmosphere, etc.: a look of arctic disdain.
noun
6. (often initial capital letter) the region lying north of the Arctic Circle or of the northernmost limit of tree growth; the polar area north of the timber line.
7. arctics, warm, waterproof overshoes.

Region above the Arctic Circle

National Snow & Ice Data Center
https://nsidc.org/cryosphere/arctic-meteorology/arctic.html

Most commonly, scientists define the Arctic as the region above the Arctic Circle, an imaginary line that circles the globe at approximately 66° 34’ N (dashed blue circle in the map at right). The
Arctic Circle marks the latitude above which the sun does not set on the summer solstice, and does not rise on the winter solstice. At the North Pole, the sun rises once each year and sets once each year: there are six months of continuous daylight and six months of continuous night. At lower latitudes, but north of the Arctic Circle, the duration of continuous day and night are shorter.

**Above tree line or based on temperature**
National Snow & Ice Data Center
https://nsidc.org/cryosphere/arctic-meteorology/arctic.html
But other people use different definitions when talking about the Arctic. Some scientists define the Arctic as the area north of the arctic tree line (green line in map at right), where the landscape is frozen and dotted with shrubs and lichens. Other researchers define Arctic based on temperature. Using this definition, the Arctic includes any locations in high latitudes where the average daily summer temperature does not rise above 10 degrees Celsius (50 degrees Fahrenheit).

**Geographic and environmental definitions**
Pew Charitable Trusts
The Arctic can be defined in various ways. Geographically, the Arctic is the region where the sun remains above the horizon for at least one full day in summer and below the horizon for one full day in winter. This is the region north of the Arctic Circle at 66°34’ latitude. Botanically, the Arctic is often defined as the region north of the tree line though tundra can be found farther south as well. Oceanographically, the presence of seasonal or perennial sea ice is one definition of Arctic waters, which can be located far to the south of the Arctic Circle.

**Difficult to define/Many definitions**
Willy Ostreng, Arctis Knowledge Hub
http://www.arctis-search.com/The+Elusive+Arctic
Many criteria have been used to delineate the Arctic from the temperate zone. Neither of them has achieved common approval or acceptance. The oldest and most common definition focuses on solar radiation, defining the Arctic as the area north of the Arctic Circle (66 degrees 32 minutes North), which encircles the area of the midnight sun. This area is about 21 million square kilometres in extension – making up about 8 percent of the Earth’s surface. This definition excludes sub-regions like the Bering Strait, the White Sea, the southern part of Greenland and the Hudson Bay (see Figure 1). In most expert opinion, these areas are as arctic in natural conditions as most of the areas situated north of the Circle. This has made the noted Canadian researcher, Moira Dunbar to characterize the Arctic Circle – a purely astronomical concept – to be meaningless “from any other point of view. A more reasonable approach would in her mind be to define the Arctic by physical criteria that are domestic to the region. In line with this thinking, multiple alternative criteria have been suggested and used: the tree line, the 10 degree C July Isotherm, the continuous permafrost, the sea ice cover, the marine boundary between cool and warm waters etc. (see Figure 1). A fairly popular and long-lived assumption has been that the limits of the tree line, which in certain areas coincides with the 10 degree July Isotherm, are more meaningful from the point of view of human activity than any of the climatic
ones2 . Although the terrestrial and marine environments vary considerably throughout this area, they nevertheless share certain Arctic characteristics that distinguish them from temperate regions, including cold temperatures, extensive snow and ice cover, large seasonal fluctuations in solar energy, continuous permafrost, polar darkness and lack of nutrients3 . Thus, in terms of natural features, this definition makes the Arctic stands out as a relatively coherent and uniform region. But also these criteria suffer from weaknesses that act counter to common perceptions of what the Arctic is and is not. For instance, the blue oceans of the North Atlantic and North Pacific are here defined as constituent parts of the Arctic along with the ice covered waters of the Central Arctic Ocean. This definition also excludes certain coastal areas of the Northeast- and Northwest Passages from the Arctic. In short: The application of single definitional criteria does not suffice to include all geographical areas hosting polar characteristics in the concept of the Arctic, or for that matter, to exclude areas featuring the characteristics of the temperate zone. The differences in aerial extension between the various definitions amount to thousands of square kilometres. The competing delineations depend upon the perspective from which one approaches it. This is not problematic when working within the confines of single scientific disciplines; rather, the difficulty arises when one seeks a definition to suit all subject areas – the multi- and cross-sections of the sciences as well as of industries. In the multilateral process of defining the Arctic in a way that is relevant for all areas of science, the Arctic Monitoring Assessment Program (AMAP) of the Arctic Council decided not to define the region in too precise terms. Instead the Program provides guidelines about a core geographical area to be used by all scientists irrespective of disciplinary orientation. Although the boundaries are not fixed once and for all they are to be located somewhere in the latitudinal area between 60 degree N and the Arctic Circle. This approach provides flexibility in boundary drawing without repudiating borders as a useful measure for multi- and interdisciplinary science. The flexibility achieved also shows in the modifications of borders suggested by AMAP. One such modification is that the Hudson Bay and the White Sea – which were excluded as Arctic territory by the Arctic Circle - are defined as integral parts of the Arctic. A second modification concerns the terrestrial environment of the eight Arctic states. Here the southern boundary of the region shall not be determined by any concrete natural criteria but by the individual countries in locations of their own liking between the Arctic Circle and 60 degree N. (see Figure 1)4 . In this definition, parts of the land territories of all the eight Arctic states have been defined as belonging to the Arctic. Previously, only the five littoral states to the Arctic Ocean were thought of having land territory in the region. What is more, by this definition the blue warm waters of the Norwegian Sea has become part of Arctic waters, which again deviates from common perception of what is characteristic of polar natural conditions. By this extension, the Northern Maritime Corridor becomes an integral part of Arctic waters along with the three Passages contained within the ice-covered part of the Arctic Ocean (see Figure 1). In AMAP terms, the Arctic covers an area of approximately 33, 4 million square kilometers, out of which 60 percent is defined as Arctic water5 . Here, the AMAP applies multiple scientific, political and pragmatic criteria that have been blended together to reach consensus across sectors and between the states. However, the ambiguity and flexibility of this definition causes overlaps with the Sub-arctic, which in principle should be the transition zone between the Arctic proper and the temperate zone (see Figure 1).

Arctic shipping/waters
Willy Ostreng, Arctis Knowedge Hub
http://www.arctis-search.com/The+Elusive+Arctic
Traditionally, and based purely on scientific criteria, the boundaries of the exit areas - or the open sea borders - of the Arctic Ocean has been drawn along the Barents shelf edge from Norway to Svalbard, across the Fram Strait, down the western margin of the Canadian Archipelago and across the Bering Strait. Thus defined and including the Canadian Archipelago the total area of the Arctic Ocean is 11.5 million square kilometres. In AMAP terms the “marine Arctic” or “Arctic waters” has been extended far beyond the Arctic Ocean to denote an area that includes Baffin, Hudson and James Bays; the Labrador, Greenland, Iceland, Norwegian, and Bering Seas (see Figure 7). This definition has been embraced by some of the most cited Arctic shipping assessment of the present. The Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA) of the Arctic Council has adopted the AMAP definition lock stock and barrel, and allowed the five coastal states to define their own Arctic waters for the purpose of data collection efforts. In this way the AMSA definition stand out as the “least common denominator” of the eight Arctic States, covering an extensive area of a variety of operational conditions. Shipping is here defined to cover all types of marine transport including tankers, bulk carriers, offshore supply vessels, passenger ships, tug/barge combinations, fishing vessels, ferries, research vessels and government and commercial icebreakers. The Canadian Arctic Shipping Assessment (CASA) follows suit when claiming that shipping “...is best defined in the broadest terms, whilst recognizing that there will be differences that depend on the issues under consideration.” Also in the CASA study shipping is taken to include: cargo vessels, passenger vessels, military/defence vessels, navigational support vessels, oil/production vessels, support vessels and fishing vessels. These lists suggest that Arctic waters comprise blue waters as well. Several of these vessels – among them fishing boats - have no sea ice capability and are functionally bound to operate in open waters only. As shown in Figure 2, the most busy ‘Arctic waters’ of vessel activity in 2004 were, according to the AMSA, the Norwegian and Bering Seas. Fishing vessels were responsible for an important part of this total. In this definition, Arctic waters span a variety of different sea areas – cold, warm, ice free, ice covered, salty, less salty, etc. - waters of no, few and multiple polar characteristics. By implication, AMSA defines these waters along three continuums. The first continuum is, as discussed above, definitional extending from temperate warm waters in the southern part of the Norwegian Sea via the cold but ice free waters of the Barents Sea to the permanently ice covered waters of the Central Arctic Ocean. Only the northern part of this long ocean stretch contains true Arctic characteristics. The second continuum is seasonal were operational conditions varies throughout the year according to the annual cyclical process of melting and freezing of sea ice. This continuum relates to the Arctic Ocean only (as defined by scientific criteria only, see above). The third continuum is generational and concerns the man made long-term melting and reduction of sea ice in the Arctic Ocean. This continuum spans from the continuous reduction of sea ice in the Central Arctic Ocean to the geographically expanding ice free stretches of the Northeast and Northwest Passages in summer, but not in winter. The latter continuum has moved the shipping industry to take a second look at the sailing conditions of the Arctic Ocean. If all three continuums are put together – as the AMSA study does - the challenges encountered by ships in these waters are gradual as one sails northward from the southern part of the Norwegian Sea and into and through the Arctic Ocean. In the south the ships may encounter storms that are domestic to the temperate zone; when reaching the ice free parts of the Barents Sea some of the operational conditions of the Arctic like icing from sea spray and polar darkness in the winter will pose a challenge to shipping. Further north and east the ship will enter into areas of light sea ice conditions in addition to icing, polar darkness, fog etc. followed by more and more heavy ice conditions.
**Nebulous geographic region**
Willy Ostreng, Arctis Knowledge Hub
http://www.arctis-search.com/The+Elusive+Arctic
Today, some define the Arctic as the physical and biological environment spanning across the northern reaches of Asia, Europe and North America, and the expanses of sea and ocean in between them. Here the Arctic is thought of as a group of concepts and attributes unique to a region far from the industrial centres of the world. Definition attempts of this kind share a common feature: The region is defined borderless and portrayed as an aerial entity fading away somewhere in the south without telling where and why it happens. In principle as well as in operational terms, lack of defined borders creates on the one hand uncertainties about the extension of the region, allowing for definitions like the ones suggested by AMSA and CASA. On the other hand, it opens up for an issue specific border setting, leaving it to the mining and shipping industry to tailor made borders that make sense from their respective operational points of view. One issue specific definition that has achieved broad international acceptance in the shipping industry is launched and applied by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO).

**Three land zones**
Kjetil S. Gronnestad, Barents Watch
https://www.barentswatch.no/en/articles/Hva-er-Arktis/
The Arctic landmass is divided into three zones: the High Arctic, the Low Arctic, and the Subarctic. It is the climate and the vegetation that determines the division and demarcation of the three Arctic landmass zones. The Subarctic (i.e., the area south of the Arctic) is a transitional zone between the tree line and the zone with contiguous boreal (i.e., Northern) forests.

**Three ocean zones**
Kjetil S. Gronnestad, Barents Watch
https://www.barentswatch.no/en/articles/Hva-er-Arktis/
The marine boundaries for the Arctic are literally fluid. According to Paul Wassmann, professor of Arctic and marine biology at UiT Arctic University of Norway, the marine Arctic can be divided into three main groups: permanent ice, the seasonal ice zone (where the ice has been), and the marginal ice zone (drift ice, including the ice edge). Permanent ice is found in the areas in the Arctic Ocean that do not melt away during the summer, in other words the area that is still covered by ice when the ice cover reaches its minimum level in September. The seasonal ice zone is the open expanse of sea that was covered by ice during the ice’s maximum extension in May but that has melted away during the summer. Such areas are oligotrophic, that is to say they offer little to sustain life. The meltwater from the ice stratifies the surface water and thus hinders circulation, so that only limited amounts of nutrients from the ocean floor reach the surface. The ice edge is where the ice cover meets the open sea. The productivity here is often high when nutrient-rich water is exposed to sunlight after the ice melts or breaks up. Put simply, this means that the marine Arctic is the area that was covered by ice during the ice cover’s maximum extension in May. This area varies from year to year.

**Consists of eight Arctic states**
Kjetil S. Gronnestad, Barents Watch
https://www.barentswatch.no/en/articles/Hva-er-Arktis/
“Given the role of states in international politics, it is natural to begin with the Arctic countries when defining the Arctic politically,” states Gunnhild Eriksen at the Section for the High North, Polar Affairs, and Marine Resources at the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Arctic Council is the premier forum for international cooperation on Arctic issues. The council consists of the eight states with land areas north of the Arctic Circle: Norway, Sweden, Denmark (with the Faroe Islands and Greenland), Iceland, Finland, Russia, the United States, and Canada. The Arctic Council is the only intergovernmental forum where the Arctic states convene to cooperate on the challenges they face. The Arctic Council was formally established in 1996 in Ottawa to promote sustainable development within the environment, social conditions, and the economy. In addition to the eight member states, six international organizations representing indigenous communities have been recognized as permanent participants in the council, while several non-Arctic countries, international organizations, and NGOs have an observer status.

Consists of the Arctic Five
Kjetil S. Gronnestad, Barents Watch
https://www.barentswatch.no/en/articles/Hva-er-Arktis/
Another potential political definition of the Arctic is based on the Arctic Ocean. The so-called Arctic Five consists of the coastal states around the Arctic Ocean: Norway, Denmark (in respect of Greenland), Russia, the United States, and Canada. These states have economic zones and continental shelves towards the Arctic Ocean in line with the law of the sea. The Arctic Five is not institutionalized, but the cooperation has been confirmed through the Ilulissat Declaration of 2008. “A recent example is from July 2015,” Eriksen says. “That’s when Norway and the four other coastal states around the Arctic Ocean signed a declaration on research and measures against unregulated fishing in the international part of the Arctic Ocean. The declaration is a collective expression that the coastal states take responsibility pursuant to the law of the sea also for the fish populations of the Arctic Ocean.”

Arctic Council

Arctic Council backgrounder
Arctic Council
The Arctic Council is the leading intergovernmental forum promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States, Arctic indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues, in particular on issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic.

Members
Arctic Council
The Ottawa Declaration lists the following countries as Members of the Arctic Council: Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden and the United States. In addition, six organizations representing Arctic indigenous peoples have status as Permanent Participants. The category of Permanent Participant was created to provide for active participation and full consultation with the Arctic indigenous peoples within the Council. They include: the Aleut International Association, the Arctic Athabaskan Council, Gwich’in
Council International, the Inuit Circumpolar Council, Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North and the Saami Council. Observer status in the Arctic Council is open to non-Arctic states, along with inter-governmental, inter-parliamentary, global, regional and non-governmental organizations that the Council determines can contribute to its work. Arctic Council Observers primarily contribute through their engagement in the Council at the level of Working Groups. The standing Arctic Council Secretariat formally became operational in 2013 in Tromsø, Norway. It was established to provide administrative capacity, institutional memory, enhanced communication and outreach and general support to the activities of the Arctic Council.

**What it does**

Arctic Council


The work of the Council is primarily carried out in six Working Groups. The Arctic Contaminants Action Program (ACAP) acts as a strengthening and supporting mechanism to encourage national actions to reduce emissions and other releases of pollutants. The Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP) monitors the Arctic environment, ecosystems and human populations, and provides scientific advice to support governments as they tackle pollution and adverse effects of climate change. The Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna Working Group (CAFF) addresses the conservation of Arctic biodiversity, working to ensure the sustainability of the Arctic’s living resources. The Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response Working Group (EPPR) works to protect the Arctic environment from the threat or impact of an accidental release of pollutants or radionuclides. The Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) Working Group is the focal point of the Arctic Council’s activities related to the protection and sustainable use of the Arctic marine environment. The Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG) works to advance sustainable development in the Arctic and to improve the conditions of Arctic communities as a whole. The Council may also establish Task Forces or Expert Groups to carry out specific work. The Task Forces operating during the Chairmanship of Finland (2017-2019) are: Task Force on Arctic Marine Cooperation (TFAMC) and the Task Force on on Improved Connectivity in the Arctic (TFICA). During the 2017-2019 Finnish Chairmanship there is also one Expert Group operating: Expert Group in support of implementation of the Framework for Action on Black Carbon and Methane (EGBCM).

**How it works**

Arctic Council


Arctic Council assessments and recommendations are the result of analysis and efforts undertaken by the Working Groups. Decisions of the Arctic Council are taken by consensus among the eight Arctic Council States, with full consultation and involvement of the Permanent Participants. The Chairmanship of the Arctic Council rotates every two years among the Arctic States. The first country to chair the Arctic Council was Canada (1996-1998), followed by the United States, Finland, Iceland, Russia, Norway, the Kingdom of Denmark, and Sweden. The second cycle of Chairmanships began in 2013. On 11 May 2017, the second United States Chairmanship concluded, and the second Chairmanship of Finland (2017-2019) began. The next country to assume the Chairmanship will be Iceland (2019-2021).
What it cannot do

Arctic Council

The Arctic Council is a forum; it has no programming budget. All projects or initiatives are sponsored by one or more Arctic States. Some projects also receive support from other entities. The Arctic Council does not and cannot implement or enforce its guidelines, assessments or recommendations. That responsibility belongs to each individual Arctic State. The Arctic Council’s mandate, as articulated in the Ottawa Declaration, explicitly excludes military security.

Arctic Council Member States

Eight member states

Arctic Council

The Arctic Council consists of the eight Arctic States: Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark (including Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States.

Arctic Council Observers

Arctic Council

Criteria for Observers. Observer status in the Arctic Council is open to: non-arctic states, inter-governmental and inter-parliamentary organizations, global and regional, and non-governmental organizations. Criteria for admitting observers: As set out in the Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council and governed by the Arctic Council Rules of Procedure, observer status in the Arctic Council is open to non-Arctic States; inter-governmental and inter-parliamentary organizations, global and regional; and non-governmental organizations that the Council determines can contribute to its work. In the determination by the Council of the general suitability of an applicant for observer status the Council will, inter alia, take into account the extent to which observers: Accept and support the objectives of the Arctic Council defined in the Ottawa declaration. Recognize Arctic States' sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the Arctic. Recognize that an extensive legal framework applies to the Arctic Ocean including, notably, the Law of the Sea, and that this framework provides a solid foundation for responsible management of this ocean. Respect the values, interests, culture and traditions of Arctic indigenous peoples and other Arctic inhabitants. Have demonstrated a political willingness as well as financial ability to contribute to the work of the Permanent Participants and other Arctic indigenous peoples. Have demonstrated their Arctic interests and expertise relevant to the work of the Arctic Council. Have demonstrated a concrete interest and ability to support the work of the Arctic Council, including through partnerships with member states and Permanent Participants bringing Arctic concerns to global decision making bodies.

Role of Observers

Role of observers: Decisions at all levels in the Arctic Council are the exclusive right and responsibility of the eight Arctic States with the involvement of the Permanent Participants. Observers shall be invited to the meetings of the Arctic Council once observer status has been
granted. While the primary role of observers is to observe the work of the Arctic Council, observers should continue to make relevant contributions through their engagement in the Arctic Council primarily at the level of Working Groups. Observers may propose projects through an Arctic State or a Permanent Participant but financial contributions from observers to any given project may not exceed the financing from Arctic States, unless otherwise decided by the SAOs. In meetings of the Council’s subsidiary bodies to which observers have been invited to participate, observers may, at the discretion of the Chair, make statements after Arctic states and Permanent Participants, present written statements, submit relevant documents and provide views on the issues under discussion. Observers may also submit written statements at Ministerial meetings.

List of Observers

Thirteen Non-arctic States have been approved as Observers to the Arctic Council:
1. France - Barrow Ministerial meeting, 2000
2. Germany - Iqaluit Ministerial meeting, 1998*
3. Italian Republic - Kiruna Ministerial meeting, 2013
4. Japan - Kiruna Ministerial meeting, 2013*
5. The Netherlands - Iqaluit Ministerial meeting, 1998*
7. Poland - Iqaluit Ministerial meeting, 1998*
8. Republic of India - Kiruna Ministerial meeting, 2013
9. Republic of Korea - Kiruna Ministerial meeting, 2013
10. Republic of Singapore - Kiruna Ministerial meeting, 2013
11. Spain - Salekhard Ministerial meeting, 2006
12. Switzerland - Fairbanks Ministerial meeting, 2017
13. United Kingdom - Iqaluit Ministerial meeting, 1998*

*"Also present at the signing ceremony" in Ottawa 19 September, 1996. (See 3rd paragraph of the JOINT COMMUNIQUE OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE ARCTIC COUNTRIES ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ARCTIC COUNCIL).

Thirteen Intergovernmental and Inter-Parliamentary Organizations have an approved observer status:
1. International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) - Fairbanks Ministerial meeting, 2017
2. International Federation of Red Cross & Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) - Barrow Ministerial meeting, 2000
3. International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) - Barrow Ministerial meeting, 2000*
4. Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM) - Barrow Ministerial meeting, 2000*
5. Nordic Environment Finance Corporation (NEFCO) - Reykjavik Ministerial meeting, 2004
6. North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission (NAMMCO) - Barrow Ministerial meeting, 2000
7. OSPAR Commission - Fairbanks Ministerial, 2017
8. Standing Committee of the Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region (SCPAR) - Iqaluit Ministerial meeting, 1998*
10. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) - Inari Ministerial meeting, 2002
11. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) - Iqaluit Ministerial meeting, 1998*
12. World Meteorological Organization (WMO) - Fairbanks Ministerial meeting, 2017
13. West Nordic Council (WNC) - Fairbanks Ministerial meeting, 2017

At the Kiruna Ministerial Meeting in 2013, the Arctic Council “receive[d] the application of the EU for Observer status affirmatively”, but deferred a final decision. Until such time as Ministers of the Arctic States may reach a final decision, the EU may observe Council proceedings.

*"Also present at the signing ceremony" in Ottawa 19 September, 1996. (See 3rd paragraph of the JOINT COMMUNIQUE OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE ARCTIC COUNTRIES ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ARCTIC COUNCIL).

Thirteen Non-governmental Organizations are approved Observers in the Arctic Council:
1. Advisory Committee on Protection of the Sea (ACOPS) - Barrow Ministerial meeting, 2000*
2. Arctic Institute of North America (AINA) (Formerly Arctic Cultural Gateway (ACG)) - Reykjavik Ministerial meeting, 2004 (as: Arctic Circumpolar Route)
3. Association of World Reindeer Herders (AWRH) - Barrow Ministerial meeting, 2000
4. Circumpolar Conservation Union (CCU) - Barrow Ministerial meeting, 2000
5. International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) - Iqaluit Ministerial meeting, 1998*
6. International Arctic Social Sciences Association (IASSA) - Barrow Ministerial meeting, 2000
7. International Union for Circumpolar Health (IUCH) - Iqaluit Ministerial meeting, 1998*
8. International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA) - Inari Ministerial meeting, 2002
9. National Geographic Society (NGS) - Fairbanks Ministerial meeting, 2017
10. Northern Forum (NF) - Iqaluit Ministerial meeting, 1998
11. Oceana - Fairbanks Ministerial meeting, 2017
12. University of the Arctic (UArctic) - Inari Ministerial meeting, 2002
13. World Wide Fund for Nature-Global Arctic Program (WWF) - Iqaluit Ministerial meeting, 1998*

Arctic Council Permanent Participants

Six indigenous peoples organizations
Arctic Council
Out of a total of 4 million inhabitants of the Arctic, approximately 500,000 belong to indigenous peoples. Indigenous peoples’ organizations have been granted Permanent Participants status in the Arctic Council. The Permanent Participants have full consultation rights in connection with the Council’s negotiations and decisions. The Permanent Participants represent a unique feature of the Arctic Council, and they make valuable contributions to its activities in all areas. The following organizations are Permanent Participants of the Arctic Council:
Aleut International Association (AIA), Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC), Gwich'in Council International (GCI), Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON), Saami Council (SC). This category is open equally to Arctic
organizations of Indigenous peoples with a majority of Arctic Indigenous constituency representing: a single Indigenous people resident in more than one Arctic State; or more than one Arctic Indigenous people resident in a single Arctic State. The Permanent Participants are supported by the: Indigenous Peoples Secretariat.

*Arctic Council Working Groups*

**Six Working Groups**
Arctic Council
There are six Working Groups of the Arctic Council: Arctic Contaminants Action Program (ACAP), Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR), Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME), Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG)

*Bilateral cooperation*

**Lay definition**
Dictionary.com
http://www.dictionary.com/browse/bilateral
adjective
1. pertaining to, involving, or affecting two or both sides, factions, parties, or the like: a bilateral agreement; bilateral sponsorship.
2. located on opposite sides of an axis; two-sided, especially when of equal size, value, etc.
3. Biology. pertaining to the right and left sides of a structure, plane, etc.
4. Chiefly Law. (of a contract) binding the parties to reciprocal obligations.
5. through both parents equally: bilateral affiliation. Compare unilateral (def 7).

**Cooperation between two countries**
https://www.minminas.gov.co/web/ingles/types-of-cooperation
Bilateral Cooperation: It involves the participation of two different countries, or of institutions from said two countries [4]. The sources of bilateral cooperation are the governments of countries that maintain relations based on International Cooperation. These relations are government-to-government in nature, through embassies or agencies that serve as cooperation instances, as well as technical coordination entities. [5]

**Cooperation between two countries, as contrasted with multilateral**
Commonwealth of Nations
http://www.commonwealthofnations.org/sectors/government/bilateral_and_multilateral_co_operation/
Formalised relations of Commonwealth countries, including economic, political and cultural, run along bilateral or multilateral lines – ‘bilateral’ referring to ties between two states and ‘multilateral’ referring to relationships of more than two states, often within an intergovernmental organisation such as the UN.

*Binding agreement*
Binding international agreements vs. US domestic policy
State of the Planet

U.S. law distinguishes between self-executing and non-self-executing international agreements. A self-executing treaty immediately takes effect as law of the United States upon ratification – supreme over state law and judicially enforceable – and does not require new legislation to enable the United States to carry out its international obligations. A non-self-executing treaty, on the other hand, requires the enactment of domestic legislation to give effect to its terms. Notably, international agreements are considered “binding” on parties when the agreement enters into force, regardless of the nature of execution at the domestic level. If the U.S. does not enact domestic legislation implementing the terms of a non-self-executing international agreement, then, the international obligation remains no less binding but the U.S. is simply in default of its international obligation. This bifurcation between domestic lawmaking and international lawmaking in the form of non-self-execution is relatively unique to the U.S. legal system, but in a broader sense reflects a general reality of the international system: international laws take effect only through the actions of individual sovereign states. States can enter any number of “legally binding” international agreements, but it is the domestic actions of each state – in the form of enacted laws, policies, and regulations – that are necessary to meet those international obligations. In essence, the international classification of an agreement as “legally binding” or merely politically binding, has little to do with what actually must happen at the domestic level to make the agreement effective.

Treaties in US law
American Society of International Law

Contrary to Mr. Bolton's assertion, it is clear that treaties are legally binding in their internal operation. The members of the United Nations, including the United States, have said as much when they established the U.N.'s principal judicial organ, the International Court of Justice. They have agreed to the Court's Statute, which provides in article 38, "The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply [among other sources] international conventions [i.e. treaties], whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states." The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, article 2(1)(a), defines a treaty as "an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law...." This provision defines "treaty" for international law purposes, except that-- as the U.S. Restatement Third of Foreign Relations Law says--"under customary international law oral agreements are no less binding although their terms may not be readily susceptible of proof." Restatement Third, § 301, Comment b. The point is that by any widely accepted definition, treaties are binding internationally. The definition of treaty for international law purposes is broader than one finds in the U.S. Constitution, where treaties are defined in domestic law as international agreements entered into with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate. It is widely accepted that the United States may enter into some international agreements that are treaties in the international sense but not in the U.S. constitutional sense. Some of those agreements are entered into by the Executive Branch on its own authority and some by the Executive with the concurrence of both
Houses of Congress. The Vienna Convention is in force for 81 nation-states, not including the United States. The reason it is not in force for the United States is that a stalemate exists between Congress and the Executive Branch over the allocation of authority between the two branches to enter into and terminate international agreements (treaties in the international sense) on behalf of the United States. The stalemate would not exist if such agreements were not regarded as binding on the United States internationally. It is precisely because they are regarded as binding that so much is at stake between the two branches of government. The United States government has frequently demonstrated that it regards treaties (including treaties for U.S. constitutional purposes as well as other international agreements) as binding instruments under international law. For example, when France breached the 1946 Air Service Agreement between itself and the United States, our government asserted a breach of an international obligation and applied counter-measures to induce France to rectify its breach. The U.S. counter-measures were upheld by an international arbitral tribunal. 54 Int'l Law Reports 304 (Award of Dec.9, 1979).

**Collaboration/Cooperation**

**Collaboration - lay definition**
Merriam-Webster
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/collaborate
Definition of collaborate
collaborated; collaborating
intransitive verb
1 : to work jointly with others or together especially in an intellectual endeavor: An international team of scientists collaborated on the study.
2 : to cooperate with or willingly assist an enemy of one's country and especially an occupying force: suspected of collaborating with the enemy
3 : to cooperate with an agency or instrumentality with which one is not immediately connected: The two schools collaborate on library services.

**International cooperation – lay definition**
Definitions.net
https://www.definitions.net/definition/international%20cooperation
The interaction of persons or groups of persons representing various nations in the pursuit of a common goal or interest.

**Diplomatic engagement**

Diplomatic engagement is continuous, sustained dialogue conducted by diplomats to foster cooperation or build confidence.
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09592296.2015.1034570
Policy and academic circles debate the wisdom and utility of diplomatic engagement.2 Nonetheless, perhaps unconsciously, feelings of selfrighteousness, moral superiority, and American exceptionalism drive United States policies that spurn or restrict constructive
engagement and find general basis on myths and narratives. Rather than delve into the sources of those ideological or emotional drivers, it is important to focus on the misperceptions, many of accepted as truth and conventional wisdom. These myths are specious and selectively applied as rationales used to support isolationist policies. Diplomatic engagement or constructive engagement—the central focus here is but one amongst many tools of statecraft employed by governments to help achieve their foreign policy objectives. In this analysis, ‘engagement’ means a ‘continuous—sustained—dialogue, conducted by diplomats’ to foster co-operation, build confidence, reduce tensions, or create a space for further interaction. In this sense, the terms ‘engagement’ and ‘diplomatic engagement’ are synonymous.

Diplomatic engagement requires direct talks, and a process of step by step reciprocal gestures to modify the target’s policies and behavior.


PRESIDENT OBAMA will have a hard time achieving his foreign policy goals until he masters some key terms and better manages the expectations they convey. Given the furor that will surround the news of America’s readiness to hold talks with Iran, he could start with “engagement” — one of the trickiest terms in the policy lexicon.

The Obama administration has used this term to contrast its approach with its predecessor’s resistance to talking with adversaries and troublemakers. His critics show that they misunderstand the concept of engagement when they ridicule it as making nice with nasty or hostile regimes.

Let’s get a few things straight. Engagement in statecraft is not about sweet talk. Nor is it based on the illusion that our problems with rogue regimes can be solved if only we would talk to them. Engagement is not normalization, and its goal is not improved relations. It is not akin to détente, working for rapprochement, or appeasement.

So how do you define an engagement strategy? It does require direct talks. There is simply no better way to convey authoritative statements of position or to hear responses. But establishing talks is just a first step. The goal of engagement is to change the other country’s perception of its own interests and realistic options and, hence, to modify its policies and its behavior.

Diplomatic engagement is proven to work — in the right circumstances. American diplomats have used it to change the calculations and behavior of regimes as varied as the Soviet Union, South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Cuba, China, Libya and, intermittently, Syria.

There is no cookie-cutter formula for making it work, however. In southern Africa in the 1980s, we directed our focus toward stemming violence between white-ruled South Africa and its black-ruled neighbors. This strategy put a priority on regional conflict management in order to stop cross-border attacks and create better conditions for internal political change. The United States also engaged with the Cubans in an effort aimed at achieving independence for Namibia (from South Africa) and at the removal of Cuban troops from Angola. In Mozambique, engagement meant building a constructive relationship with the United States, restraining South African interference in Mozambique’s internal conflicts and weaning the country from its Soviet alignment.

More recently, the Bush administration’s strategy for engagement with Libya ultimately led to the re-establishment of diplomatic relations and the elimination of that country’s programs to develop weapons of mass destruction.
While the details differ, each case of engagement has common elements. Engagement is a process, not a destination. It involves exerting pressure, by raising questions and hypothetical possibilities, and by probing the other country’s assumptions and thinking. Above all, it involves testing how far the other country might be willing to go. Properly understood, the diplomacy of engagement means raising questions that the other country may wish to avoid or be politically unable to answer. It places the ball in the other country’s court.

Engagement, of course, comes with risks. One is that domestic opponents will intentionally distort the purposes of engagement. Another risk is that each side may try to impose preconditions for agreeing to meet and talk — and ultimately negotiate. But we will not get far with the Iranians, for example, if we (and they) insist on starting by establishing the other side’s intentions.

Another risk is that, no matter what we say, the rogue regime may claim that engagement confers legitimacy. A more consequential danger is that a successful engagement strategy may leave the target regime in place and even strengthened, an issue that troubled some critics of the Bush administration’s 2003 breakthrough that led to the normalizing of relations between the United States and Libya.

But by far the greatest risk of engagement is that it may succeed. If we succeed in changing the position of the other country’s decision-makers, we then must decide whether we will take yes for an answer and reciprocate their moves with steps of our own. If talk is fruitful, a negotiation will begin about taking reciprocal steps down a jointly defined road. Engagement diplomacy forces us to make choices. Perhaps this is what frightens its critics the most.

As the Obama team works to fend off accusations that it is rushing into Russian, Iranian, Syrian or even North Korean arms, it will need to get the logic and definition of engagement right. In each case, we will need a clear-eyed assessment of what we are willing to offer in return for the changed behavior we seek. Engagement diplomacy may be easier to understand if the Obama administration speaks clearly at home about what it really requires.

**Economic development**

**Lay definition**
Business Dictionary
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/economic-development.html
Progress in an economy, or the qualitative measure of this. Economic development usually refers to the adoption of new technologies, transition from agriculture-based to industry-based economy, and general improvement in living standards.

**Economic engagement**

Economic engagement promotes interdependence as a long term strategy of gradual change.
The basic causal logic of economic engagement, and the emphasis on domestic politics, can be traced to Hirschman. He viewed economic engagement as a long-term, transformative strategy.
As one state gradually expands economic interaction with its target, the resulting (asymmetrical) interdependence creates vested interests within the target society and government. The beneficiaries of interdependence become addicted to it, and they protect their interests by pressuring the government to accommodate the source of interdependence. Economic engagement is a form of structural linkage; it is a means to get other states to want what you want, rather than to do what you want. The causal chain runs from economic interdependence through domestic political change to foreign policy accommodation.

**Economic engagement means positive sanctions**

Much of the renewed attention in political science to the question of interdependence and conflict focuses at the systemic level, on arguments and evidence linking the expansion of economic exchange among states on the one hand to the exacerbation of international conflict or the facilitation of international cooperation on the other. The approach taken in this contribution focuses instead at the state level, on the expansion of economic interdependence as a tool of statecraft. Under what circumstances does the cultivation of economic ties, i.e., the fostering of economic interdependence as a conscious state strategy, lead to important and predictable changes in the foreign policy behavior of a target state? Students of economic statecraft refer to this strategy variously as economic engagement, economic inducement, economic diplomacy, positive sanctions, positive economic linkage, or the use of economic “carrots” instead of sticks. Critics of the strategy call it economic appeasement.

**Economic engagement includes both explicit quid pro quos and unconditional strategies.**
Kahler, Professor of Political Science at UC San Diego and Kastner, Professor of Gov’t and Politics @ U of Maryland, 6
Miles and Scott, “Strategic Uses of Interdependence”,
www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/kastner/KahlerKastner.doc, Accessed 7/7/13 GAL

Scholars have usefully distinguished between two types of economic engagement: conditional policies that require an explicit quid-pro-quo on the part of the target country, and policies that are unconditional. Conditional policies, sometimes called “linkage” or economic “carrots,” are the inverse of economic sanctions. Instead of threatening a target country with a sanction absent a change in policy, conditional engagement policies promise increased economic flows in exchange for policy change. Drezner’s (1999/2000) analysis of conditional economic inducements yields a set of highly plausible expectations concerning when conditional strategies are likely to be employed, and when they are likely to succeed. Specifically, he suggests that reasons exist to believe, a priori, that policies of conditional engagement will be less prevalent than economic sanctions. First, economic coercion is costly if it fails (sanctions are only carried out if the target country fails to change policy), while conditional engagement is costly if it succeeds (economic payoffs are delivered only if the target country does change policy). Second, states may be reluctant to offer economic inducements with adversaries with whom they expect long-term conflict, as this may undermine their resolve in the eyes of their opponent while also making the opponent stronger. Third, the potential for market failure in an anarchic international setting looms large: both the initiating and the target states must be capable of making a credible
commitment to uphold their end of the bargain. These factors lead Drezner to hypothesize that the use of economic carrots is most likely to occur and succeed between democracies (because democracies are better able to make credible commitments than non-democracies), within the context of international regimes (because such regimes reduce the transactions costs of market exchange), and, among adversaries, only after coercive threats are first used. Unconditional engagement strategies are more passive in that they do not include a specific quid-pro-quo. Rather, countries deploy economic links with an adversary in the hopes that economic interdependence itself will, over time, effect change in the target’s foreign policy behavior and yield a reduced threat of military conflict at the bilateral level. How increased commercial and/or financial integration at the bilateral level might yield an improved bilateral political environment is not obvious. While most empirical studies on the subject find that increased economic ties tend to be associated with a reduced likelihood of military violence, no consensus exists regarding how such effects are realized. At a minimum, two causal pathways exist that state leaders might seek to exploit by pursuing a policy of unconditional engagement: economic interdependence can act as a constraint on the foreign policy behavior of the target state, and economic interdependence can act as a transforming agent that helps to reshape the goals of the target state.

**Engagement**

**Engagement is the opposite of isolation or disengagement**
Capie and Evans 2002 (David Capie is a Post-doctoral Research Fellow @ Institute of International Relations, Liu Center for Study of Global Issues, U of British Columbia, Vancouver. Paul Evans is Professor and Director of the Program on Canada-Asia Policy Studies, The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon, p. 110-111)
In the wider literature on security, engagement is used in a looser sense. First it is regularly employed to describe a state's attitude or posture towards the world at large, or sometimes towards a particular region. While this usage most commonly refers to the disposition of the United States, it has also been used to describe other states' attitudes. In this context engagement is often defined by what it is not. It is not "isolationism" or "disengagement". Speaking soon after the Clinton administration came to power, National Security Adviser Tony Lake described the "imperative" of continued U.S. engagement in world affairs. He gave as examples the United States' role in the Middle-East peace process; its role in Haiti; its relations with Russia and Japan; its role in the Group of Seven (G7); as well as in Somalia and Bosnia. Engagement is closer to the school of American foreign policy that usually falls under the label "internationalism". John Ruggie has said that American Presidents from the turn of the century have "sought to devise strategies of international engagement for the United States. They have differed little about why such engagement was deemed necessary; differences lie in their preferred means toward that end."11

**Distinct from Cooperation**
Michael Luck and Mark d’Inverno
Engagement and Cooperation in Motivated Agent Modelling
3 Engagement and Cooperation
Much existing work has defined cooperation only in terms of helpful agents that are predisposed to adopt the goals of another (e.g.[12, 2]). This assumes that agents are already designed with common or non-conflicting goals that facilitate the possibility of helping each other satisfy
additional goals. Our view differs in that autonomous agents will only adopt a goal if it is to their advantage to do so, while non-autonomous agents may benevolently adopt goals. This leads to the distinction between cooperation and engagement as discussed below. 3.1 Engagement A direct engagement occurs when a neutral-object or a server-agent adopts some goals. In a direct engagement, an agent with some goals, which we call the client, uses another agent, which we call the server, to assist them in the achievement of those goals. Remember that a server-agent is non-autonomous, and either exists already as a result of some other engagement, or is instantiated from a neutral object for the current engagement. No restriction is placed on a client-agent. We define a direct engagement to consist of a client agent, client, a server agent, server, and the goal that server is satisfying for client. An agent cannot engage itself, and both agents must have the goal of the engagement.

**Adjustment in behavior**
Ray Takeyh

It is Obama's declared engagement policy that has raised the ire of critics and led them to once more take refuge in the spurious yet incendiary charge of appeasement. Columnist Charles Krauthammer recently exclaimed, "When France chides you for appeasement, you know you're scraping bottom." Acknowledgement of America's misjudgments is derided as an unseemly apologia while diplomacy is denigrated as a misguided exercise in self-delusion. After all, North Korea continues to test its nuclear weapons and missiles, Cuba spurns America's offers of a greater opening, and the Iranian mullahs contrive conspiracy theories about how George Soros and the CIA are instigating a velvet revolution in their country. Tough-minded conservatives are urging a course correction and a resolute approach to the gallery of rogues that the president pledges to embrace. Such views miscast the essence of diplomatic engagement. Diplomacy is likely to be a painstaking process and it may not work with every targeted nation. However, the purpose of such a policy is not to transform adversaries into allies, but to seek adjustments in their behavior and ambitions. North Korea, Cuba, Syria, and Iran would be offered a path toward realizing their essential national interests should they conform to global conventions on issues such as terrorism and proliferation.

**Environmental**

**Lay definition**
Collins Dictionary

adjective [ADJ n]
Environmental means concerned with the protection of the natural world of land, sea, air, plants, and animals.

Environmental groups plan to stage public protests during the conference.

environmentally adverb [ADV adj]
...the high price of environmentally friendly goods.

2. adjective [ADJ n]
Environmental means relating to or caused by the surroundings in which someone lives or something exists.
It protects against environmental hazards such as wind and sun.

**Indigenous**

**No clear international definition, but based on self-identification**

United nations

Considering the diversity of indigenous peoples, an official definition of indigenous has not been adopted by any UN-system body. Instead the system has developed a modern understanding of this term based on the following: Self-identification as indigenous peoples at the individual level and accepted by the community as their member. Historical continuity with pre-colonial and/or pre-settler societies. Strong link to territories and surrounding natural resources. Distinct social, economic or political systems. Distinct language, culture and beliefs. From non-dominant groups of society. Resolve to maintain and reproduce their ancestral environment and systems as distinctive peoples and communities. A question of identity. According to the UN the most fruitful approach is to identify, rather than define indigenous peoples. This is based on the fundamental criterion of self-identification as underlined in a number of human rights documents.

**Lay definition**

Dictionary.com
http://www.dictionary.com/browse/indigenous

1. originating in and characteristic of a particular region or country; native (often followed by to): the plants indigenous to Canada; the indigenous peoples of southern Africa.
2. innate; inherent; natural (usually followed by to): feelings indigenous to human beings.

**Indigenous Peoples**

**People with historical ties to a particular territory; defined in international or national legislation**

IndigenousPeople.net
http://www.indigenouspeople.net/

Indigenous people are people defined in international or national legislation as having a set of specific rights based on their historical ties to a particular territory, and their cultural or historical distinctiveness from other populations that are often politically dominant. The concept of indigenous people defines these groups as particularly vulnerable to exploitation, marginalization and oppression by nation states that may still be formed from the colonising populations, or by politically dominant ethnic groups. As a result, a special set of political rights in accordance with international law have been set forth by international organizations such as the United Nations, the International Labour Organization and the World Bank. The United Nations has issued a Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples to guide member-state national policies to collective rights of indigenous people—such as culture, identity, language, and access to employment, health, education, and natural resources. Although no definitive definition of "indigenous peoples" exists, estimates put the total population of post-colonial indigenous peoples who seek human rights and discrimination redress from 220 million to 350 million.
Examples of Arctic Indigenous Peoples
Arctic Centre, University of Lapland
http://www.arcticcentre.org/EN/communications/arcticregion/Arctic-Indigenous-Peoples

Indigenous peoples have inhabited the Arctic for thousands of years. The proportion indigenous people is estimated to be about 10 percent of total population living in arctic areas. There are over 40 different ethnic groups living in the Arctic. Arctic indigenous peoples include for example Saami in circumpolar areas of Finland, Sweden, Norway and Northwest Russia, Nenets, Khanty, Evenk and Chukchi in Russia, Aleut, Yupik and Inuit (Iñupiat) in Alaska, Inuit (Inuvialuit) in Canada and Inuit (Kalaallit) in Greenland. All of the above-mentioned countries except Iceland have indigenous peoples living within their Arctic territory. Official statistics do not necessarily recognize indigenous populations separately, although differences occur. The number of indigenous people is not accurate because of the definition of indigenousness. See the map Demography of indigenous peoples of the Arctic based on linguistic groups. There is a great variation of cultural, historical and economical backgrounds among the groups. However, a common feature for most of the indigenous communities in the Arctic is that they have already undergone substantial changes due to the globalization of the western way of life, state policies, modern transport and the introduction of mixed economy. In general, indigenous people have a specific connection to land that they have inhabited. Other features, for example distinct language, culture and traditional livelihoods such as reindeer herding, fishing and hunting are characteristics of indigenous people in the Arctic. Industrialization, social change and environmental problems such as climate change, however, present threats to the continuity of these livelihoods and culture.

Mandate (Arctic Council)

Ottawa Declaration mandate
Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council
http://arcticcircle.uconn.edu/NatResources/Policy/decacouncil.html

The Arctic Council is established as a high level forum to: (a) provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States, with the involvement of the Arctic indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic. (b) oversee and coordinate the programs established under the AEPS on the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP); Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF); Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME); and Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR). (c) adopt terms of reference for, and oversee and coordinate a sustainable development program. (d) disseminate information, encourage education and promote interest in Arctic-related issues.

Limited to environment-oriented issues; excludes military and security issues
World Policy
https://worldpolicy.org/2016/09/19/evaluating-the-arctic-council-at-20-or-27/

When Canadian officials initiated the move to transform the AEPS into a more politically robust entity, they were hoping that the new body would be able to address all political issues concerning the Arctic, including security issues. However, the United States and some of the other northern states were hesitant about allowing such a politically active body. As a result, the
Arctic Council’s formal mandate was limited to environment-oriented issues, a field where the AEPS had already developed a constructive regime. Furthermore, issues relating to military security, whaling, and other politically sensitive subjects were explicitly excluded from its mandate. In part, this meant that the Arctic Council was designed to address issues where there was a good chance of success. On the other hand, it meant that it never had the opportunity to deal with the more contentious security issues that began to re-emerge in the mid-2000s.

Research focus
Daniel Ahrens, Berkeley Political Review
The Arctic Council was established in 1998 as a forum to aid the formulation of multilateral responses to environmental problems in the Arctic. Canada, Denmark (including Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States make up the Arctic Council. Each country chairs the council for two years, and the US will chair from 2015 to 2017. The Arctic Council has focused primarily on the coordination of research, with its primary working groups titled as unobtrusively as “Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna” or “Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment.” To protect its focus on scientific and environmental organization, military and political issues are excluded from the Arctic Council’s mandate.

Multilateral agreements

An international agreement involving three or more parties
Global Negotiator
https://www.globalnegotiator.com/international-trade/dictionary/multilateral-agreement/
A international agreement involving three or more parties. For example, the GATT (General Agreement o Tariffs and Trade) has been, since its establishments in 1947, seeking to promote trade liberalization through multilateral negotiations. See also bilateral trade agreement.

Written agreement between three or more sovereign states
USLegal.com
https://definitions.uslegal.com/m/multilateral-treaty/
A multilateral treaty is a written agreement between three or more sovereign states establishing the rights and obligations between the parties. They often result in international conference or gathering of nations done under the auspices of international organizations. Bilateral treaties, by contrast are negotiated between a limited number of states, most commonly only two, establishing legal rights and obligations between those two states only. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Geneva Conventions are the examples of multilateral treaties.

Multilateral cooperation

Involves several countries and a coordinating body
https://www.minminas.gov.co/web/ingles/types-of-cooperation
Multilateral Cooperation: It a type of cooperation discussed and channeled through international, regional and sub-regional organizations, which involves several countries with certain political,
regional or sector interests. Cooperation is implemented using their own resources or funds provided by member countries for specific topics. Examples include the United Nations (UN), the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the CAF Development Bank of Latin America. [6]

**Lay Definition**
adj.
1. Having many sides.
2. Involving more than two nations or parties: multilateral trade agreements.

**Protection**

**Lay definition**
Definition of protection
1 : the act of protecting : the state of being protected
2 a : one that protects
b : supervision or support of one that is smaller and weaker
c : a contraceptive device (such as a condom)
3 : the freeing of the producers of a country from foreign competition in their home market by restrictions (such as high duties) on foreign competitive goods
4 a : immunity from prosecution purchased by criminals through bribery
b : money extorted by racketeers posing as a protective association
5 : coverage 1a
6 : anchoring equipment placed in cracks for safety while rock climbing

**Environmental Protection**
Definition:
Environmental protection refers to any activity to maintain or restore the quality of environmental media through preventing the emission of pollutants or reducing the presence of polluting substances in environmental media. It may consist of:
(a) changes in characteristics of goods and services,
(b) changes in consumption patterns,
(c) changes in production techniques,
(d) treatment or disposal of residuals in separate environmental protection facilities,
(e) recycling, and
(f) prevention of degradation of the landscape and ecosystems.
What is ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION? Environmental guardianship based on policies and procedures. Objectives are (1) the conserving of natural resources, (2) the preserving of the existing natural environment and, (3) where possible, repairing damage and reversing trends.

**Reform**

**Lay definition**
Merriam-Webster
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/reform
Definition of reform
transitive verb
1 a : to put or change into an improved form or condition
b : to amend or improve by change of form or removal of faults or abuses
2 : to put an end to (an evil) by enforcing or introducing a better method or course of action
3 : to induce or cause to abandon evil ways: reform a drunkard
4 a : to subject (hydrocarbons) to cracking
b : to produce (gasoline, gas, etc.) by cracking

**Structure (Arctic Council)**

Weak organizational structure defined by consensus-based decision-making and composed of Member States, Permanent Participants, Observers, and Working Groups
Helga Haftendorn, Free University of Berlin
The scientific origins and distinctive composition of the Arctic Council are mirrored in its weak organizational structures. The Council can only move as far and as fast as its members are prepared to go. Chairs rotate among members and ministerial meetings take place every two years in the presiding country, which had also provided a secretariat and limited administrative services. With growing activities Arctic countries began to think about establishing a permanent secretariat as an element of strengthening the AC’s role. At their Nuuk Ministerial Meeting they accepted a Norwegian invitation to set up a small, standing AC Secretariat at Tromsø. In a deviation from previous rules, the secretariat is financed by members’ financial contributions. Hitherto all expenses had been covered according to the principle that costs lie where they fall, and by voluntary contributions from member and observer countries. The lack of a cost-sharing formula is a special hardship to the indigenous representatives and has circumscribed their participation in Council meetings, AC projects, working groups and task forces. Occasionally it has been suggested that the rich observer countries should support the involvement of indigenous peoples with special financial contributions, but at Nuuk – as noted above – the members adopted rules to pre-empt the possibility of the AC’s work being dominated by any rich non-Arctic country. Today, the Arctic Council is the most prominent and visible Arctic institutional actor in the region. It is not a decision-making organization, but rather a decision-shaping body based on consensus. Its primary function is to enable international cooperation on the environmental protection and the sustainable development of the Arctic. “As a producer and circulator of ideas and presentations the Arctic Council helps to spatially order the Arctic region.” It is unique among international organizations because it grew out of practical regional activities,
originally constituting little more than an umbrella for a number of specialized working groups, while recognizing their activities and providing suggestions for their further work.

**Scientific**

**Lay definition**
Merriam-Webster
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/scientific
Definition of scientific
1: of, relating to, or exhibiting the methods or principles of science
2: conducted in the manner of science or according to results of investigation by science: practicing or using thorough or systematic methods: scientific advertising, scientific baby care, a scientific boxer

**Social**

**Lay definition**
Merriam-Webster
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/social
1: involving allies or confederates: the Social War between the Athenians and their allies
2 a: marked by or passed in pleasant companionship with friends or associates: an active social life
   b: sociable
   c: of, relating to, or designed for sociability: a social club
3: of or relating to human society, the interaction of the individual and the group, or the welfare of human beings as members of society: social institutions
4 a: tending to form cooperative and interdependent relationships with others: “Infants can become social beings only through interaction with others.” —Gerald R. Leslie and Sheila K. Korman
   b: living and breeding in more or less organized communities especially for the purposes of cooperation and mutual benefit: not solitart: “Of the canid family, the wolf is one of the most social species, since it is a pack hunter.” —Michael W. Fox
   “The evolutionary theory of kin selection requires that social animals recognize their relatives so that altruistic behavior can be displayed preferentially toward kin.” —Science
   — see also social insect
   c of a plant: tending to grow in groups or masses so as to form a pure stand
5 a: of, relating to, or based on rank or status in a particular society: a member of our social set
   b: of, relating to, or characteristic of the upper classes
   c: formal
6: being such in social situations: a social drinker

**Study**

**Lay definition**
Merriam-Webster
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/study
Definition of study
plural studies
1 : a state of contemplation : reverie
2 a : application of the mental faculties to the acquisition of knowledge: years of study
   b : such application in a particular field or to a specific subject: the study of Latin
   c : careful or extended consideration: the proposal is under study
   d (1) : a careful examination or analysis of a phenomenon, development, or question
       (2) : the published report of such a study
3 : a building or room devoted to study or literary pursuits
4 : purpose, intent: it has been the study of my life to avoid those weaknesses —Jane Austen
5 a : a branch or department of learning : subject —often used in plural: American studies
   b : the activity or work of a student: returning to her studies after vacation
   c : an object of study or deliberation: every gesture a careful study —Marcia Davenport
   d : something attracting close attention or examination
6 : a person who learns or memorizes something (such as a part in a play) —usually used with a
   qualifying adjective: he's a quick study
7 : a literary or artistic production intended as a preliminary outline, an experimental
   interpretation, or an exploratory analysis of specific features or characteristics
8 : a musical composition for the practice of a point of technique

**Sustainable Development**

To protect and enhance the environment and the economies, culture, and health of
indigenous peoples and Arctic communities

Arctic Council
development-projects-for-arctic-communities

The goal of the Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG) is to propose and adopt steps
to be taken by the Arctic States to advance sustainable development in the Arctic, including
opportunities to protect and enhance the environment and the economies, culture and health of
Indigenous Peoples and Arctic communities, as well as to improve the environmental, economic
and social conditions of Arctic communities as a whole.

**Includes seven thematic areas**

Arctic Council
development-projects-for-arctic-communities

The thematic areas for SDWG projects and activities include:

**Arctic Human Health:**
To broaden the scope and strengthen the integration of human health activities within the
Council by developing concrete initiatives to improve the health and well-being of Indigenous
Peoples and other Arctic residents.

**Arctic Socio-Economic Issues:**
To advance on a better understanding of the human influences on the Arctic environment and the
socio-economic conditions of Indigenous Peoples and Arctic communities.

**Adaptation to Climate Change:**
To strengthen the work of the Council by reducing vulnerability and implementing adaptation initiatives related to climate change in the Arctic, including practical community-based actions.

Energy and Arctic Communities:
To consider future projects and activities in relation to the Arctic region as energy consumer, and the importance of environmentally friendly economic activity in the energy sector to ongoing social and economic development in the Arctic region.

Management of Natural Resources:
To consider that Indigenous Peoples and Arctic communities rely on the sustainable use of natural resources for their health and economic well-being; increases in shipping, petroleum activities, fishing, mining as well as external influences such as climate change and variability, require that the management of resources is based on a holistic perspective.

Arctic Cultures and Languages:
To support Arctic cultures; to reduce the loss of Arctic Indigenous languages and to follow-up on the Arctic Indigenous Languages Symposium.

Strategic Planning:
To develop a more integrated and inclusive approach to managing and planning SDWG priority-based activities undertaken in collaboration with other Arctic Council Working Groups, Permanent Participants, Arctic community stakeholders and external partners.

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Prospective Topic Paragraph

The Arctic is an emerging geopolitical region characterized by complex, multi-scalar, and rapidly evolving environmental, political, and economic processes. An Arctic topic is particularly timely because environmental shifts in the region are endangering Arctic peoples and the Arctic environment, while also opening up new opportunities for economic development. This produces a topic area that rife with complex contradictions that can be exploited by both teams. There will be immense trade-offs between actions that focus on economic development, environmental protection, or empowerment of indigenous communities. There is also an international forum, the Arctic Council, for political dialogue between eight Arctic Member States, ensuring that the topic is strongly focused on international action. Categories of possible affirmative cases include the following: increasing collaboration with indigenous peoples in the Arctic; improving Arctic infrastructure, sustainable development, and safety planning; implementing new social programs for Arctic communities; increasing support for scientific and environmental programs; increasing bilateral or multilateral collaboration with other Arctic states; and reforming the Arctic Council’s mandate or structure to better solve current Arctic problems. Potential negative arguments include environment and economy disadvantages; politics and geopolitics disadvantages; international actor counterplans; consult indigenous peoples counterplans; and indigenous-based criticisms.
Summary Report: Arctic/Arctic Council
Jason C. Young

Prioritized Potential Resolutions

1. The Arctic Council Member States should substantially increase and/or reform their multilateral cooperation in the Arctic.
2. The United States federal government should substantially increase its multilateral cooperation in the Arctic.
3. The United States federal government should substantially increase its support of Arctic Council programs.
4. The United States federal government should substantially increase its support for multilateral efforts on sustainable development in the Arctic.
5. The United States federal government should substantially increase its bilateral cooperation in the Arctic.

Potential Affirmative Case Areas

Potential harm areas for affirmative teams include indigenous knowledge, livelihoods, and politics; geopolitics and international relations; environmental issues including climate change, pollution, and biodiversity; and economic or sustainable development. Depending on the final wording of the resolution, potential solvency methods may include the following:

- Increasing Support of or Collaboration with Indigenous Peoples in the Arctic
- Improving Arctic Infrastructure, Sustainable Development, and Safety Planning
- Implementing of New Social Programs for the Resilience of Arctic Communities
- Implementing or Increasing Support for Scientific and Environmental Programs
- Increasing Collaboration between Key International Actors, such as the US and Russia
- Reforming the Arctic Council’s Mandate or Structure to Better Solve Current Arctic Problems

Potential Negative Approaches

Potential negative ground may include the following:

- Environment and Economy Disadvantages – the tension between economic development and environmental protection will be one of the largest areas of debate on the topic
- Politics and Geopolitics Disadvantages – many Arctic issues are divisive both in domestic political arenas (e.g., climate change in the United States) and on the international stage (e.g., disagreements over human rights and indigenous peoples)
- International Actor Counterplans – there are eight different Arctic countries, giving the negative many options for counterplan actors
- Consult Permanent Participants Counterplan – increased consultation of indigenous peoples is uniquely important in the context of indigenous relations and colonialism within the Arctic Council
• Indigenous-based Criticisms – negative teams can argue that affirmative methods for economic development, environmental management, or scientific study perpetuate colonial violence at material and epistemological levels

**Debatability of the Topic**

An Arctic resolution can be scoped to ensure a well limited topic that provides fair affirmative and negative ground. As mentioned above, this resolution would have a natural scope because of the geographic boundedness of the Arctic and the pre-existing mandates and programs of the Arctic Council. The exact dimensions of affirmative ground will be impacted by the selection of an actor for the resolution. Choosing the Arctic Council or United States federal government will provide a more limited set of possible affirmative cases, while choosing a broader set of Arctic Council Member States as actors will expand affirmative ground. The physical and social attributes of the topic – low human population, nascent economy, and fragile environment – will likely also limit affirmative ground, since they impact what academic literature is available. However, these areas have large amounts of literature associated with them, and will give affirmative teams access to large and varied harm impacts. Regardless of how the resolution is worded, negative teams are assured ample ground. The Arctic is characterized by very complex issues, and action in the Arctic to solve one set of harms often exacerbates other harms. For instance, economic development and environmental protection are often in tension with one another, and indigenous interests in the Arctic can clash with both of these initiatives. This guarantees strong negative disadvantage ground. Because there are eight Arctic Council Member States, the negative will have access to some set of international actor counterplans. Finally, the colonial context of the Arctic will give negative (and critically minded affirmatives) access to unique ground for criticisms, in addition to more generic economic and environmental critiques.

**Topic Area Synopsis**

The Arctic is an emerging geopolitical region characterized by complex, multi-scalar, and rapidly evolving environmental, political, and economic processes. An Arctic topic is particularly timely because environmental shifts in the region are endangering Arctic peoples and the Arctic environment, while also opening up new opportunities for economic development. This produces a topic area that rife with complex contradictions that can be exploited by both teams. There will be immense trade-offs between actions that focus on economic development, environmental protection, or empowerment of indigenous communities. There is also an international forum, the Arctic Council, for political dialogue between eight Arctic Member States, ensuring that the topic is strongly focused on international action. Categories of possible affirmative cases include the following: increasing collaboration with indigenous peoples in the Arctic; improving Arctic infrastructure, sustainable development, and safety planning; implementing new social programs for Arctic communities; increasing support for scientific and environmental programs; increasing bilateral or multilateral collaboration with other Arctic states; and reforming the Arctic Council’s mandate or structure to better solve current Arctic problems. Potential negative arguments include environment and economy disadvantages; politics and geopolitics disadvantages; international actor counterplans; consult indigenous peoples counterplans; and indigenous-based criticisms.