INDIA

A Topic Proposal for the
National Federation of High Schools Topic Selection Committee

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The 2018-2019 foreign policy topic offers an opportunity to focus on a country that is particularly relevant in the current international climate and has been neglected by the policy debate community: India.

India has only made one appearance in a resolution from high school or college (1992-1993 RESOLVED: "That the United States should substantially change its development and assistance policies toward one or more of the following nations: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burma, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka."). While there have been multiple single-country on Russia and China, and various resolutions dealing with regions like Latin America or Africa, India has been noticeably left out of the foreign policy resolution rotation.

India has one of the largest and fastest growing populations in the world. Indian-Americans are also a significant and growing demographic in the US. According to the Pew Research Center, 3.2 million Indian Americans reside in the US (Desilver, 2014). In addition, Indian immigrants are the second largest immigrant group after immigrants from Mexico, with 2.4 million Indian immigrants residing in the United States as of 2015 (Zong et al., 2017). The debate community would do well to spend a year discussing such an important country.

There are many aspects to India’s economy that would be good areas to debate. India boasts a “$2 trillion economy” that is “growing at approximately 7 percent per year” (Jaishankar, 2017). Furthermore, “India’s trade as a percentage of GDP is 42 percent, higher than China’s” (Jaishankar, 2017), which demonstrates how interconnected their economy is with the rest of the world and, therefore, the relevance of a topic investigating the US-India economic relationship. An Indian economy topic could cover areas such as trade, investment, technology, energy, agriculture, and intellectual property.

When it comes to their military prowess, India “has a large and capable military experienced in dealing with a broad array of security challenges” (Jaishankar, 2017). In addition, India “is the world’s largest importer of defense equipment” (Jaishankar, 2017), which is evidence of a robust debate around US-India military cooperation. An India topic that involves the military would touch on areas such as China, Japan, Australia, Pakistan, maritime commerce, nuclear cooperation, and cybersecurity.

Other potential areas an India topic could include are social issues (such as poverty, gendered violence, discrimination, immigration, public health, education, foreign aid, and disaster relief), and India’s involvement in global governance (in forums such as the UNSC, World Bank, G-20, ASEAN, and WTO), both of which cover a wide variety of problems.
The following is introductory research regarding a potential India topic. The topic areas are split between economic/development and military areas. We hope you will consider an India topic for the upcoming slate of resolutions.
The election of President Trump created uncertainty for the Modi administration, which has made an effort to better understand how this new era of American politics will affect the relationship (Madan, 2017). Some people believe the US-India relationship has been a point of focus for the Trump administration for many reasons: India was the only country that the Trump administration created a 100-year plan for; Trump’s first National Security Strategy “described India as a "leading global power" and stressed on deepening US' strategic partnership with New Delhi and support its leadership role in maintaining security in the Indo-Pacific region;” and Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Trump met twice in 2017 (The Economic Times, 2017).

However, concerns remain about whether or not the Trump administration will back up its positive rhetoric with strong action (The Economic Times, 2017). While the relationship has avoided the public spotlight and mass media attention for the most part, when India “has been in the American spotlight, the attention has been of the unwanted kind: related to attacks against Indians, criticisms from Trump himself over climate issues, or reports on the president’s businesses in India” (Madan, 2017). Still, the relationship between Trump and Modi seems relatively strong compared to the personal distaste many other leaders around the world have for Trump, creating a solid foundation to build policy on (Kugelman, 2017).

There are irritants in the relationship now, but both leaders have developed a good rapport, and have a list of contentious policy areas to work on.


There was something both familiar and reassuring about Indian prime minister Narendra Modi’s recent visit to Washington. It was familiar because it was reminiscent of his previous trips here as premier. And at a time when the world has seemingly been turned upside down by disorienting levels of change, anything familiar is reassuring. Ever since Donald Trump took office five months ago, we’ve heard so much about how everything is so different in Washington and in the world on the whole. And indeed, from the way he runs the White House to his views about his business interests, and from the way he interacts with foreign officials to his intention to lighten the U.S. footprint overseas, there is much that has changed. The U.S.-India relationship has gotten caught up in this new zeitgeist, introducing new irritants into a relationship that had experienced an extended warming pattern in recent years. The Trump administration’s vow to rein in the H1B visa program, which allows high-skills workers to live in the United States, worries New Delhi and the powerful Indian information-technology firms
that are the program’s main beneficiaries. Trump’s relative silence following the murder of several Indian-Americans earlier this year concerns Indians even more. New Delhi is also none too pleased about Trump’s false claim that India receives billions of dollars in aid from the developed world to participate in the Paris climate accord. More broadly, Trump’s hostility to climate change and clean energy has deprived the U.S.-India relationship of one of its newest and fastest-growing areas of cooperation. And his strident anti-trade position threatens to undercut bilateral economic ties at a time when India, after many years of resistance, is tightening its embrace of globalization. And then Modi came to town. From start to finish, the Indian premier’s stay in Washington was a case of, in the immortal words of Yogi Berra, “déjà vu all over again.” In the end, his visit telegraphed a fittingly familiar message: The U.S.-India relationship is going places, and fast. On Saturday evening, when Modi’s plane landed at Andrews Air Force Base, and again when he reached his Washington hotel, an adoring gaggle of Indian-American supporters was, as always, waiting to greet him. On Sunday, he participated in two events that typically precede his meetings with official Washington. One was a roundtable with American CEOs. Privately, some of them may believe India’s investment climate still leaves much to be desired. Still, these corporate titans had good reason to be encouraged. New Delhi’s “Make in India” policy, which encourages foreign firms to set up shop in India, and the recent implementation of a new goods and services tax signify Modi’s strong intent to make India a more attractive investment destination. The other familiar event was a speech to the Indian diaspora at a Ritz Carlton Hotel in northern Virginia. It wasn’t as raucous as Modi’s previous diaspora shindigs—he delivered a subdued speech in a hotel conference room, not a rollicking address to a sports arena blaring Bollywood tunes—but it sounded the same themes about the critical role played by Indian-Americans in the U.S.-India relationship. Monday brought another familiar sight: droves of Indian journalists on the streets of Washington, most of them staking out positions along a small patch of real estate stretching from the Willard Intercontinental, where the premier was staying, to the White House a few blocks away. When Modi visits Washington, the Indian media come out in force. And they always ask why the American press corps don’t do the same. After meetings with several members of Trump’s cabinet, Modi arrived at the White House in the late afternoon. Trump and Modi greeted each other with smiles and a handshake, and they appeared to swap a joke. In their very first moments together, their body language was positive and assured—signifying, perhaps, that in time they’ll develop the strong chemistry that characterized the Obama-Modi rapport. Later, after their private meeting, when Trump and Modi appeared together in the Rose Garden, Modi initiated two of the signature bear hugs that have spawned umpteen memes and GIFs. The first one was rather awkward, with Trump appearing unsure how to position himself, but the second one was decidedly more natural. These Trump-Modi hugs won’t be mistaken for the deep and confident embraces shared by Obama and Modi, but they did underscore the continued salience of personal relations in the U.S.-India partnership.
The meeting between Trump and Modi showed the two can overcome hurdles in the relationship, but so far, it has been all talk. Now it’s time for action, which will determine the course and strength of the partnership.

Ashok Sajjanhar 6/20/17, President, Institute of Global Studies, and a former Ambassador of India to Kazakhstan, Sweden and Latvia, "India-US Relations: On the Upward Trajectory", Institute of Defense Studies and Analyses, https://idsa.in/idsacomments/india-us-relations-on-the-upward-trajectory_asajjanhar_300617

Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited the United States on 25-26 June at the invitation of the new President of the United States Donald Trump. This was Modi’s first meeting with Trump, although the two leaders had spoken to each other on three occasions after Trump won the election. One call was made by Modi and two by Trump, the last one being by Trump in end-March to congratulate Modi for the emphatic victory of the BJP in the Uttar Pradesh elections. Notwithstanding these pleasant and reassuring conversations, a sense of unease did prevail in the run-up to Modi’s visit. Several reasons contributed to this disquiet, the most recent being Trump’s outburst against India on 1 June while announcing the US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Change Accord. He accused India of demanding billions of dollars to comply with its commitments under the Paris Pact. This was resolutely refuted by External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj, but the damage was done. In addition, Trump’s attitude and behaviour over the last five months gave the impression that he is fickle, mercurial, unpredictable and impulsive. He has applied himself single-mindedly over this period to overturn most of the initiatives of his predecessor. In addition to the Paris Climate Change Pact, he withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement and is not leaving any stone unturned to reverse the policies initiated by Obama on Iran and Cuba. On the domestic front as well, similar efforts are visible. It was feared that Trump might decide to put India-US relations in neutral gear, if not exactly in the reverse. This would have been a huge setback for Modi who has invested enormous political capital and effort over the last three years in bringing bilateral ties to where they are today. The fact that the visit was taking place after five months of Trump’s assumption of the presidency was also commented upon adversely by several analysts as proof that India was not a priority for the new US administration. It was asserted that all major American partners including Japan, Germany, United Kingdom, China, etc. had already met Trump. This was an erroneous assessment. India itself did not wish to appear to be in a tearing hurry to go calling immediately after Trump's inauguration. It wanted to bide time. Moreover, this period gave Trump time to settle in and deal with pressing domestic issues such as immigration, jobs, healthcare, etc. Modi's visit after a reasonable interregnum was considered ideal timing to make Trump focus on the strategic partnership between India and USA. The final results have proved the validity of this assessment. On account of the rather discouraging build up to the visit, it was suggested that expectations should be kept modest and no big-bang announcements should be expected. It was billed as a get-to-know each other meeting. The mood lifted perceptibly just before the onset of the visit with Trump’s tweet extending a warm
welcome to his "true friend" Modi. The White House announced that Modi will be accorded a red carpet welcome and that he would be the first foreign leader to dine at the White House after Trump’s assumption of office. In the backdrop of initial apprehensions, Modi’s visit can be termed an unqualified success. It provided a valuable opportunity to the two leaders to spend time with each other, get to know each other, and establish a warm, comfortable and respectful working relationship. They exuded easy camaraderie and bonhomie with each other. The body language was reassuring and encouraging. In addition, several significant decisions were taken during the visit and reassurance received that the upward trajectory of bilateral ties will continue unabated. The biggest takeaway in substantive terms was the stern language against Pakistan and the designation of Syed Salahuddin, the ‘supreme commander’ of the Kashmiri militant outfit Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist because of his pronouncements about wreaking havoc in Kashmir and making it a graveyard for Indian forces. This is a huge slap on Pakistan’s face. To compound the ignominy heaped on it, Pakistan has been mentioned twice by name in the Joint Statement issued at the end of the visit, once to ensure that its territory is not used to launch terror strikes against other countries, and the second to expeditiously bring to justice the perpetrators of the 26/11 Mumbai, Pathankot, and other cross-border terrorist attacks perpetrated by Pakistan-based groups. The Joint Statement also names terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed and others, and exhorts the international community to take united, stringent action against them. Other actions identified by the Joint Statement include increased intelligence sharing, operational-level counterterrorism cooperation, exchange of information on known and suspected terrorists for travel screening, strengthening information exchange on plans, movements and linkages of terrorist groups and their leaders, terror financing, etc. The real test of the commitments assumed by the two countries will lie in action taken by them in the coming months. For the time being, all this represents a collection of pious intentions. Keeping in view Trump’s strong position on global terrorism, there are better prospects today than at any time in the past that suitable action will be taken by the two countries to quell this menace.

There’s a litany of situations where there is uncertainty in the direction the US is going to take on issues affecting India. Aff teams would have many different policy areas to focus on, including development (trade, investment, visas, immigration, intellectual property, clean tech) and military (Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Indo-Pacific, China, military exercises, terrorism).


The upcoming trip has been action-forcing to some extent, and brought India some attention; Delhi will also hope it’ll bring greater clarity on certain bilateral, regional, and global issues where there is continued uncertainty—and in some cases greater concern—about the
administration’s approach. On the bilateral front, the Indian government is having to adapt to President Trump’s more transactional approach, rather than the more strategic one that prevailed towards India in previous administrations. On economic issues, there continue to be differences on trade, investment, and immigration policies. The Trump administration has highlighted concerns over the trade deficit with India (which, at $30.8 billion is a tenth that with China, but nonetheless is under administration review), tariffs (referring to a country with a 100 percent tariff on motorcycle imports), intellectual property concerns, and market access for American companies. Complaints on these fronts have also come from some members of Congress and the private sector. India, in turn, is concerned about standards and technical regulations that affect its exports to the United States, and potential changes to the high-skilled visa programs (particularly, but not only, H-1Bs). The safety of Indians and, to some extent, Indian Americans in the United States has also been an issue, particularly after the killing of an Indian engineer in Kansas. On the regional front: To its west, India has been following the administration’s review of Afghanistan policy. Delhi is concerned about the security situation there, the Ghani government’s stability, and what it sees as a China-Pakistan-Russia-Iran tactical tag-team, particularly vis-à-vis the Taliban. It wants to see Washington remain engaged in Afghanistan, but will also be wary if this means a carrots-heavy approach toward Pakistan. In the past, this has meant military aid for Rawalpindi, but also what Delhi has seen as attempts to push it to make concessions to Islamabad. After comments from U.S. ambassador to the U.N. Nikki Haley about the United States potentially taking a more “proactive” role to de-escalate tensions between India and Pakistan, Delhi stressed that this was a bilateral problem for Delhi and Islamabad to resolve. The State Department subsequently clarified that it encouraged “direct dialogue.” Indian officials will closely follow the interagency review on Pakistan. They will watch for further indications that the administration is willing to press Pakistan (such as the reported drone strike against targets in Pakistan). Delhi also wants clarity on whether the U.S. counterterrorism approach in the region will be group-specific (against groups like ISIS or the Haqqani network) or more all-encompassing (i.e. including Pakistan-based terrorist groups targeting India, like Lashkar-e-Taiba). Also to its west, Indian officials have concerns about the deteriorating Iran-U.S. dynamic, which has affected its plans for developing the port of Chabahar (policymakers in Delhi are relieved, at the same time, that the Iran deal has not—yet—been jettisoned). To India’s east, questions about the U.S. role in the Indo-Pacific remain, and there are concerns about the administration’s approach to China—strategic convergence in this area has been a major driver for the U.S.-India relationship. Delhi was not pleased by the bonhomie on display during and after the Trump-Xi summit, statements by Secretary of State Tillerson on his visit to China, the apparent upgrading of the U.S. delegation to the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing (which the Indian government declined to attend), and the perceived utility of China vis-à-vis North Korea. More reassuring was Defense Secretary Mattis’ speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue, which quoted Modi on freedom of navigation and acknowledged India’s role in the Indian Ocean region, as well as some recent signals on U.S. freedom of
navigation operations. The two sides also went ahead with their maritime security dialogue in May, and the joint India-Japan-U.S. Malabar exercise is scheduled for July. On the global front, the administration’s attitude on multilateral trade, climate change, and terrorism have raised questions. But more broadly, potential global U.S. disengagement—or as the foreign secretary put it “changes in the terms of engagement between the United States and the world”—will raise crucial challenges, and some opportunities, for Indian policymakers. Even those in India who had been optimistic about Trump have expressed concern about his approach to countries like China and Saudi Arabia, and his recent criticism of India, as well as the lack of what they’d hoped would be a U.S. rapprochement with Russia, and the prevailing atmosphere in the U.S. for immigrants and minorities. In this context, the upcoming visit is being seen as a chance to reinvigorate the relationship.
One way for a resolution to address India’s economic issues is through development assistance or cooperation:

Development assistance must be provided between governments and promote economic development/welfare as its main objective

The current international framework: definition and target The following definition of ODA was agreed by the DAC to measure and compare the expenditure of donor countries: Official development assistance is defined as those flows to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients and to multilateral institutions which are: i. provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and ii. each transaction of which: a) is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and b) is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25% (calculated at a rate of discount of 10%). The decisive factor in determining whether funding qualifies as ODA is that its primary aim must be to promote economic development and prosperity in developing countries. Only concessional aid qualifies as ODA. These funding flows must come from official government agencies and must be spent in countries on the DAC list of developing countries and multilateral institutions.

Development cooperation is distinct from development assistance---cooperation goes beyond finance


Development cooperation is crucial to development progress – that much we know. It is the world’s attempt to work together to achieve commonly held ambitions, and to support those parts of the world that need special assistance. But we use the phrase ‘development cooperation’ without much thought. It has become the jargon of choice, especially in an era when people like to look ‘beyond aid’ and the now old-fashioned donor/recipient language. But what is development cooperation really? In a new paper for the UN’s Development Cooperation Forum, meeting this week in Korea, we try to answer that question. As globalisation intensifies, and relationships between countries become more specialised, it is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish development cooperation from other actions necessary for the good of the planet or to meet domestic objectives. This trend is set to continue as the era of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) beckons, setting a range of global objectives not just limited to poverty reduction in poor countries. Traditionally, the term
has been almost synonymous with financial aid – or even more narrowly with official development assistance (ODA). But as the number and diversity of countries and organisations engaged in international development has increased, the ways development support is carried out have become more varied than ever before. It now goes well beyond financial transfers, with an increasing focus on technical and technological cooperation. Furthermore, at the other extreme from traditional financial aid, development cooperation can include, for instance, remittances or foreign direct investment (FDI) that supports development. As with any new reality, language and definitions are often slow to catch up. But we need clarity to describe support for developing country efforts to build inclusive and sustainable development strategies. Development cooperation is not just ODA, nor Financing for Development (FfD), international public finance (IPF), or total official support for development (TOSD). All of these terms attempt to measure certain aspects of the field, but none of them capture precisely what we are talking about, not least because cooperation goes well beyond finance. But development cooperation is not the same as international cooperation such as sharing rules on international flights or adopting preventive measures against terrorism either. While providing international public goods (IPGs) may be part of the global development agenda, it is not necessarily development cooperation. Switching to cleaner fuels at home can hardly be construed as primarily an act in support of poorer countries, although it may also have that benefit. With the above in mind, here are our four criteria for what constitutes development cooperation: 1. It aims explicitly to support national or international development priorities. Not all international public non-profit activity is development cooperation. For instance, internationally coordinated security manoeuvres or support to developing countries’ military capacity may require plenty of international cooperation but it would not be classified as development cooperation. In order to help classify activities by whether they are developmental or not – there will always be grey areas – we should rely on globally agreed goals, namely the internationally agreed development goals, such as the MDGs and proposed SDGs, alongside other international or regional development agreements. 2. It is not driven by profit. This is the critical added value of development cooperation. Development cooperation means doing something that is not-for-profit, or that accepts a lower profit than the market would offer. It would not happen if profit incentives alone were followed, or at least not in the same way. It is about correcting market failures and rules that impede or undermine developmental objectives. That said, development cooperation can also play a role in incentivising genuine for-profit activities with positive developmental impacts. 3. It discriminates in favour of developing countries. Only if an action tries deliberately to create new opportunities for developing countries, in a discriminatory way, and taking into account the structural impediments that limit poor countries’ development, can it be considered development cooperation. This criterion will be increasingly important when it comes to implementing the post-2015 agenda, as it distinguishes development cooperation from international action on sustainable development more generally. 4. It is based on cooperative
relationships that seek to enhance developing country ownership Development cooperation should be based on cooperative and non-hierarchical relationships between international partners that seek to complement resources and capacities. These relationships should be respectful of national sovereignty in defining and steering national development strategies and should seek to widen developing countries' room for manoeuvre, limiting the restrictions and enhancing the opportunities that shape their development processes. Any activities complying with all of these four criteria should be regarded as ‘development cooperation’.

Military assistance can include foreign military financing, international military training, counter-narcotics assistance, non-proliferation, anti-terrorism, and peacekeeping operations FAS 07, Federation of American Scientists, "U.S. Foreign Military Assistance", https://fas.org/asmp/profiles/aid/aidindex.htm

Listed below are several U.S. programs that provide foreign states with military and related assistance, directly and indirectly supporting U.S. arms transfers. Foreign Military Financing: Foreign Military Financing refers to congressionally appropriated grants given to foreign governments to finance the purchase of American-made weapons, services and training. Since 1950, the US government has provided over $91 billion in FMF to militaries around the world. The vast majority of these funds goes to Israel and Egypt to reward them for making a cold peace in 1979. Economic Support Fund: Congress established the economic support fund (ESF) to promote economic and political stability in strategically important regions where the United States has special security interests. The funds are provided on a grant basis and are available for a variety of economic purposes, like infrastructure and development projects. Although not intended for military expenditure, these grants allow the recipient government to free up its own money for military programs. International Military Education and Training: International Military Education and Training (IMET) grants are given to foreign governments to pay for professional education in military management and technical training on US weapons systems. Over 2,000 courses are offered, including some on human rights and civil-military relations. This program is said by its proponents to promote positive military-to-military contacts, thereby familiarizing foreign officers with "US values and democratic processes," though critics argue there is too much emphasis on military skills and not enough on human rights. The Expanded IMET program offered to certain states only focuses on the latter. Counter-Narcotics Assistance: Through International Narcotics Control programs, the US government provides funds for military equipment and training to overseas police and armed forces to combat the production and trafficking of illegal drugs. These funds are generally dedicated to the export of firearms and the refurbishment of surveillance aircraft, transport planes and helicopters.Additional counter-narcotics training and equipment is provided by the Department of Defense, the Drug Enforcement Agency and other agencies. In recent years, human rights abuses by military and police units receiving this aid - especially in Colombia - have intensified
criticism of the program. Non-Proliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs: This category of funding provides resources in support of a variety of security-related foreign policy objectives. Funds go to nuclear non-proliferation programs, anti-terrorism aid, demining activities, and - a new item in FY 2001 - small arms destruction programs. "Anti-Terrorism Program of the Department of State," State Department, 1985. Obtained by the National Security Archive. Peacekeeping Operations: These funds provide voluntary support for international peacekeeping activities (as opposed to the U.S. share of UN-assessed peacekeeping operations, which is financed elsewhere). PKO funds promote increased involvement of regional organizations in conflict resolution and help leverage support for multinational efforts where no formal cost sharing mechanism is available.

Here are some potential resolulional phrases that could describe the action taken between the US and India:

Assistance
Relations
Cooperation
Partner/Partnership
Ties

Here are some potential verbs to describe the resolulional actions:

Increase
Cooperate
Deepen
Upgrade
Advance
Reinvigorate
Enhance
Top Suggestions

The United States federal government should substantially increase its development and/or military assistance to the Government of India.

The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic and/or military cooperation with the Government of India.

Other Ideas

The United States federal government should substantially change its foreign policy toward the Government of India.

The United States federal government should substantially increase its military and/or economic engagement with the Government of India.

The United States federal government should substantially increase its military and/or economic partnership with the Government of India.

The United States federal government should deepen its military and/or economic partnership with the Government of India.

The United States should significantly upgrade its military and/or economic ties with the Government of India.

The United States federal government should cooperate with the Government of India on military and/or economic matters.
Sphere of influence
India is an important country in South Asia that other countries, such as Russia and China, have an interest in. Both countries see India as an important part of their sphere of influence and therefore are competing with the United States to be India’s primary economic partner. This has ripple effects on the influence those countries have in the region, as well as their perception globally. Would it be good to crowd out competitors like Russia and China by increasing development assistance? Or are those countries better influences in the region?

Industries
Many important industries in India compete with other countries to attract investment (nuclear energy, agriculture, oil, defense). But, would it be good if these industries strengthened their ties to other countries like the US? Would it make India vulnerable to donor leverage by giving a country undue power over the development over their industry? Would it collapse India’s foreign exchange reserves? Or would their industries flourish and require development assistance to be competitive?

Modeling
Empirically, other countries have used development assistance to India as a training ground to develop experience and learn lessons about how to/whether to provide development assistance to other countries besides India. What lessons can India offer? What countries would or would not receive development assistance as a result? Would development assistance to other countries be a good idea?


The issue of development aid has significant contemporary relevance. Today, many longstanding donor countries like the United States debate the efficacy of aid, while new donors such as China and India explore the possibility of using economic assistance for political purposes. As David Engerman, Professor of History at Brandeis University, shows in his new book The Price of Aid, development politics can have significant – often unintentional and undesirable – effects for both donor and recipient countries. Much of Engerman’s narrative focuses on India, and explores how different domestic constituencies used the two superpowers to advance their own economic and political objectives. Among the individuals who played important roles were the statistician P.C. Mahalanobis and Homi Bhabha, who headed India’s atomic energy programme. Both courted the United States and Soviet Union at the same time, and tried to advance their personal ambitions along with their broader objective
of furthering India’s development. India, particularly initially, was deeply ambivalent about aid, but saw utility at various points of time. The campus of Mahalanobis’s Indian Statistical Institute (ISI) in Calcutta hosted such Cold War figures as U.S. Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson, Cuban revolutionary Che Guevara, and Soviet statesman Alexei Kosygin, as well as three of the first four winners of the Nobel Prize in Economics. Meanwhile, Bhabha used his direct contacts with Washington to Moscow (even hosting delegations from the two countries at the same time in February 1960) to sidestep Indian government agencies such as the Planning Commission and the Cabinet. Similar development politics played out in other sectors such as agriculture, oil, and defence. India tried to be – in the words of the prominent Polish economist Michal Kalecki – the “clever calf that suckles from two cows.” But instead India incurred significant costs in the process in the form of donor leverage. Nor was there a significant improvement in India’s economic condition. Following the second Five Year Plan in 1956, India’s foreign exchange reserves collapsed, and the country required loans from a consortium led by the United States and the World Bank. India, particularly initially, was deeply ambivalent about aid, but saw utility at various points of time. The freedom struggle had made India inclined towards import substitution and pessimistic about the prospects of exports. Various ministries felt differently about this, leading to sharp differences about the benefits of foreign assistance within the Cabinet. Even technical assistance was viewed with a great deal of scepticism: the assistance that contributed to the Green Revolution was perceived in some quarters as an excuse to increase U.S. fertiliser exports to India. Later, some of India’s objections to foreign assistance diminished because of strategic considerations. For example, an agreement for Soviet MiG combat aircraft was concluded with the mistaken belief that it would help deter China. At other points, India was dragged into the domestic politics and economics of the superpowers. Once he began to harbour presidential ambitions, Senator John F. Kennedy reached out to India and advocated increased aid to the country to appease the left wing of the Democratic Party, for whom India was a darling. Similarly, U.S. food aid to India was often a product of oversupply rather than altruism. All the while, U.S. and Soviet officials spoke the common language of helping to “put India on its own two feet.” But just as development aid had unexpected and significant consequences for India, Engerman argues that the aid policies of the United States and Soviet Union were both primarily defined by the India experience. Essentially both Washington and Moscow learned about the politics and economics of development aid – the potential and the pitfalls – from the process of dealing with India. This was reflected in the changing nature of U.S. aid to India. U.S. assistance began with community development programs in the early 1950s, when technical assistance trainers were sent to Indian villages. India was the largest recipient of U.S. community development assistance during this time. But while big on rhetoric and goodwill, it was accompanied by relatively little financial assistance (just 6 cents per beneficiary per year). In the early 1960s, India asked the Kennedy Administration for funds that were unlinked to projects in order to finance imports, so called “free money.” But instead, as the Cold War heated up, aid became increasingly linked to
outcomes and was subject to narrower U.S. conditions, such as on family planning, food aid, and reduced Indian criticism of the Vietnam War. In other words, project aid initially meant to develop the Indian economy gradually evolved to programme aid whose express purpose was to shape Indian policy. The changing nature of U.S. assistance increased donor leverage and therefore presented new challenges to the Indian policy-making community. Among other consequences, it helped ensure that very little technological transfer took place. Similarly, the Soviet approach to economic cooperation in the developing world began with India in the 1950s and was largely driven by Indian conditions. Over time, it eventually assumed a very different character from U.S. aid. During the visit of Soviet leader Nikolai Khrushchev to India, the U.S.S.R. pulled off something of a coup with an agreement to support a steel plant in Bhilai in Madhya Pradesh. This was the first plan of Soviet assistance outside the Communist Bloc, and represented a move away from the relative economic isolationism of the Stalin years. Ironically, India had sought Japanese and West German assistance before turning to the Soviets, and even the Soviet project at Bhilai benefited from components and services provided by Western companies. The shock of the Bhilai announcement forced the United States to increase its support for India, but the Soviet Union soon ran into problems as its own economic growth began to slow. Gradually, Moscow discovered that it had an advantage over the United States in being more open to industrial licensing, which meant that military assistance to India came to predominate. This was accelerated by the U.S. cut-off of military support during the 1965 India-Pakistan War. Yet, over time, as the technological gap between the United States and Soviet Union widened, India found that the over-dependence on Soviet military assistance put it at a disadvantage.

Social Prosperity
India has become globally infamous for social problems such as poverty, the caste system, and gendered violence. Combatting these issues will be an important part of India’s development and may define its reputation as it rises on the international stage. There have been gains in some areas, with India boasting “one of the fastest rates of poverty reduction in the world,” and recently losing the title of home to the largest number of people in extreme poverty (Times of India, 2018). Some problems have recently gotten worse, including a sharp rise in crime against lower caste individuals (Saldanha and Mallapur, 2018). Are there ways for the US to support solutions? What might the US be able to learn about addressing its social issues through such interaction? Would it be better for the US to refrain from interfering in these affairs?

Democracy
The US and India represent the world’s two largest democracies, giving them important responsibilities in promoting democracy globally. Both also currently have leaders who engage in forms of nationalism which may endanger democratic norms (Rahn, 2017). What influence
might increased ties between these two governments have on domestic governing practices or those of other countries?
Bilateral Investment Treaty:
Negotiating a bilateral investment treaty with India would increase trade in general, increase trade over particularly significant resources, and strengthen the relationship.

Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum:
APEC is a regional organization which could offset the influence of China over the Asian economy. The US could take a major step by supporting India’s effort to join APEC.

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Closer economic ties. Trade has transformed U.S.–India relations. “Bilateral trade has more than doubled in the last decade from $45 billion in 2006 to more than $114 billion in 2016,” as the State Department’s Alice Wells recently told Congress. In 2014, President Obama and Prime Minister Narendra Modi pledged to increase U.S.–India trade fivefold, and in the past two years, U.S. foreign direct investment in India has grown 500 percent. However, U.S.–India trade remains far short of its full potential. The president promised in his State of the Union address Tuesday that “we will work to fix bad trade deals and negotiate new ones.” If he is serious, the president should negotiate a bilateral investment treaty to further promote U.S.–India trade. For comparison: Joshua Meltzer and Harsha Singh of the Brookings Institution note that trade between America and South Korea is twice as large as that between America and India, even though South Korea’s economy is 40 percent smaller than India’s. Another vital step for the administration is to support India’s effort to join the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC). India has sought to join APEC for more than 20 years, and in 2010 the organization lifted a moratorium on new members. Despite this, Washington has not seized the opportunity to support New Delhi. “India in APEC would help offset the now overwhelming influence of the Chinese economy,” writes Alyssa Ayres of the Council on Foreign Relations, “while also embedding India in a forum that would nudge it toward further economic reform.” For his part, Prime Minister Modi took office in 2014 promising ambitious economic reforms. He quickly unveiled his “Make in India” initiative to boost the country’s manufacturing sector from 17 percent of the country’s GDP to 25 percent over the next decade. Recently, India introduced a goods and services tax to replacing existing state and local levies in favor of a common national tax. Overall, however, Modi’s policies have fallen short of his promises. As the 2019 Indian election approaches, he should not shy away from pursuing dramatic structural reforms. Derek Scissors of the American Enterprise Institute recommends allowing Indian manufacturers to
hire more people, privatizing banks, improving market access, and permitting full private
ownership of land. Indeed, while India is expected to become the world’s fifth-largest economy
this year, there is still much New Delhi can do to promote economic growth. As Wells noted,
India still has “significant tariff and non-tariff barriers, subsidies, localization policies,
restrictions on investment, and intellectual property concerns that limit market access and
impede U.S. exporters and businesses from entering the Indian market.” The Commerce
Department reports that India has levied an array of tariffs on U.S. goods such as medical
equipment, automobiles and motorcycles, rubber, alcoholic beverages, and textiles. What
makes this particularly frustrating is that “India has considerable flexibility to change tariff rates
at any time,” leaving U.S. exporters with tremendous uncertainty. If U.S.–India trade is to meet
its full potential, then the relationship needs to be rooted in policies that are free and fair.

Alternative Energy:
Increasing development assistance for alternative energy sectors in India, possibly including
solar energy, nuclear energy, or liquified natural gas, would reduce global emissions to prevent
catastrophic warming and provide India with energy security.

Raksha Kumar 10/3/17, a multimedia journalist, reported for the New York Times, BBC,
Guardian, TIME, Foreign Affairs, The Hindu, Caravan and Scroll, "Even as Trump and Modi clash

India and the United States have traditionally not seen eye-to-eye on climate change and
energy policies. Since the Kyoto Protocol negotiations of the 1990s, diplomats of the two
nations have fought many a fierce battle in air-conditioned rooms during international summits
arguing over emission cuts and their cost to both economies. And they haven’t come away with
much to show for their work. Recent political events have done little to reveal any new
common ground between two of the world’s largest democracies, and carbon polluters. Two
days before President Donald Trump announced that the U.S. would pull out of the Paris
agreement, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi warned him that “playing with the wellbeing
of future generations would be an immoral and criminal act,” emphasizing the need for the
world’s nations — including the U.S. — to strive towards protecting the planetary environment.
On the 1st of June, President Trump showed that, to his mind, calls to morality and shared
responsibility, did not hold water: “The bottom line is that the Paris Accord is very unfair at the
highest level to the United States,” said Trump in his White House Rose Garden speech. “India
will be allowed to double its coal production by 2020. Think of it. India can double their coal
production. We’re supposed to get rid of ours!” In essence, not a lot has changed diplomatically
between India and the U.S. since the years leading up to Kyoto: India believes the U.S. should
shoulder more responsibility, as it is the highest historic contributor to carbon emissions, and
the second highest emitter now, after China. But the U.S. holds that developing countries,
especially those with large populations, like India and China are shirking their obligation to cut emissions while gaining huge economic advantage. Smog near Delhi. India suffers from severe air pollution due to its past commitment to coal burning power plants. Public outrage over severe urban smog has helped push India’s leaders toward clean energy solutions. Photo by Saurabh Kumar licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International license Regardless of the high level rift, observers have long hoped that bipartisan solutions to climate change would eventually emerge from market forces and greater awareness of global warming risk. The sharply falling price of renewables, for example, coupled with an understanding by businesses and the public in both nations could eventually bring cooperation to reduce emissions. “Renewable energy becoming affordable is the game changer,” said Chandra Bhushan, Deputy Director General of the Centre for Science and Environment, a New Delhi based research and advocacy organization. “The market is doing what endless discussions of world leaders cannot easily achieve.” In reality — even though the rhetoric of Trump and Modi seems worlds apart — the international energy trade is bringing the two countries together. Put simply, India possesses a huge potential market and need for clean energy technologies, an that’s a need which U.S. tech companies would love to fill. India’s Carbon Reduction Challenge Of India’s more than 1.2 billion citizens, more than 360 million live in poverty. That population is projected to grow to 1.45 billion by 2028, surpassing China’s, with India becoming the world’s most populous country. As that population grows, and also hopefully prospers, energy demands will soar. India’s challenge: maintain high levels of economic growth despite the burgeoning population by increasingly reducing its carbon footprint. Keeping that goal in mind, the country unveiled its long-range climate change plan in October 2015, pledging to source 40 percent of its electricity from renewable and other low-carbon sources by 2030 — a tall order for a nation in the developing world. The Kudankulam nuclear power plant, currently India’s largest was built with Russian cooperation, and became operational in 2013. Even as U.S. nuclear plant construction stalled this year, India sanctioned ten new nuclear plants, with an estimated generating capacity of 7000 megawatts (MW). U.S. companies hope to profit from some of this new construction. Photo courtesy of indiawaterportal.org licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 2.0 Generic license. One way to achieve those ambitious targets is by relying on cleaner energy sources like natural gas and nuclear energy. But that means tapping into the international community’s clean energy entrepreneurs and their first world technologies. And that means global partnerships that include the United States. One example: Gas Authority India Limited (GAIL), the largest state-owned natural gas processing and distribution company in India, is currently contracted to purchase 5.8 million metric tons per year (MMTPA) of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from a US terminal. However, the approved price of the gas could be higher than what India could get from West Asia or Africa. However, analysts say U.S. gas suppliers are very likely to renegotiate price because India is a very important potential LNG market. As a result, President Trump, even as he loudly proclaims a rebirth of U.S. coal, has also pushed for long-term
contracts with India to purchase American natural gas. By 2020, India will potentially be importing 50 MMTPA of natural gas. “If the price were right, in principle there would be a lot of scope for additional gas imports [to India]. Almost up to 88 percent of projected net natural gas exports from the United States,” revealed Arunabha Ghosh, CEO for the Council on Energy, Environment and Water. “There is [potential for] a broader scope in bilateral energy partnership [between India and the U.S.], especially when we count in nuclear technologies.” In 2008, during the Bush administration, the two countries signed a civil nuclear agreement, ending India’s nuclear isolation, and allowing civil nuclear trade with New Delhi. This is seen as a huge market opportunity for the U.S. nuclear energy industry, and just in time. Even as U.S. nuclear plant construction stalled this year, India sanctioned ten new nuclear plants, with an estimated generating capacity of 7000 megawatts (MW). While many environmentalists will argue that neither nuclear or natural gas represent the best alternative energy way forward for India, such cooperative international agreements certainly represent a definite move away from both coal and oil.

Clean technology partnership:
A partnership would spur the clean tech sector in the US and provide global leadership through international collaboration on warming.


Rahul Tongia, with a view from India: India’s current views on climate change have little to do with the United States, or any other country. In the past, issues of “who’s to blame” underpinned all negotiations. The current leadership is focused on growth and action, and, in fact, treats sustainability (especially growing renewable energy, or RE) as “an article of faith.” Whatever calculations India has on its NDCs remain independent of U.S. actions, and there are virtually no immediate or direct negative implications for India, and there are no global carbon prices to jump or fall. Some may argue that India is no longer bound to undertake undue or heroic efforts, but with falling prices for clean tech, it’s possible that much of India’s actions are more market driven than a costly choice just to “do the right thing.” In fact, it’s possible that any reduction in U.S. clean tech deployment may make more technology and funding available for India. Global funding remains attractive for India, and almost all the RE India is deploying is by the private sector. India welcomes global capital for its scale and low interest rates. India and the United States collaborate extensively on energy and clean energy, including through the U.S.-India Clean Energy Finance Task Force, which also draws in the private sector through complementary mechanisms. These efforts will likely continue as India represents an enormous (and now even more important) market for U.S. suppliers. The energy market is far more vibrant in India as overall demand is still growing by some 6-7 percent annually, and RE is
targeted to grow by 25 percent annually, based on Indian plans announced even before the Paris Accord. Is the United States leaving a vacuum? Numerous analysts talk of Chinese leadership, in which case India may not publicly embrace them, despite the fact that Chinese manufacturing fuels much of Indian solar panels (no solar cells are made in India, just assembled into panels in India). India is also positioning itself as a sustainability leader, with Prime Minister Modi spearheading the International Solar Alliance (ISA) at Paris. Again, this effort benefits from U.S. support, but isn’t dependent on it. Before we examine how India could react, we’d first need to ask why it would react. Given its actions and plans are domestically driven, it’s hard to make a case for “retaliation.” Leaving aside any theoretical but unlikely formal measures, it’s even unlikely India would join any global bottom-up efforts to counter “Make in America” with “Don’t Buy American.” Indian consumers don’t directly buy so many “Made in USA” products. What they do buy often no immediate alternative, especially in the IT world, with the “big five” of consumer tech—Google, Apple, Microsoft, Amazon, and Facebook—all being American. Notably, these companies are quite “green” in their energy purchases. Perhaps the world may evolve towards corporate differentiation on carbon, instead of national frameworks, which, like city and state efforts in the United States, might be a way forward to reducing global carbon emissions. Any consumer backlash would likely be more symbolic than impacting the bottom line, though it might hurt selected American companies more than others, especially where alternatives exist. So does the U.S. withdrawal mean nothing for India? It may impact posturing, and even some amount of mindset, especially below the national leadership, but it will likely have less impact on on-ground activities. India may even double down on its efforts.

Promoting Economic Opportunity for All:
Both countries have various opportunities to cooperate on common problems.


Create jobs and economic opportunity for all The United States and India, while at vastly different levels of development, face similar challenges. Both countries need to create new jobs; move people into the middle class and keep them there; provide better educational and health care opportunities; address infrastructure issues; and contend with the forces of globalization that pose challenges to sustainable domestic growth while also providing
opportunities. The economic relationship between the United States and India is rapidly growing in importance to both countries. Bilateral trade grew from $45.1 billion in 2006 to $114.8 billion in 2016. As of 2015, according to the U.S. government, Indian companies had invested more than $12.1 billion in the United States, and those companies employed more than 56,500 Americans. In 2016, the United States imported $46 billion in goods (up 110.7 percent from 2006) and $26.8 billion in services (280 percent greater than 2006 levels). As of 2016 there was $32.9 billion in overseas direct investment in India from the United States. But both countries have significant work to do, at home and between them to accelerate the bilateral economic partnership. In the United States, the middle class is being squeezed, and opportunities for working families and the poor to ascend to the middle class are narrower than ever. Meanwhile, India faces some different challenges, the magnitude of which are staggering. For example, according to the Asian Development Bank, as of 2011, 21.9 percent of India’s population lived below the national poverty level; a 2015 International Energy Agency report notes that 240 million people in India were still without access to electricity. The types of jobs India needs to create are often different, and the investments in growth and social safety nets it needs are also different from the United States. As rapidly as India is changing, the sheer size of the obstacles will mean that progress in addressing certain trade, economic, and regulatory issues will be slow. Building a smart U.S.-India economic partnership can help each country improve the condition of ordinary working families. While the private sectors will drive the economic relationship, governments can put in place policies and tools that support the ability of their middle and working classes to succeed. Under the right circumstances, expanding trade can be a powerful engine of economic growth, job creation, and poverty reduction. Yet without sufficient attention to the fate of ordinary workers and the poor, powerful market forces can leave vulnerable people grappling with sometimes devastating economic change. The United States and India must also ensure that all of their citizens can fully participate in society and the economy. In both countries, barriers exist that prevent women from fulfilling their potential. For example, in the United States, women’s median wages were 80.5 percent those of men in 2016, while in India, as of 2012, rural women have an average daily wage 62.5 percent that of rural men and urban women’s is 77.9 percent that of urban men. Women make up only 20.6 percent of the U.S. Congress and in 2016, they comprised only 12.0 percent of India’s national parliament. The U.S. maternal mortality ratio has been on an upward trend since the mid-1990s. In India, the adult female literacy rate is 59.3 percent, while the male rate is 78.8 percent. India and the United States must continue to do the hard work that needs to be done so that men and women have equitable economic, civic, health, and educational opportunities and outcomes. While empowering women is critical for human rights reasons, it also can have incredible economic benefits; McKinsey estimates that if women’s labor-force participation rates in India increased by 10 percentage points (bringing 68 million more women into the labor force) combined with reforms related to working hours and productivity, the Indian gross domestic product (GDP) would increase by an
additional $700 billion in 2025. As democracies, the United States and India share common
interests in ensuring that families enjoy the benefits of higher wages, better working
conditions, and a healthier environment, and both should stand together as standard bearers of
progressive action in these areas. We recommend that the governments and private sector
keep in mind the following principles to help foster an economic relationship that maximizes
benefits for both countries over the long-term, and pursue them in the concrete ways outlined
below. Enable economic deals to create jobs Without jobs that benefit all segments of society,
norther country will be able to support sustainable growth, and the backlash against trade will
grow, harming economic opportunities and the openness of our two societies. Finding ways to
facilitate two-way, socially responsible business investment can help both economies grow and
create jobs. Recommendation: Make infrastructure a key area of focus While there are many
possibilities to bolster job prospects in both countries, one area that should receive top priority
is infrastructure. India and the United States are facing massive infrastructure gaps: India needs
to invest $1.5 trillion over the next 10 years to meet its infrastructure needs, while the U.S.
Department of Transportation estimates an additional $800 billion of investment needs just for
bridges and roads in the United States. Functioning infrastructure is mission critical for an
economy to run smoothly. Infrastructure development, maintenance, and operation are also
opportunities to stimulate economic growth and create jobs. Municipal bonds In the United
States, municipal bonds traditionally finance much infrastructure investment, but the municipal
bond market is not well established in India. Through the U.S.-India Economic and Financial
Partnership, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Technical Assistance has been
assisting the Pune Municipal Corporation to prepare for the issuance of its own pilot municipal
bond. The U.S. Department of the Treasury should use this program as a model and expand it
to advise other cities that India has designated as Smart Cities with capacity-building technical
assistance so that they can issue municipal bonds to finance their own infrastructure projects.
Investment Large institutional investors, such as U.S. public pension funds, have been
increasingly focused on investing in global infrastructure since they need a diversity of quality
investment options to help them meet the retirement security needs of their beneficiaries, who
include public school teachers, firefighters, and police officers. Some of the largest investment
managers in the world have been actively raising infrastructure funds to meet investor
needs. Yet many of them, as well as smaller investment managers, face significant
informational and other gaps in their ability to effectively deploy those investments in India. An
institutional investor summit focused on opportunities in the United States and India that could
help enable private sector actors in both countries to better identify quality investment
opportunities. Digital infrastructure The two countries must also focus on building digital
infrastructure. Increasing access to the right kinds of digital technologies can help boost
economic growth by helping people find jobs, increasing education, and gaining access as
consumers. Working together through conferences and exchanges, bringing together the
expertise and experience available in the private sectors in both countries to share lessons
learned can help advance these efforts in both countries. Improvements in education, health, agriculture, and other sectors. Improvements in these domestic sectors are vital to growth and will be just as important as the number of dollars invested. It is crucial to note that the prospects for job creation and economic opportunities for people of both countries will hinge overwhelmingly on the policies that each country pursues on its own in areas like education and health care. While each country has much work to do to improve its domestic policies on these fronts, cooperation between the United States and India can yield real benefits for both sides. Collaboration between businesses and researchers—such as that which helped produce the Green Revolution—and lessons learned from one another can play a key role in improving domestic efforts. Elsewhere in this report we identify certain areas—such as clean energy and education—on which the two countries can work together. Be force multipliers of innovation by working together India and the United States have some of the most talented and innovative companies and research capabilities in the world, and need to work together to direct those resources at tackling shared challenges, such as the growing role of automation and its impact on the future of work. Recommendation: Expand the United States-India Science and Technology Endowment Fund (USISTEF) The United States and India both have tremendous human capital and research and development (R&D) capabilities. In the United States, more than 3 million people are employed in engineering, architectural, and science (including social science) professions. In India, 2.6 million people graduated in 2016 with a science, technology, engineering, or math (STEM) degree. In 2014, the United States spent the most money in the world on R&D, and India spent the sixth-most. Harnessing this work, the U.S. Department of State and the Indian Department of Science and Technology created USISTEF to fund research conducted by U.S.-Indian teams focused on supporting healthy individuals or empowering citizens through technology, with an emphasis on the marketability of the research outcomes. Both governments should continue to support this program, retain its commitment to public-interest oriented challenges, and consider expanding its funding by building private sector partnerships. In this regard the longstanding scientific partnership between the U.S. National Academies of Science and India’s National Institute of Advanced Studies offers a model of cooperation and could be expanded. Recommendation: Start a Future of Work dialogue Technology is evolving more rapidly than ever, and the nature of work is in the crosshairs; many jobs, not only those that are low-skill, are at risk of being replaced by automation and artificial intelligence. The World Bank believes that 69 percent of jobs in India are threatened by automation, and PricewaterhouseCoopers estimates that 38 percent of jobs in the United States are at high risk of automation by the early 2030s. Should automation arrive at the scale at which experts predict, this will be challenging for both countries, and will have effects on job creation, economic growth, education, and more. In both the United States and India, traditional forms of employment are also being disrupted by the arrival of technology-enhanced freelance and so-called gig economy work structures. To address these issues, the two countries should begin a track 2 dialogue with policymakers,
entrepreneurs, technology experts, and community leaders. Drawing on the tremendous talent in the private sector in both countries, this dialogue should address employment trends and community needs in order to refine policy solutions that leverage the changing nature of work to create stable, well-paying jobs and empower citizens. This dialogue could have cross-cutting applications to issues covered elsewhere in this report, from job creation to education to energy and beyond. Build Blue Economy capacity The United States and India both have extensive, economically robust coastlines: 42.1 percent of the U.S. population lives in a coastal county, and 44 percent of the Indian population lives in a coastal state, island, or union territory. U.S. coastal counties generate 48 percent of the country’s GDP. India, for its part, is encouraging investment in its maritime sector through its India Maritime Plus initiative. Sharing lessons learned can contribute to environmentally friendly ideas for economic growth spurred by coastal communities. Recommendation: Develop Blue Economy web portals The U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Indian National Centre for Ocean Information Services, and the Indian Ministry of Commerce and Industry should collaborate to develop Blue Economy web portals to systematically capture and publicize demographic and economic data on the coastal and ocean-driven industries in each country. Economists, oceanographers, and data scientists from each country could collaborate to share best practices in economic monitoring and data science, and consult with India’s extensive data management industry to serve as a resource for capacity-building in both countries. These Blue Economy data portals would benefit U.S. and Indian coastal communities by disseminating information and case studies related to sustainable economic development ideas. They could also elevate the voices in marine resource management policy of key coastal and ocean stakeholder groups such as those in fishing, shipping, recreation and tourism, offshore renewable energy, and ecosystem conservation. Recommendation: Co-host the Our Ocean conference The United States and India should consider co-hosting an upcoming round of the annual Our Ocean global conference of foreign ministers and heads of state, emphasizing innovations in the Sustainable Blue Economy as the overarching theme. This convening, which is part of an ongoing series, could help maximize the exchange of new policy ideas, technological advancements, and lessons learned from coastal countries around the world. Recommendation: India should sign and ratify the Port State Measures Agreement and the U.S. should support India’s implementation of it. The United States and India could deepen collaboration to ensure global marine fish stocks and other living marine resources—pillars of a Blue Economy—are sustained for generations to come. India should sign and ratify the Port State Measures Agreement as part of a commitment to cracking down on illegal, unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fishing in its waters or in the supply chain of its seafood imports, thereby enhancing ocean health and the plentitude of fish available for honest, legal seafood producers. To support India’s accession to the treaty, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and NOAA should provide monetary aid and technical support to help India’s relevant fisheries and law enforcement agencies implement and enforce the Port State Measures
Agreement. Focus on subnational cooperation The future of many of these issues—including economic growth, job creation, and education—will depend on how effectively cities in both countries can adapt to the needs of rapidly growing populations. Individual states in both nations have GDPS greater than those of some countries; California alone has a higher GDP than India, and roughly 11 Indian states have GDPS greater than $100 billion. Other states in both countries have dramatically fewer resources. Initiatives that empower citizens and create jobs cannot come solely from the federal level; in these geographically vast and economically diverse countries, states and cities will be key actors as they craft solutions that meet their regions’ unique needs.
Military technology Sales:
This could include drones, fighter aircraft, and aircraft-carrier technology.

Joint defense operations:
This could include increasing consultations, exercises, and defense procurement.

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Increasing military cooperation. Just as trade is bringing the United States and India together economically, China’s military actions are bringing them together strategically. Sales of U.S. military equipment to India have gone from zero to $15 billion in ten years. Already, the United States sells India transport and maritime patrol aircraft, anti-ship missiles, and helicopters. But, with the declaration of India as a “major defense partner” in 2016, the administration can offer even more systems for sale, such as drone and fighter aircraft and aircraft-carrier technologies. Last fall, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson detailed the administration’s “vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific, supported and protected by two strong pillars of democracy — the United States and India.” But to achieve that aim, Washington and New Delhi must further enhance their defense cooperation. The end goal of this cooperation, says James Carafano of the Heritage Foundation, is to craft a unique strategic relationship, “one that delivers the benefits of allied status without the formal architecture that goes with it.” Finally, as China’s military power grows, U.S. allies in the Pacific are increasing their security cooperation with the United States and each other. The Trump administration should help further incorporate India into this emerging quadrilateral relationship between themselves, Japan, and Australia. Washington, Ashley Tellis of the Carnegie Endowment says, should “actively encourage consultations, exercises, liaison relationships, and even defense procurement among any combination of partners within this ‘Quad.’” By working together to defend their common interests, the Quad can advance a shared vision of an Indo-Pacific that is free from coercion and intimidation.

Cooperate over anti-terrorism efforts:
Terrorism and Pakistan are other security issues that both countries are concerned about. They have discussed increasing intelligence sharing and counter-terror cooperation.

Ashok Sajjanhar 6/20/17, President, Institute of Global Studies, and a former Ambassador of India to Kazakhstan, Sweden and Latvia, "India-US Relations: On the Upward Trajectory", 
The biggest takeaway in substantive terms was the stern language against Pakistan and the designation of Syed Salahuddin, the ‘supreme commander’ of the Kashmiri militant outfit Hizbul-Mujahideen, as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist because of his pronouncements about wreaking havoc in Kashmir and making it a graveyard for Indian forces. This is a huge slap on Pakistan’s face. To compound the ignominy heaped on it, Pakistan has been mentioned twice by name in the Joint Statement issued at the end of the visit, once to ensure that its territory is not used to launch terror strikes against other countries, and the second to expeditiously bring to justice the perpetrators of the 26/11 Mumbai, Pathankot, and other cross-border terrorist attacks perpetrated by Pakistan-based groups. The Joint Statement also names terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed and others, and exhorts the international community to take united, stringent action against them. Other actions identified by the Joint Statement include increased intelligence sharing, operational-level counterterrorism cooperation, exchange of information on known and suspected terrorists for travel screening, strengthening information exchange on plans, movements and linkages of terrorist groups and their leaders, terror financing, etc.

Cybersecurity cooperation:
Cybersecurity is a growing threat to international democracies, and could play a role during military conflicts.

And yet Modi’s visit was as much about policy continuity as it was about the enduring appeal of personal relationships. The joint statement released after the Trump-Modi meeting reiterated the same themes that have animated U.S.-India relations for a number of years—shared values (such as democracy), shared interests (such as combating terrorism and promoting stability in the Indo-Pacific region) and, most strikingly, opportunities for economic cooperation. Even clean energy received a (brief) mention. An implicit implication from the joint statement is that U.S.-India ties are invested with enough goodwill to overcome any new irritants that may have crept into the relationship in recent months. Indeed, opportunities abound for the United States and India to keep working together, including in ways that uphold the “America First” principle and reflect Trump’s transactional approach to foreign relationships. These include counterterrorism, to help preempt threats to the U.S. homeland and to U.S. interests abroad, as well as arms deals, which are bound to intensify given Washington’s decision, in the waning days of the Obama administration, to grant India the status of major defense partner. For a
security-focused, deal-oriented leader like Trump, arms sales should be a very easy sell. Cybersecurity—which both Trump and Modi have highlighted as domestic priorities—is another promising space for greater collaboration. Modi’s visits to the United States are typically well-received affairs, and this one was no exception, with the premier wow ing U.S. business leaders and Trump, who praised Modi for his country’s economic performance. In that regard, this trip—like those before it—highlighted how far Modi has come from his days as a pariah. Until 2014, when Modi became prime minister, the United States effectively banned him from visiting the country because of allegations that he failed to prevent deadly anti-Muslim riots in Gujarat, the state where he was chief minister, in 2002. There were, as always, a smattering of anti-Modi protests around Washington, with their causes ranging from Kashmir to independence for Indian Sikhs. But these were quite limited in number and scope. So, as always, Modi came, saw and conquered. But what was different this time around was that he also reassured. In an era of tumult and unpredictability, Modi’s visit served as a reminder that the U.S.-India relationship—warts and all—still remains on relatively solid ground.
As India continues its rise as a global power, debates about the US-India relationship will only become more important. Our survey of potential India topics led us to two directions which provide especially rich ground for discussion: economic/development assistance and military cooperation. Together, they open paths for all debaters to dive into issues they are interested in or discover a passion for something new, whether it be geopolitics, economics, terrorism, technology, social justice, or the environment. A resolution solely focused on India offers a unique way to explore these issues which has never been attempted in policy debate. The world has changed significantly in the 25 years since the last topic which included India. New questions have emerged regarding how the US should and should not work with India, and clear answers are rare. Now is a perfect opportunity to give debaters a chance to engage a literature base they may not encounter otherwise, and shed light on some of the issues that may shape international communities for generations to come.

We sincerely appreciate your interest in the India topic and hope that it will be represented in the next resolution. Thank you.
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